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ABSTRACT 
 
Nestled within the Constitution lies a guarantee for the sanctity and enforcement of sections 
10, being the right to human dignity, 11, promising the right to life and 12, protecting the 
freedom and security of the person.1 On the converse, the acts of consensual sexual violence 
between adult partners, from the practices of sadomasochism and BDSM, question the very 
essence of these protected Constitutional rights. 
South African criminal courts have not yet heard a matter concerning a dispute arising from 
consensual sexual violence. However, such may not be completely obscured within the vast 
discord of legality. The complexity and lingering shroud of legal ambivalence over this practice 
raises the question of whether South African courts will deem such activity as inherently 
criminal, based on existing legislation; along with the similarities in both national and 
international case law. Will a court find its definition within the common law crime of assault, 
or pay homage to the aforementioned Constitutional rights and rule in favour of the rights to 
privacy, dignity and freedom of expression? A court may also draw inspiration from the 
assessment of public policy, public interest and the often-illusive judicial perspective of 
victimless crimes.  
This dissertation analyses the development of relevant criminal cases within the jurisdictions 
of England and Canada involving consensual sexual violence, bringing varying degrees of 
bodily harm, and its displacement within those legal systems. The dissertation interprets and 
compares such developments by the implementation of a cross-jurisdictional timeline 
regarding cases of consensual sexual violence and similar acts. Such leads to the juxtaposition 
within South African criminal jurisprudence, paying homage to the relevant Constitutional 
rights guaranteed to every citizen within South Africa.  
The dissertation delves into the assessment and interpretation of relevant South African 
viewpoints regarding legal aspects such as consent, public policy, autonomy, dignity, sexuality, 
and elements of assault. This inquiry determines whether there is a duty upon the State to 
intervene and control such practices of consensual sexual violence in the democratic society, 
                                                          
1 Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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or whether there is any respite for the State within the private confines of consensual adult 
interactions.  
Ultimately, this dissertation analyses the possible legality of consensual sexual violence arising 
in varying degrees of bodily harm between consenting adult partners within South Africa. This 
is explored through perspectives of English and Canadian law by implementing a cross-
jurisdictional timeline, in juxtaposition to the South African Constitutional prerogatives. Such 
a comparative inquiry leads to the possible position of the South African law in dealing with 
acts of consensual sexual violence and the interpretation of harm that emanates from these 
practices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
 
As unexplored as is the legality of consensual sexual violence within the legal system of South 
Africa, a prelude regarding the element of consent is essential. Consent in this setting stretches 
beyond the mere peripheral definition, and into the realm of informed consent between 
consenting adults. 
South African criminal law jurisprudence has faced instances where consensual bodily harm 
has manifested itself within various sectors of our society. This is prevalent in sports such as 
rugby and boxing where the consent to the infliction of bodily harm is acquired through the 
mutual consent of the participants.2 Furthermore, the relevant sporting authority, and the State 
itself, sanction these particular activities as lawful practices. The recipient to such harm accepts 
the reasonable apprehension of the nature and risk of such a sport, bolstered by the common 
law volenti non fit iniuria  principle.3 Even though prevalent in the law of delict, the volenti 
non fit iniuria principle dictates that willing consent to bodily harm; and its possible 
materialisation, is insufficient for a successful claim, or measure of prosecution, against an 
alleged wrongdoer. 
 Even though the volenti principle is far more prevalent in the law of delict than it is in criminal 
law, its extension in the criminal law’s inquiry is prevalent to the element of consent. The focus 
of the volenti principle is the appreciation of the risk of the practice and the willingness to 
receiving such bodily harm by the ‘victim’. This principle serves as a candid entry point for 
the criminal law where possible consensual sexual violence bringing bodily harm arises in 
South Africa. As was noted in the case of Coetzee v Steenkamp: 
“Volenti non fit iniuria or voluntary assumption of risk or that which is done with consent, within legal limits, is 
not wrongful or injurious.4” 
                                                          
2 R. Ahmed “Contributory Intent as a Defence Limiting or Excluding Delictual Liability" (Masters Thesis, University 
of South Africa, 2011), 23. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Coetzee v Steenkamp (579/2009) [2010] ZANCHC 25. 
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Consent to bodily harm proves to be pivotal in the inquiry within this dissertation. It should be 
noted that an individual is free to consent to bodily injury within South African law, as long as 
such an injury is not of a serious nature, resulting in actual, or grievous, bodily harm. In 
inspiration of the findings from the English case of R v Donovan,5 it was held that the nature 
of actual bodily harm is not transient or trifling, for such is any hurt or injury inherently 
calculated to interfere with the wellbeing of the consenting party.  
Consent to varying degrees of bodily harm by autonomous, adult individuals encompasses 
multiple considerations of freedom and dignity, along with the looming allure of public policy, 
in guiding the broad societal acceptance of the harm caused. This dissertation’s discourse into 
the criminal law’s assessment of consent to bodily harm will follow the principles of valid 
consent and the accepted ambit of this defence to the practised harm. The element of intention 
within the specific crime of assault is also noteworthy if the State would seek to prosecute the 
specific harm emanating from consensual sexual violence.6  
The right to freedom and security of the person is guaranteed within section 12 of the 
Constitution.7 The importance of the Constitutional right to bodily safety, security, and 
integrity assumes a paramount consideration within the background of this dissertation. This is 
attributed to the potential outlining of constitutional rights which consensual sexual violence 
may infringe. As it would appear, the Constitutional viewpoint serves as the forerunner in the 
necessity for the State to protect this fundamental right from being infringed by consensual 
activities that bring violence and bodily harm.8  
The State is tasked with a two-fold inquiry in controlling the potential harm emanating from 
consensual sexual violence. Firstly, the State must determine whether it is necessary to effect 
a criminal prosecution over the practice, based on the intensity of the harm and its potential 
risk to others. Secondly, the State may seek to control the extent of the harm from the practice 
by implementing section 36 of the Constitution (‘The Limitations Clause’) to limit the various 
autonomy rights of the participants.9 If the State chooses the latter, the justification of the 
limitation of the specific rights must be substantiated by a broad legal inquiry.  
                                                          
5 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
6 J.M. Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed. (2013) 577. 
7 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
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The aspect of consent to bodily harm delves into vast networks of correlating viewpoints from 
different jurisdictions. This dissertation shall draw primarily from the views of the relevant 
English and Canadian law principles regarding this consideration. It must be noted that a 
consensual, transient injury is of no concern to the law, for the harm caused is not of a severe 
magnitude to warrant a prosecution.10 However, consent to actual, or serious bodily harm may 
transcend societal interests and morals and may compel the State to act in protecting the rights 
of, inter alia, bodily safety, security, and dignity. The immensity of the harm emanating from 
the consensual act may be sufficient for the State to prosecute an individual whose actions have 
fallen within the definition of a crime. However, whether this stance will correlate to the 
reasonable limitation of personality rights treads upon a tightrope of uncertainty as consensual 
sadomasochism is unexplored in terms of South African law. 
Marcus Tullius Cicero stated that ‘We are in bondage to the law [in order] that we may be 
free.11’ This remains a relevant social and legal viewpoint, for as citizens of the State, we are 
bound by the regulations of imposed law, and in turn, emancipated in the face of any injustice 
regarding our protected rights. In light of contemporary experimentation within our society, 
the nascence of consensual sexual violence should also be highlighted as a potential legal 
inquest within South Africa. Entwined within this viewpoint is the obligation of the State to 
prosecute an individual whose actions fall within the definition of a crime. In the absence of a 
specific statutory definition of an offence that brings a certain degree of harm upon the interests 
of the State or the rights of the people, a definitive application of the existing law should be 
conducted. The allotment of consensual sexual violence with the aforementioned perspective 
appears to push these legal boundaries within South African law and the potential approach of 
a court when interpreting such activities. 
The legality of consensual sexual violence remains unexplored in the South African legal 
sphere and unidentified by any statutory aid or mechanism. The acts of sadomasochism and 
BDSM (Bondage, Discipline/Domination, Sadism, and Masochism) delve into the vast 
network of consensual sexual violence, coupled with a multitude of other legal avenues, such 
as autonomy and human rights. The act of sadomasochism involves two or more consenting 
adults; aware of, and accepting, the reasonable apprehension of receiving and/or delivering 
                                                          
10 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
11 C. Hanna ‘Sex Is not a sport: Consent and violence in criminal law’ (2011) 42 Boston College Law Review 239. 
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physical harm unto each other12 in order to achieve sexual gratification. The practice is not 
limited to the aforementioned submission and the extent of sadomasochism varies considerably 
between partners. 
This ‘grey area’ in the current South African law paves the way for the possible reasons as to 
why the State would seek to prosecute acts of consensual sexual violence, inspired by the views 
of the public interest and the desire to keep the public safe from risky and dangerous practices. 
A highly dangerous physical practice shall never sustain consent to serious bodily harm, as 
expressed in the precursor case of S v Sikunyana.13 However, much has changed in South Africa 
since the aforementioned case was heard and the development of public policy shines on in a 
flowering progression within the legal system. The advent of the Constitution and the 
entrenchment of democracy, along with ever-evolving public policy considerations, prove that 
stagnancy of an initial ideal in the South African legal system is highly unlikely.   
Adhering to the concept of safeguarding the public health and well-being of the people, the 
concept of human dignity is cast into light regarding the practices of consensual 
sadomasochism and BDSM. Section 10 of the Constitution dictates,14  
‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’ 
The promise of human dignity must be explored in juxtaposition to the practices of consensual 
sexual violence. Both the general idea of human dignity, which is applied unanimously to the 
public; and the subjective ideal of dignity regarding the participants to the sexual practice must 
be established. Within the concept of human dignity, it should be mentioned that individuals 
are capable of self-determination, along with the intrinsic manifestation of personal autonomy. 
Section 11 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the absolute right to life of an individual is 
relevant, for the extent and intensity of the sexual violence may very well infringe this right, 
based on the degree of the consensual harm.15 Furthermore, section 12 of the Constitution is 
instrumental in assessing the freedoms and security of every individual within South Africa.16 
This section appears to stand at loggerhead with acts of consensual sexual violence, for the 
practice outlines potential violence and degrees of torture, emanating in varied forms of assault. 
                                                          
12 J.T. Harviainen ‘Sadomasochist role-playing as liveaction role-playing: A trait-descriptive analysis’ (2011) 2 
International Journal of Role-Playing 60. 
13 S v Sikunyana 1961 (3) SA 549 (E). 
14 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
15 Section 11 of the Constitution. 
16 Section 12 of the Constitution. 
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Furthermore, these practices of bodily harm appear to contradict section 12, as there is a 
physical threat to one’s body, and a psychological desire to inflict such a harm.17  
Without being benighted by the viewpoint of what the public interest views as safe and lawful, 
the notion of sexual gratification becomes pertinent within this inquiry. The act of 
sadomasochism, at its root, is to express sexual gratification between the giver and the 
receiver.18 Sadomasochism is not only steeped within acquiring consent to sexual intercourse, 
but also to the acquisition of consent to the specific form of sexual violence.  
In a democracy such as South Africa, a reasonable intervention by the State in prosecuting an 
act of consensual sexual violence would be juxtaposed to the notion of freedom of expression,19 
tied to human morality and dignity. In a constitutionally protected sphere, morality and dignity 
stand as a paragon human benchmark of protection by the State. Human dignity, under section 
10 of the Constitution,20 is a pivotal concept that should be interpreted individualistically, based 
on its inherency for every person and the potential outlining of the subjective nature of 
consensual sexual violence.  
However, in stark contrast to the State’s prerogative to prosecute acts of consensual sexual 
violence between adults, the viewpoint of victimless crimes becomes prevalent. The emerging 
modern society is entwined with social facets that did not exist in years past. Furthermore, the 
influx of sadomasochistic material in the media is noteworthy. From fictional literary works, 
such as the international bestseller Fifty Shades of Grey,21 to modern films and the pornographic 
industry; sadomasochistic material has seeped its way into the very fabric of the public sphere 
and has garnered a level of intrigue, experimentation, and investigation throughout.   
Individuals engaging in practices such a consensual sadomasochism may desire hazardous 
actions inflicted upon them. Such was apparent in the English case of R v Brown,22 known 
colloquially as ‘Operation Spanner’. A focus of this dissertation seeks to shed light on whether 
there is an inherent need for the State to prosecute victimless crimes, where both consenting 
parties engage in ‘prohibited’ acts. It should be noted that the victim feels no need to lay a 
charge against the perpetrator, based on the personal belief that such a victim has experienced 
                                                          
17 Section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
18 R. McAnulty Sex and Sexuality/ 3 Sexual Deviation and Sexual Offences vol. 3 (2006) 22. 
19 Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
20 Section 10 of the Constitution. 
21 E. James Fifty Shades of Grey (2012). 
22 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212.  
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no true harm or injury from the practice.23 The individual is a ‘victim’ because it is the law that 
labels them as such.  
R v Brown shall be juxtaposed to the development of relevant legal viewpoints from both 
English and Canadian law,24 elaborating on the extension of legal issues in Laskey, Jaggard 
and Brown v the United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights.25 The cases of R v 
Welch,26 and R v Lock,27 are but a few of the cases that will be explored within this dissertation; 
whilst assessing other, splinter-like, cases related to the interpretation of consensual harm.  
The possibilities of consensual sexual violence arising as a victimless crime, as both 
participants have the necessary intention to receive and/or inflict bodily harm, proves essential 
to decipher. Even though the acts of violence are consensual between the adults, the integral 
question of whether the State may prosecute such a victimless crime may derive itself from a 
multitude of factors. This is encumbered upon the rights of individuals within the democracy 
of South Africa, focussing on constitutionally protected rights and the doctrine of public policy 
regarding the broad exposure of such an act. In addition, the notion of autonomy and its 
displacement within consensual adult interactions is drawn into the fold of investigation. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem Question and Correlating Inquiries 
 
The focal question that this dissertation shall seek to answer is in consideration of the overall 
harm caused within a consensual sadomasochistic relationship. When will the State be justified 
in prosecuting consensual sadomasochism that brings varied degrees of bodily harm? This digs 
deep into the notion of whether such an act, between consenting adults, is inherently unlawful 
in its nature, or is only rendered unlawful at a defined threshold of bodily harm.  
Thus, an investigation of this dissertation seeks to uncover whether the practice of consensual 
sadomasochism falls within a valid entry point for prosecution by the South African Criminal 
law. If such a realisation of prosecution exists, the secondary investigation will consider the 
appropriate manner to prosecute such an action. Accessory to this problem question is whether 
                                                          
23 Sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 of the United Kingdom. 
24 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
25 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom 1997 (Application No. 21627/93; 21628/93; 21974/93) ECHR 4. 
26 R v Welch (1995) 25 OR (3d) 665. 
27 R v Lock at Ipswich Crown Court (Judgement on 22nd January 2013)  
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the inquisition of the State into the nature of the practice will unjustifiably infringe the 
personality rights of human dignity,28 privacy,29 and the freedom of expression of the 
participants.30 Therefore, if the State sees it fit to prosecute consensual sexual violence, will 
such a prosecution be justified in the limitation of the aforementioned personality rights? 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research Dissertation 
 
The primary objective of the research is to determine the legality of consensual sadomasochism 
practised between consenting adults. Secondly, the aim is to consider a definitive bracket of 
State-interpretation regarding the harm from the practice. Accessory to these aims, the 
objective of juxtaposing consensual sadomasochism to legal avenues such as public policy, 
public interest, considerations of autonomy rights, and a reflection upon victimless crimes takes 
flight. 
 
1.4 The Significance of the Research Dissertation 
 
Consensual sexual violence is emerging in greater volumes within societies of the world and 
developing into far more than just an underground ‘deviant’ sexual act.31 This dissertation seeks 
to elaborate on whether consensual sexual violence should be prosecuted by the South African 
Criminal law, or permitted under an accepted nature and defined setting. 
There is a dearth of legal literature encompassing the validity of consensual sadomasochism 
resulting in varying degrees of harm within South African criminal law jurisprudence. The 
significance of this dissertation will seek to decipher the potential position of the criminal law 
regarding its interpretation of consensual sadomasochism. This, in turn, attempts to yield a 
clearer transition of the application of the criminal law in a holistic interpretation of other legal 
                                                          
28 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
29 Section 14 of the Constitution. 
30 Section 16 of the Constitution. 
31 T. Bezreh, T.S. Weinberg, and T. Edgar ‘BDSM disclosure and stigma management: Identifying opportunities 
for sex education’ (2012) 7 American Journal of Sexuality Education 38, 39. 
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considerations. This will be in reflection of the specific constitutionally protected rights of the 
consenting individuals to the practice.  
 
1.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
The research shall only consult the international legal strides from the developments of the 
relevant legal positions within England and Canada respectively. The reason for choosing these 
jurisdictions derives from the numerous consensual sexual violence matters that have found 
themselves before courts of the aforesaid countries. As will be explored in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, these countries have interpreted principles of consent to the commission of bodily 
harm and propose a developing judicial outlook on the act of consensual sadomasochism. 
Furthermore, these countries allow for a broad interpretation of different forms of consensual 
sadomasochism which has evolved over the years. In turn, the courts of the aforesaid 
jurisdictions have attempted to develop their initial outlook on consensual harm and the 
extension of such to consensual sadomasochism. These considerations are important to outline 
when interpreting the development of the judicial outlook on consensual activities and such 
will be highlighted in a single “cross-jurisdictional” timeline, found in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.  
This dissertation shall focus predominantly on private consensual sadomasochism bringing 
varying degrees of bodily harm and injury. It shall not consult other forms of sexually divergent 
practices and will be limited to case law and legal literature dealing specifically with consent 
to private consensual sexual violence. 
A further limitation of the research problem is that there is a dearth of information regarding 
the legal position of consensual sexual violence within South African law. Therefore, this 
research shall be limited to the specific crimes of assault arising in either common assault or 
assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm. Further, any potential legal aids from the 
South African Law Reform Commission are absent, based on the minimal prior legal research 
within South Africa regarding the topic.  
 
1.6 Research Goals 
 
9 
 
Among the more pressing goals for the research, the dissertation intends to show a predictive 
outline of the approach of a South African court if interpreting private consensual 
sadomasochism. This is facilitated by the goal of deciphering what may be defined as valid 
consent to permissible bodily harm within the consensual sexual dynamic between adult 
partners.   
In the exploration of the aforementioned goal, the research dissertation shall harness the 
Constitutional values of South Africa, paying homage to the personality rights to bodily safety, 
security and integrity, freedom of expression, the right to privacy and the right to human 
dignity. The goal of this segment of the research will be to show the protected rights of the 
participants that engage in consensual sexual sadomasochism and the interpretation by the State 
when limiting such rights. 
Another goal of the research is to surface the current South African policy considerations 
regarding consensual bodily harm. This will inevitably attempt to determine whether 
consensual sadomasochism is inherently a victimless crime, or whether such may be afforded 
some degree of legal protection, based on the contemporary South African legal influences.  
Ultimately, the core goal of the research dissertation is to review and interpret the relevant 
South African inventory of legal aids that may be applied to potential sadomasochistic practices 
within the legal system. This will be induced by juxtapositions to relevant findings and 
submissions of English and Canadian law and whether there would be any direct applicability 
of the values of the foreign perspectives in the South African outlook of the practice. The 
research shall also be supported by the goal of investigating the internal safeguards and 
controls, belonging to those that partake in consensual sadomasochism and forming part of the 
broader arch of the ‘kink’ community.  
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
 
The dissertation shall implement a qualitative research methodology in its approach in dealing 
with the problem statements. It is not the objective of the dissertation to seek to employ an 
empirical approach within the research. The core of the qualitative research approach will be 
hinged upon legal principles that cover applicable sectors of interest within the criminal law of 
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South Africa, England and Canada and the possible extension of these laws in interpreting acts 
of consensual sexual violence in South Africa.  
Further, the dissertation shall implement a cross-jurisdictional timeline that draws on cases 
from both England and Canada regarding consensual sexual violence in hopes of creating a 
predictive outline with South African jurisprudence if hearing such a matter. The research shall 
be juxtaposed to the applicable Constitutional provisions in hopes of bolstering the perspective 
of human rights and personal autonomy amongst consensual partners. The prosecution for the 
unlawful infringement of the right to privacy, human dignity, and freedom of expression is a 
constitutional cornerstone that is inspired by the Bill of Rights.32 Such shall be explored by an 
inquiry into South African law (statutes, cases, public policy and the Constitution) and an 
exploration of foreign jurisdictional viewpoints in hopes of determining whether South 
Africans who participate in acts of consensual sexual violence should be subject to a criminal 
prosecution for offences against another person.  
References will be attributed to applicable legislation, case law and legal literature that 
correlate with the research questions. Further, academic writings in the form of scholarly 
submissions and journal articles, along with relevant textbooks and information from websites, 
will be consulted. 
 
1.8 Terminology and Definitions 
 
 Dominant (‘dom’): An individual who controls the sadomasochistic encounter by 
inflicting physical force and/or verbal force. 
 Submissive (‘sub’): An individual who is the recipient to such force from the dominant  
 BDSM: An acronym for activities involving bondage-discipline-domination-
submission-sadomasochism and includes role-playing or activities such as cutting and 
marking, movement limitation, sensory deprivation and hitting. 
 ‘Kink’ Community: Members of the broad group of individuals who engage in minority 
sexual practices that form part of a collective minority sexual group. 
 Sadomasochism:  
o  sadism – arousal by inflicting physical pain upon another person 
                                                          
32 Chapter II of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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o  masochism -  arousal by personally experiencing physical pain 
 The merging of the two concepts creates a union of a practice that involves the 
administration and the receiving of pain between partners.  
 Scene: The colloquial term for a BDSM/sadomasochistic encounter. 
 
 
1.9 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Six chapters shall support the discussion of this dissertation: 
Chapter one (1) outlines, inter alia, the purpose, aims, objectives, goals and the research 
methodology of the dissertation. 
Chapter two (2) sets the stage for the conceptualisation of the sexual practice of consensual 
sadomasochism. This will be evaluated in light of the cross-jurisdictional timeline that 
interprets the progression of relevant foreign cases arising in England and Canada respectively. 
This will draw inspiration from the element of consent in sustaining practices that involve 
variant degrees of bodily harm and how such has been progressively interpreted by the relevant 
courts. The South African perspective shall be illustrated in light of consent to bodily harm and 
the investigation of the applicability of the volenti non fit iniuria principle to the potential 
existence of consensual sadomasochism before the criminal law. 
Chapter three (3) builds on the established principles of consent to bodily harm by juxtaposing 
the ever-growing legal considerations of public policy. The concept of public policy, 
interpreting consensual sadomasochism, will be inspected by the relevant submissions from 
legal sources from England, Canada, and South Africa respectively. This will pay homage to 
the expansion of sadomasochistic material into the public sphere and the resounding influence 
of the porn industry and in supporting such. Finally, the applicable Constitutional provisions 
will correlate to the legal considerations of the boni mores and Ubuntu in shaping the South 
African public policy and its combating of the infliction of harm unto the public. 
Chapter four (4) reflects an evaluation of the autonomy rights of human dignity, freedom of 
expression and privacy. These rights are inherent to the participants of consensual sexual 
violence and demand a reciprocal obligation of care from the State and other members of 
society. This will be investigated in the assessment of the legal systems of England and Canada 
12 
 
and by the precursor international conventions, namely the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,33 and the European Convention on Human Rights.34 The South African Constitution 
will serve as the primary guide in the reflection of the aforementioned autonomy rights and 
will attempt to draw an equitable resolve regarding the autonomous actions of consenting adults 
in the practice of consensual sadomasochism. 
Chapter five (5) considers at the legal anomaly of victimless crimes and the influence of a broad 
public morality upon the criminal law. This will seek to explore whether consensual sexual 
violence falls within the bracket of a victimless crime in juxtaposition to other crimes that 
inhabit this niche. Guidance will be sought from the submissions of the colloquially coined 
‘Wolfenden Report’ and the Hart-Devlin debate.35 The chapter unravels into the consideration 
of victimless crimes within South Africa and the progressive attempts of the Constitution to 
decriminalise private consensual actions that bring no harm unto others. 
Chapter six (6) concludes the discussion of the dissertation and amalgamates the arguments 
made in each chapter, resolving in recommendations and final concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 UN General Assembly "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1948). 
34 Council of Europe "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (1950). 
35 Great Britain. Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution Report of the Committee 
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1957). 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGENCE OF CONSENSUAL 
SADOMASOCHISM WITHIN ENGLISH AND CANADIAN 
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE GAP-IN-KNOWLEDGE IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL LITERATURE 
 
"Like alcohol abuse, binge eating, and meditation, sadomasochism is a way people can forget themselves." - Roy 
Baumeister, Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Case Western Reserve University. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Consensual sadomasochism has emerged as a developing atypical sexual practice in the 
contemporary international sphere amongst consenting adults.36 Sexuality itself has been an 
important aspect in the study of human self-actualisation.37 With this understanding, the 
concept of sexual expression has slowly progressed within the legal system of South Africa, 
ushered into the democratic age by a flurry of Constitutional perspectives and supporting 
legislation38.  
Homosexuality, once being a punishable crime under the Apartheid regime,39 is now legally 
accepted within South Africa; and endures within a gradual expanse.40 What is evident is that 
the State recognises equality amongst all citizens, encumbered with one’s sexual orientation. 
However, the role of some religious organisations,41 and other bodies have been the 
predominant harbingers of scrutiny and discrimination for homosexuals, and other sexual 
minority groups such as the LGBT,42 within the republic. The constitutional right to sexual 
                                                          
36 B. O'Dowd ‘Consensual sadomasochism’ (2009) 3 Mako: NSU Undergraduate Student Journal 2. 
37 A. De Wet ‘Human rights and sexuality - Reimagining the language of equality towards transformation in and 
through education’ (2017) 31 South African Law Journal of Higher Education 113. 
38 The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 of South Africa is a beaming example of the South African legislature accepting 
same-sex couples to be joined in matrimony. 
39 See the case of  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 
15; 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (9 October 1998) where the act of sodomy was decriminalised 
within South Africa. 
40 A.M. Ibrahim ‘LGBT rights in Africa and the discursive role of international human rights law (2015) 15 African 
Human Rights Journal 278. 
41 Ibrahim Ibid 270. 
42 K.L. Collier et al. ‘Sexual orientation and gender identity/expression related peer victimization in Adolescence: 
A systematic review of associated psychosocial and health outcomes’ (2013) 50  Journal of Sex Research 7, 17. 
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expression allows for the facilitation of legal cognisance of these forms of sexuality; however 
morally divergent such may be to the public. 
The essence of the ‘deviant’ act of consensual sadomasochism is to derive sexual pleasure in 
the application of physical violence and pain.43 Thus, the objective that exists at the root of the 
practice is to express sexual gratification.44 The practice can be defined as the participation of 
two or more consenting adults who are aware of the reasonable apprehension of receiving 
and/or delivering physical harm unto each other.45  
The notion of individuals inflicting physical harm unto one another, solely to draw sexual 
gratification, stands as a prerogative for the State to intervene and control such practices. 
However, drawing inspiration from the recent developments of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V),46 it is relevant within this early inquiry regarding 
sadomasochism to illustrate that these classifications have been removed from the medical 
niche.47 The practice of sadomasochism proves to be an activity that should not be viewed as 
one that is practiced by those who suffer from any form of mental disorder. The focal avenue 
of consideration would be hinged upon the relevant criteria of acceptable and lawful boundaries 
of the practice by the State itself.  
BDSM and sadomasochism bring with it a flurry of unique jargon and colloquialism. The terms 
‘dominant’ and ‘submissive’ (‘Dom/Sub’) are the common roles for partners within the 
dynamic of the relationship.48 Generally, a ‘dominant’ exhibits dominium over the ‘submissive’ 
by the exercise of physical force or verbal control.49 A ‘submissive’ may desire the dominant 
to inflict physical force unto their bodies in the hope of deriving sexual gratification via the 
stimulus of pain.50 A ‘submissive’ might also desire to be humiliated in the form of verbal 
abuse from the ‘dominant’.51 The pertinence of arriving at a legal interpretation of consensual 
sadomasochism lies within the assessment of the magnitude of the physical aggression exerted 
                                                          
43 T. Bennett ‘Sadomasochism under the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act of 1994’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law 
Review 541. 
44 McAnulty Sex and Sexuality/ 3 Sexual Deviation and Sexual Offences (2006) 728. 
45 Bennett ‘Sadomasochism under the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act of 1994’ (2013) 543. 
46 American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 ed. (2013). 
47  The concepts of the conditions of “Sadism” and “Masochism”.  
48 W. Pawlowski ‘BDSM: The ultimate expression of healthy sexuality," in W.J. Taverner and R.W. McKee (eds) 
Taking Sides: Clashing Views in Human Sexuality (2009) 70-75. 
49 A. Avedano ‘Violence and veneration: Tapping a sadomasochistic vein in the American psyche’ (2014) 7 
Mythological Studies Journal 15. 
50 O'Dowd ‘Consensual sadomasochism’ (2009) 4. 
51 Chancer as cited in O’Dowd above, 14. 
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upon the submissive’s body and the impact of the actual bodily harm that is brought upon their 
psychological framework.52  
Part of the focus of this chapter shall derive itself from the jurisdictions of English and 
Canadian law respectively when interpreting consensual bodily harm. Both of these 
jurisdictions have endured skirmishes with the legality of consensual sadomasochism and have 
produced notable precedents regarding the lawfulness of the practice. The cross-jurisdictional 
timeline of comparison between the developments within the aforementioned jurisdictions 
shall be elaborated upon in fact, relevance, and the link to the possible South African 
perspective of consensual sadomasochism. It is the intention of this chapter to expose and 
analyse the developments of the legal positions of England and Canada regarding relevant 
examples of consensual sadomasochism and the progressive interpretation of varying degrees 
of bodily harm from these practices.  
Lastly, the interpretation of the facts and legal developments regarding the cases that inhabit 
the judicial timeline will be explored holistically. These submissions will attempt to give 
credence as to the development of the sadomasochistic acts and their legal interpretation within 
the contemporary sphere. These findings of consensual sadomasochism will accordingly be 
juxtaposed to existing doctrines and requirements within the defence of consent to bodily harm 
and injury within South African criminal law.  
 
2.2 The Judicial Timeline of Comparison and Development of Consensual Harm and 
Sadomasochism within England and Canada 
 
2.2.1.) 1934: R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 – England  
The English case of R v Donovan sets the stage for the foundations of this jurisprudential 
timeline.53 The case ushered through the notion of the state prosecuting an incident of assault, 
arising in actual bodily harm, where the harm suffered is beyond transient and trifling. The case 
involved the caning of a 17-year-old girl by an adult male, solely for purposes of sexual 
gratification.54 It was explored that even though the victim had given consent to the beating, 
such consent does not make lawful the unlawful act of assault, or indecent assault. It is clear 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
54 N. Padfield Criminal Law 8 ed. (2012) 104. 
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that the court viewed the act as inherently unlawful, based on its juxtaposition to the definition 
of actual bodily harm. Furthermore, the minority of the victim proved to be a decisive factor in 
the decision itself.  
The importance of Donovan’s submission is that it summons a test of assessment where actual 
bodily harm exists, deliberately inflicted to affect an individual’s well-being. Thus, at the early 
stages of assessing degrees of harm upon persons, along with the applicable stage of 
involvement by the state to prosecute such harm, the English courts had tacitly outlawed 
sadomasochism, even if such was yet to be coined. It is evident that English courts, even in 
1934, had the interest of safeguarding the sanctity of the 17-year-old girl’s bodily integrity, just 
as the South African Constitution does.55 Swift J had stated,  
‘[I]t is an unlawful act to beat another person with such a degree of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is 
a probable consequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial.’56 
It is clear, adhering to Donovan’s principles, that when sadomasochistic acts between 
consenting partners come to light in the eyes of the State, the English court had prosecuted the 
participant who had caused actual bodily harm. To the court, such a harm which interferes with 
the comfort and health of the complainant is beyond transient and trifling; even if such is not 
permanent in its existence.57 Furthermore, the focus of a prosecution by the State is not 
dependent upon the element of consent being sustained in a consensual sadomasochistic 
encounter.58 Such a stance by the court proved to be dependent on the existence of actual bodily 
harm inflicted between the consenting parties, thus vitiating consent as a defence.  
However, what is problematic in retrospect to Donovan is nestled within the court’s initial 
inquiry of actual bodily harm. The nature of the harm itself is not the only factor in determining 
whether consent should sustain itself as a valid defence in a modern legal system. The age and 
capacity of the partners also prove to shape the legal validity of consent to actual bodily harm. 
Therefore, compartmentalisation of the elements of the consensual activity must be interpreted 
by the relevant court in order to draw an adequate interpretation of the act itself.  
                                                          
55 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
56 The words of Swift J, commenting in R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498, 509. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
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2.2.2) 1991: R v Jobidon 1991 SCR 714 – Canada   
The Canadian case of R v Jobidon was an important judgement in determining the validity of 
consent to bodily harm in Canada.59 Sadomasochism promises the actualisation of bodily harm 
in the inherent nature of the consensual sexual practice. However, the events of Jobidon did 
not involve sadomasochistic activities, but rather a consensual fistfight between two men. This 
submission can be extended to the concept of actual bodily harm and similar to the practice of 
sadomasochism. The harm that arose from the events of Jobidon can be paralleled to the harm 
that exists within certain types of sadomasochistic relationships.  
A Canadian court shall be justified in balancing the element of consent between participants 
involved in a physically dangerous activity and the inherently unlawful outcome of the 
consensual encounter.60 The court prosecuted Jobidon for the death of a man who had 
consented to a fistfight with him. The impact of Jobidon’s punch had rendered his opponent 
unconscious, to which Jobidon continually beat his head, causing severe concussions and 
resulting in eventual death. The defence of consent to the dangerous activity did not sustain 
itself as a valid defence to the Ontario court. With this perspective, it is supported by the court’s 
reasoning that the deceased’s consent could not extend to his own death; thus, liability for 
manslaughter still attached to Jobidon.61  
Without deviating from this chapter’s focus on the assessment of the validity of the element of 
consent, it is clear that the Canadian courts, as early as 1991, highlighted that certain consensual 
activities may result in actual or grievous bodily harm occurring, and even the possibility of 
death to be rampant.  
‘The principal objective of the criminal law is the public identification of wrongdoing qua wrongdoing which 
violates public order and is so blameworthy that it deserves penal sanction.’62 
A court within South Africa, if faced with such similar facts, will have substantial and 
compelling reasons to prosecute an individual who has caused such harm, even if consent is 
established between participants to this dangerous activity. This is based on the inherently 
dangerous physical practice of sadomasochism, capable of causing actual bodily harm unto an 
individual, thereby infringing their bodily safety and security.63 Thus, identification of the 
                                                          
59 R v Jobidon (1991) 2 SCR 714. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 R v Mabior (2012) SCC 47 at para 23. 
63 Section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
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intensity of the harm exerted from the consensual encounter is paramount in determining the 
involvement of the State in such activities. However, socially sanctioned consensual physical 
activities stand at loggerhead with such State-protected norms. Sports such as boxing and 
rugby, and medical procedures along the lines of surgery, bring with them a similar intensity 
of physical bodily harm that is viewed in a more favourable light in the eyes of the State.  
This is an example of the early developments within the international conception of consent 
regarding activities that render physical bodily harm. It was clear, within the international 
perspective at this stage, that the existence of actual bodily harm will vitiate consent as a 
defence to a consensual physical practice. The only compelling definition of actual bodily harm 
at this node in the timeline proves to be harm that is not ‘transient and trifling.’64 This definition 
is common in the assessment of harm unto a person if one is a victim to an assault. In the 
extreme case of participants engaging in consensual activities that result in actual bodily harm, 
physical impairment, or death; a court would have cause to disregard the defence of consent 
and to prosecute a perpetrator as being the harbinger-of-the-harm. 
 
2.2.3) 1992: R v Boyea 156 JPR 505 – England 
The case of R v Boyea presents itself just before the zenith of sadomasochism’s quarrel for 
legality.65 The case of Boyea manifested itself within the jurisdiction of England, alluding to 
the inflcition of physical harm within a sexual dynamic. The complainant in Boyea had suffered 
internal vaginal injuries when the defendant had inserted his hand into her vagina. The 
defendant raised the defence of consent, stating that his actions were in accordance with 
consenting to the enhancement of the shared notion of sexual gratification between him and his 
partner.66  
The court asserted its inquiry to consent to actual bodily harm. The extent of the injuries 
sustained by the complainant proved far too severe to allow consent to sustain itself as a valid 
defence for the accused. The focus of the harm inflicted being beyond the threshold of transient 
and trifling proved to be sufficient for the court to prosecute the accused on indecent assault.67 
This conviction is noteworthy, for one would have expected the passing of a harsher sentence 
                                                          
64 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
65 R v Boyea (1992) 156 JPR 505. 
66 J. Moulds ‘Is society still shackled with the chains of a 1993 England? Consent, sado-masochism and R v Brown’ 
(2015) 1 UniSA Student Law Review 77. 
67 R v Boyea (1992) 156 JPR 505. 
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by the court, by virtue of the actual bodily harm that was inflicted. However, the defence of 
consent to actual bodily harm was not available, for the defendant had caused injuries that 
transcended the threshold of permitted actual bodily harm.68 Here, once again, the court had 
noted that the harm caused was beyond ‘transient and trifling’. Such proved to be the cypher 
for disregarding consent as a defence to such activity, following the stance of Donovan,69 and 
Jobidon.70 
The court also considered the development of the law regarding the ‘level of vigour’ in forms 
of sexual practices since its yesteryears.71 However, the development of the sexual attitudes 
from 1934 could not emancipate the conduct exhibited in Boyea based on the intensity of the 
actual bodily harm that had occurred.72 The court was of the final opinion that had the injuries 
been transient and minor, consent would have sustained itself as a valid defence in exempting 
liability for the defendant. To the reasoning of the court, it was unimaginable for the 
complainant to have reasonably consented to such serious injuries that had caused actual bodily 
harm.    
 
2.2.4) 1993 - 1994: R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 – England73  
The most notable legal precedent emerging within the interpretation of the practice of 
sadomasochism, and its skirmish with the possibility of legal acceptance, originated from the 
English case of R v Brown.74 The House of Lords was faced with a graphic portrait of the 
underground BDSM scene, occurring for a number of years between consenting adult 
homosexual men. The culmination of legal factors within this case involved consensual 
sadomasochism and its legal standing in contemporary society, public policy regarding the 
exposure of dangerous physical practices to the public, and the concept of the State’s control 
of violence amongst its citizens.75   
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
70 R v Jobidon (1991) 2 SCR 714. 
71 Moulds ‘Is society still shackled with the chains of a 1993 England? Consent, sado-masochism and R v Brown’ 
(2015) 78. 
72 R v Boyea (1992) 156 JPR 505. 
73 It should be noted that this case was decided in the 1993 and reported in 1994. 
74 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
75 Ibid. 
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The facts of Brown are essential to this dissertation’s inquiry as to the consensual nature of 
certain sadomasochistic relationships and the activities therein.76 A group of homosexual men 
had met over a number of years to engage in consensual sadomasochism between one another. 
Their activities included beatings of the human body, piercing of the male genitals, and other 
acts of torture that brought the breakage of skin and the release of blood.77 The actions 
expressed flourishes of both actual bodily harm and serious bodily harm, bringing a degree of 
pain that was beyond transient and trifling within the consensual relationships.78  
What is pertinent within the facts of Brown is that the men had recorded their consensual 
sadomasochistic activities and disseminated the tapes to members within their group.79 
‘Operation Spanner’,80 as it was colloquially coined, commenced when an unrelated 
investigation by police unearthed the sadomasochistic activities that occurred between the men. 
The films that were later discovered by the police and proved most alarming as the actions 
depicted torture and the possibility of murder. 
After news of the films had circulated throughout the British media, the orchestrators of the 
sadomasochistic activities pleaded guilty to the charges of assault laid against them in the trial 
court. In their defence, they had submitted that their actions were consensual, aimed to derive 
sexual gratification between partners by utilising pain as a stimulus. Furthermore, it was put 
forward that the men had participated in such activities over a period of ten years with 
consenting partners. Allegedly, the sadomasochistic encounters did not yield any permanent 
bodily injuries and the men had practiced such for a considerable period of time. Additionally, 
the footage had not been exposed to the public until the police had stumbled upon the films.  
The accused men were charged with assault causing bodily harm and injury, under sections 20 
and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act, respectively.81 Section 20 of the Act focusses 
primarily on the unlawful and malicious wounding of an individual by another, with or without 
the use of a weapon, causing grievous bodily harm.82 Such an injury can be met with penal 
sanction according to the ambit of this section within the Act83. Section 47 of the Act supports 
                                                          
76 A.P. Simester et al. Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine 6 ed. (2016) 784.  
77 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212.  
78 See R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
79 M. Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual harm and public interest’ (1994) 57 The Modern Law Review 102. 
80 R v Brown supra. 
81 Sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 of the United Kingdom. 
82 Ibid at section 20.   
83 Ibid. 
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the aforementioned section, laying the foundation of imprisonment for anyone convicted of an 
assault that causes such bodily harm.84  
The trial judge had ruled that the defence of consent would not sustain itself against the charges 
of assault, for the intensity of the harm caused by the sadomasochistic practice nullified the 
prospects of the defence. The men later appealed the decision in the House of Lords, in hopes 
to emancipate the legality surrounding consensual sadomasochism that caused actual bodily 
harm. The appellants wished to affirm that such a practice could be recognised as an exception 
to the charge of assault, based on the sustained element of consent.  
The central issue to Brown within the House of Lords was whether consent to private 
sadomasochistic activities between adults rendered such an act to be lawful, thus sustaining 
consensual sexual violence as a defence.85 Furthermore, the House of Lords attempted to 
decipher whether consensual sexual violence to derive pleasure and gratification was a 
mitigating factor to the assaults that had occurred when interpreting the charges of the accused 
men86 in light of public policy considerations.  
An investigation at this critical juncture of judicial comparison regarding the legal development 
of consensual sadomasochism must be explored.87 The fundamental inspection of Brown 
reveals the inherent danger of sadomasochism, occurring in assault bringing actual bodily 
harm, had sufficient cause to be punished under the Offences Against the Person Act in the 
majority view of the House of Lords.88 The consensual actions of the men, even if conducted 
within private confines, had fallen within the public domain based on the dissemination of the 
films depicting the consensual practices. Upon assessment, the right to individual privacy is 
weighted against the protection that the State owes to the public at large. The State, in its 
paternalistic approach, assumes the herculean task of safeguarding the interests of the public 
as a whole. Thus, the actions of the accused men satisifed the definition of the crime of assault, 
expressed in sections 20 and 47 of the aforementioned Act, allowing the House of Lords to 
prosecute the offenders and awarding penal sanction.89 
                                                          
84 Ibid at section 47.  
85 Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual harm and public interest’ (1994) 101. 
86 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
87 See Attorney General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 where an assault that is intended or which is 
likely to cause bodily harm, accompanied by indecency, shall prove to be an offence; irrespective of consent. 
This, however, shall only materialise if the injury caused is not transient or trifling. 
88 Sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 of the United Kingdom.  
89 Ibid.  
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However, the House of Lords was not swayed in favour of the prosecution in a totality of 
judicial support.90 The majority stood at loggerhead with the minority regarding the 
interpretation of the sadomasochistic acts that were practised and the actual harm that was 
caused; not only to the consenting ‘victims’ but to the public who had become so erroneously 
exposed to the practices.91 Generally, the basic starting point in the assessment of an assault, as 
accepted by the House of Lords, is the absence of consent between the offender and the victim. 
However, as drawn out by the inspection of the court, there are instances where consent is not 
given and no assault occurs, even if an individual suffers actual bodily harm, such as 
therapeutic surgery.92 The ambivalence that was created by the presence of consent in Brown 
did not give credence to the statutory definition of an assault as prescribed by the wording of 
the Act.93    
Upon a critical interpretation of the case in point, the House of Lords was faced with a two-tier 
question. Firstly, whether the court should consider public policy and supporting interests in 
dealing with what appears to be prima facie illegal behaviour in an attempt to allow such to go 
by unpunished.94 Secondly, whether the court may harness the public’s interest to criminalise 
those activities that could be deemed as ‘lawful’ behaviour.95 These notions pave the path for 
the emerging public policy considerations as a facet of a court’s assessment regarding the 
legality of consensual sadomasochism that causes varying degrees of bodily harm.       
The majority, held sway by Lords Templeman and Jauncey, began their assessment in line with 
the statute,96 focussing on the infliction of actual, or grievous bodily harm between the 
consenting partners. The actions of the sadomasochists, juxtaposed to the wording of sections 
20 and 47,97 proved to fall within the definition of unlawful conduct, constituting an offence. 
The exceptions to the general rule of prosecuting acts that fit the prescribed statutory bar, 
generally falling into the sphere of consent, may allow a court to exempt inherently unlawful 
behaviour. Such exemptions, or grounds for justification, are nestled within the concept of 
public policy. Lords Templeman and Jauncey collectively wished to ascertain whether, by 
                                                          
90 Padfield Criminal Law (2012) 106. 
91 ‘Victims’ is placed in inverted commas, for the theory of victimless crimes is prevalent at a later stage within 
this dissertation. 
92 Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual harm and public interest’ (1994) 105. 
93 Offences against the Person Act 1861 of the United Kingdom. 
94 Giles op cit note above 92.  
95 Ibid. 
96 See sections 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 of the United Kingdom.  
97 Ibid. 
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virtue of policy considerations, sadomasochistic acts might fall within the scope of such 
accepted exemptions. Ultimately, Lord Templeman stated that, 
‘It is an unlawful act to beat another person with such degree of violence that the infliction of bodily harm is a 
probable consequence, and when such an act is proved, consent is immaterial.      
Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult of violence. Pleasure derived from the infliction of 
pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivilised. I would answer the certified question in the negative and dismiss the 
appeals of the appellants against conviction.98’ 
Lord Templeman stated further that it is an ‘evil thing’ to derive pleasure from the infliction of 
physical pain. This is seemingly contradictory to other lawful practices that endure within 
society, such as the sports of boxing and mixed martial arts. These sports, and their 
international following, reverberate the support society has for the infliction of pain, as such is 
a legally sanctioned event. It could be argued that individuals go so far as to derive ‘pleasure’ 
in watching these athletes bludgeon and inflict various degrees of bodily harm within the 
sanctioned event.  
The minority judgement was derived from Lords Mustill and Slynn. Lord Mustill’s perception, 
regarding the act of sadomasochism, sheds light on the importance of consent as a factor in the 
assessment of criminal liability in the manifestation of this type of actual bodily harm. The 
absence of any supporting legal literature and decided cases at the time proved to diminish 
Lord Mustill’s attack against the majority. However, Lord Mustill musters the perspective of 
the: 
‘[E]xcessive complication of using the public policy interest to annul the defence of consent because of the harm, 
and then using it again to recreate it in some cases.99’ 
Lord Mustill was of the opinion that the submissions of public policy, and the safeguarding of 
such public’s exposure, are insufficient as a viable factor to solely criminalise activity that is 
otherwise lawful. Upon a critical analysis of the reasoning of the minority, it is imperative to 
note that sadomasochism, whether consensual or not, was not regarded as lawful. Therefore, 
Lord Mustill’s interpretation may be viewed in light of the lawfulness of an activity, however, 
the activity in point was not deemed to be inherently lawful. 
Lord Slynn’s interpretation rested upon a distinction between grievous bodily harm of the 
committed acts and its separation from lesser harms, such as actual bodily harm. Lord Slynn’s 
                                                          
98 The words of Lord Templeman in R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212.  
99 Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual harm and public interest’ (1994) 108.  
24 
 
assessment was strained by the rigorous concept of consent to bodily harm and its existence 
within sadomasochism. This viewpoint derived from the fact that actual bodily harm had 
occurred and was consented to by the participants. It is evident that the sustainability of the 
defence of consent to actual bodily harm before the House of Lords could only be assessed by 
comparison to a holistic interpretation factors, not exclusive to policy considerations and the 
public interest. Upon inspection, it is submitted that the reasoning for the minority in bolstering 
the inquiry into the element of consent was to probe the possibility of the existence of a legal 
safeguard for the accused sadomasochists that had inflicted actual bodily harm. 
Between the majority and minority split, Lord Lowry’s perspective took centre stage. It is 
believed that within this precedent set down by the House of Lords, Lord Lowry’s judgement 
was sufficient in propelling the majority’s viewpoint and opted for the prosecution against the 
accused sadomasochists.100 Lord Lowry commenced by drawing upon the concept of an assault 
within English law. He dictated that such an assault is lawful if consented to, however, if there 
are policy considerations that are shared by the public that advocate against the practised 
behaviour, such consensual assaults can be deemed as unlawful. To the majority, there was no 
‘good reason’ for allowing sadomasochism to assume a position upon the mantle of accepted 
exemptions to assaults causing actual bodily harm.101 The inherently violent practice detracted 
from what the public would view as acceptable. This exploration by the House of Lords proved 
that consent would not emancipate the practice of sadomasochism as being lawful. What is 
noteworthy here is unlike Donovan in the past,102 the actual bodily harm was assessed in 
relation to not only its consensual validity but also the steady emergence of the notion of public 
policy. Public policy proves to play a predominant role in a court’s holistic investigation of the 
legality of consensual sadomasochism and its possible criminalisation. 
With the developing legal canvas of Brown, it is clear that the House of Lords considered the 
validity of consent to an assault that brings actual bodily harm and the concept of public policy 
in a stark dichotomy103. According to Brown,104 consent is far from an intangible shield when 
it comes to consensual sexual violence. Lord Templeman’s judgement echoes that 
sadomasochism is more violent than sexual, far from positive within the public’s interest, 
enough to radiate in tones of moral outrage within the community that the law itself wishes to 
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safeguard. On a closer inspection of the case in point, consent alone to the materialisation of 
actual bodily harm in England proved to be a hollow defence for the appellants. However, the 
House of Lords was careful in outlawing all forms of consensual physical activity that bring 
with it actual bodily harm. A consensual activity that brings foreseeable harm within socially 
sanctioned and accepted behaviour would still allow such a defence of consent to stand firm 
for an accused. This, in culmination, appeared to be sufficient reason for the majority opting 
not to develop a defence of consensual sadomasochism for the accused men.  
The defence of consent to the infliction of physical harm may rightly be vitiated by the force 
in which such is inflicted.105 In reflection of Brown, the exertion of physical force inflicted 
upon the participants, radiating violent conduct, appears to be a factor that gives credence to 
the prosecution of consensual sexual violence. The defence of consent seemingly falls away in 
this stead. The act of consensual sadomasochism, to the House of Lords, was cruel and had no 
place within the public’s sphere. Furthermore, it is clear that the prosecution of this act is also 
supported by the State’s notion to control violence within the public sphere.  
 
2.2.5) 1995: R v Welch (1995) 25 OR (3d) 665 – Canada  
The stance taken by the House of Lords in disregarding the defence of consent to bodily harm, 
and prosecuting consensual sadomasochism, in Brown served as a stark reminder as to the 
legality of the practice within the mid-1990’s by English courts. The case of R v Welch presents 
a judgement that attempted to shatter the ‘grey-area’ regarding the legality of consensual sexual 
violence in Canada.106 The jurisprudence regarding the crime of assault,107 and the variant 
offences within its bracket have been established and developed in jurisdictions across the 
world.108 The nature of the assault brought upon the human body may cause injury, bodily harm 
and even death; depending on the force that is applied.109  
The case of Welch brought with it a flurry of judicial interpretation regarding the element of 
consent, which plays a decisive role within this chapter and the dissertation at large.110 The 
                                                          
105 Simester et al. Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2016) 788. 
106 R v Welch (1995) 25 OR (3d) 665. 
107 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 577 states that an assault occurs where an individual unlawfully 
and intentionally applies force to the person of another individual, or inspires the apprehension that such an 
individual shall recieve such a force unto their person.  
108 Actions that inhabit the variant bracket of assaults, inter alia, include common assault, indecent assault, 
aggravated assault, and sexual assault.  
109 Burchell op cit note 6 above, 580. 
110 R v Welch (1995) 25 OR (3d) 665. 
26 
 
complainant’s version of the events involved the appellant (Welch) tying her to his bed, beating 
her buttocks with his belt, penetrating her vagina with both his penis and fingers and placing 
an object into her rectum.111 The complainant also put forward to the court the harrowing events 
that followed the alleged assault. The complainant had suffered bleeding from her rectum for 
at least three days, along with considerable bruising across her body.112 The accused agreed 
that he had behaved in such a manner, however, sublimated by the consent of the complainant. 
Mr Welch, in the Court of Appeal for Ontario, appealed the sentence of sexual assault set down 
by the trial court.113  
It was the position of the Court of Appeal to determine whether the element of consent existed 
between the parties, and if such were evident, would consent sustain a valid defence against 
the crime of sexual assault?   
The court began by following the common law definition of assault, whilst adhering to the 
precedent of Jobidon.114 The validity of the element of consent within this sadomasochistic 
activity proved to be shattered by the development in the Canadian legal system regarding an 
assault that causes actual bodily harm.115 The common law principles applied and laid down in 
Jobidon moulded the extent of a Canadian court’s tolerance of consent to specific degrees of 
bodily harm. As expressed in Jobidon, certain consensual activities may result in actual or 
grievous bodily harm occurring, and even the possibility of death to materialise. Consent as a 
defence shall be vitiated only if the activities, practised by consenting adults, bring with them 
such hazardous impairment that infringes the sanctity of human life.116  
The Criminal Code of Canada shall now be observed in interpreting the validity of consent 
regarding this form of sexual assault, juxtaposing the statute’s limitations to the acts that have 
been committed by the appellant.117 Section 271 expressly provides for the punishment of an 
offender who has committed a sexual assault.118 Section 272 builds on the prosecution of sexual 
assault by adding a provision highlighting such an assault caused by a weapon, threat to the 
third party, or causing bodily harm.119 Lastly, section 273 explores the bracket of aggravated 
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sexual assault, outlining the severity of the harm caused in the form of wounding, maiming, 
disfiguration or the endangering of the victim’s life.120  
Under section 273.1 (1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, the application of consent to sexual 
assault reads as follows: 
Subject to subsection (2) and subsection 265(3), consent means, for the purposes of sections 271, 272 and 273, 
the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.121  
Lastly, Section 273.1 (2) adds a paramount cog in the machine of consent that exists within 
this inquiry, namely: 
No consent is obtained, for the purposes of sections 271, 272 and 273, where 
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant; 
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; 
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; 
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or 
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of 
agreement to continue to engage in the activity.122  
It is clear, adhering to the aforementioned sections and their ambits, that even if consent had 
existed between the parties, the appellant’s actions paralleled the definition of sexual assault.123 
The wounding of the complainant causing rectal bleeding, along with the set of bruises inflicted 
upon her body finds itself within the niche of aggravated sexual assault in terms of the Code.124 
The court also noted that in paying homage to considerations such as public policy and public 
interest,125 it cannot allow the alleged ‘consensual activity’ to endure with the defence of 
consent. This was in line with Brown’s meditation, balancing the concerns of the notions of 
public policy with the consensual sexual act that had occurred.126  
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The counsel for the appellant put forward the existence of a blurred line relating to the State’s 
prerogative to prosecute acts it has specifically outlawed, juxtaposed to the existence of 
inherent human rights, many of which are subjective.127 The concepts of individual freedom, 
autonomy, privacy, public policy, morality and dignity were yet another castanet that the State 
was faced to silence in deciphering an adequate approach regarding the legality of consensual 
sadomasochism.  
After a rigorous judicial critique of the facts and issues, the court ruled that the crime of assault, 
nestled within section 265(2) of the Code,128 existed in the sexual assault inflicted upon the 
complainant by the appellant. The court derived its verdict from the extreme use of violence 
upon the complainant, extending beyond the ambit of bodily harm one could reasonably 
consent to. This unlawful and intentional application of force, nullifying the possibility of 
consensual sadomasochism, was sufficient to dismiss the appeal that clung to the defence of 
consent.  
The Ontario Court for Appeal did not recognise sadomasochism as a practice of consensual 
bodily harm that could validly exist within society. Such conduct between consenting partners 
did not find itself in any accepted boundaries of consensual violence within the legal system of 
Canada at the time. It is evident from this judgement that the defence of consent to bodily harm 
that is not serious in nature will sustain itself as a valid defence for an accused. However, where 
the bodily harm inflicted is sufficient to injure the consenting partner’s health and safety, 
bringing with it an injury that is beyond transient and trifling, consent to such harm will 
dissipate as a valid defence. The initial viewpoint of ‘transient and trifling’ harm is now 
entwined within the perspective of health and safety of the human body.  
On a critical inspection of Welch,129 the case proves that Canadian courts shall not interpret the 
undefined ‘crime’ of sadomasochism solely on the harm that it has brought. A culmination of 
other legal factors are moulded into the judgement’s structure, that being the validity of consent 
in relation to the harm caused, individual human rights of the participants, and the notions of 
the doctrine of public policy to such behaviour.   
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2.2.6) 1996: R v Wilson (1996) 2 CR App Rep 241 – England 
The case of Wilson was yet another English law example of consensual harm, however, 
between a husband and wife in the private confines of their matrimonial home.130 The case may 
be remote from the findings of the House of Lords in Brown,131 however, it saw the charge of 
assault causing actual bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act,132 
being brought against Mr Wilson for carving his initials with a hot-knife on the buttocks of his 
wife.133  
The facts, in brief, involved Mrs Wilson expressly asking her husband to brand his initials upon 
her buttocks during their sexual activity. The carving later turned sceptic, to which Mrs Wilson 
sought the medical assistance of a doctor.134 The doctor, after learning of the behaviour 
between the couple, reported Mr Wilson to the local authorities on the allegation of assault. 
The Crown Court found Mr Wilson guilty of an assault that caused actual bodily harm under 
section 47.135  
The decision of the Court in Brown dictates that consent to an injury causing actual bodily 
harm shall not sustain itself as a valid defence for an accused.136 This thus proves that the 
Court’s assessment highlighted that actual bodily harm was administered and the activity was 
unlawful.  
Upon appeal against the Crown Court’s judgement, a paramount distinction was drawn from 
that of Brown.137 The prosecution of Mr Wilson’s branding of his wife, which caused actual 
bodily harm, should be interpreted in light of Mrs Wilson’s consent to the act and the 
encouragement of her husband in committing such. The importance of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, finding in favour of consent as a defence for Mr Wilson, is pertinent within the broad 
judicial perspective of consensual harm of this nature. It is evident that Brown’s ruling does 
not lay a blanket ban on all forms of consensual harm, as the facts of each case raising consent 
as a defence must be assessed on its own merits.138 Arguably, the case of Wilson should not be 
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viewed in light of consensual sadomasochism, but rather that of the infliction of actual bodily 
harm and more specifically within the forms of tattooing and bodily adornment. 
It is with this finding by the court that consent may sustain itself as a defence to a section 47 
prosecution, even if actual bodily harm is administered and intended.139 Upon a critical 
inspection of the judgement, the nature of the harm inflicted must be compared against any 
corresponding state-sanctioned practices or activities. The consent to the harm caused must be 
observed, along with the nature of the harm itself, when determining the legality of the practice 
adopted between the participants.  
Perhaps what had given Wilson greater exemption from the talons of the criminal law was that 
the branding was a momentary and once-off event between a husband and a wife. The activity 
in question is far more likened to the accepted practice of tattooing and should not be classified 
as that of sadomasochism. However, the findings of the Court are noteworthy in the overall 
assessment of consensual bodily harm and the categorisation of such harm from accepted 
physical practices.  
 
2.2.7) 1997: Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom 1997 (Application No. 21627/93; 
21628/93; 21974/93) ECHR 4 – England 
Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom exists as an attempt to combat the English 
stance on prosecuting consensual sadomasochism.140  The appellants from the case of Brown 
appealed the judgement of the House of Lords in the European Court of Human Rights.141 
Whilst the relevance of consensual sadomasochism played a noteworthy role in the House of 
Lords, the European Court of Human Rights focused on whether the sadomasochists’ rights to 
privacy were infringed by the investigation of English law.  
This viewpoint regarding privacy is not relevant in the inquiry of consent and will be elaborated 
upon in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. However, for purposes of developing this judicial 
timeline, the Court142 found that no infringement to the right of privacy had occurred by the 
methods implemented by the English law. The State in Brown applied the law that was codified 
in statute,143 stressing the responsibility it had in safeguarding and balancing aspects of public 
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health and wellbeing against that of sexual violence. Even if such violence was consensual in 
nature and performed in the privacy of one’s own home, the inherently unlawful outcome 
brought with it the materialisation of actual bodily harm. 
 
2.2.8) 1999: Regina v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710 – England 
Within a period of two years from the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Laskey,144 English law was faced with yet another sadomasochistic encounter between 
adults in the case of Regina v Emmett145. Although not as landmark as Brown,146 or as 
independent as Wilson,147 the case reaffirmed the position regarding consent to such dangerous 
physical practices.  
The appellant (Emmett) appealed against the conviction of assault causing actual bodily harm 
under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act,148 clinging to the defence of consent 
to the sadomasochistic behaviour he practiced with a woman. The appellant, on the first 
occasion, had asphyxiated his partner by fastening a plastic bag around her neck. On the second 
occasion, he had doused her breasts with lighter fluid and set it alight. On both occasions, the 
appellant had stated that his partner had consented to the activities and was aware of the 
inherent harm which was promised.  
The practices of the appellant were assessed by a single question: would the consent of the 
injured woman render such physical practices as lawful?149 The court noted that the first 
occasion had brought the woman close to the brink of death by asphyxiation, as she had lost 
consciousness during the sexual encounter. On the second occasion, the burns to her breasts 
had caused injury that was beyond transient and trifling, bringing actual bodily harm.150 
The court held that even though the element of consent was established, high-risk and violent 
activities in the pursuit of sexual gratification, which bring actual bodily harm, are contrary to 
public policy and the values of the State. Such would stand as a flimsy defence against a 
prosecution under section 47.151 This viewpoint also draws upon a distinction between acts that 
                                                          
144 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom 1997 (Application No. 21627/93; 21628/93; 21974/93) ECHR 4. 
145 Regina v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710. 
146 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
147 R v Wilson (1996) 2 CR App Rep 241. 
148 Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. 
149 Regina v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710. 
150 Ibid. See also R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
151 Section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
32 
 
result in transient injury and those that bring with it actual and potential harm.152 Once again, 
the concept of public policy begins to cascade through the cracks of interpreting the defence of 
consent to the actual bodily harm raised by an appellant.  
The court’s ruling adhered to the principles created in Brown by emphasising the protection of, 
inter alia, the right to life and the safety and security of an individual’s body against actual 
bodily harm.153 These findings in the law of England echo South African constitutional 
perspectives and the universal understanding of a judicial system that prosecutes individuals 
who commit violent crimes, even in the pursuit of consensual sexual gratification.154 On 
inspection of the matter in point, it is shown that even if Brown is not authority for all 
sadomasochistic cases before a court within England, it attempts to create a test, focussing on 
the tolerance of a court in permitting actual bodily harm caused that is beyond transient and 
trifling in nature.  
The appeal was dismissed and prosecution upheld against Mr Emmett, as the consent of his 
sexual partner could not detract from the inherently unlawful activity practised within the 
sadomasochistic relationship. The asphyxiation and burning proved to be aggravating factors 
of potential death as a result of the conduct of the Appellant. Both instances of the sexual 
activities were viewed in the bracket of actual bodily harm that is not transient or trifling within 
a form of consensual activity that is not sanctioned by the State.155  
At the transition to the new millennium, courts of England and Canada had already established 
acceptable boundaries regarding the act of consensual sadomasochism. The focus of the 
materialisation of actual bodily harm in such sexual desires proves to be a pertinent factor 
within the inquiry regarding the validity of consent to sadomasochism. The act may be coined 
colloquially as a ‘consensual sadomasochism’; however, its definition and interpretation within 
the veil of England’s judicial system remained an assault and a punishable offence.  
 
2.2.9) 2011: R v J.A. 2011 SCC 28 – Canada  
The defence of consent to bodily injury, and its extension to sadomasochism have been 
assessed so far in the exploration of relevant findings from Canadian and English law. Both 
jurisdictions prove similar in their interpretation of consensual sadomasochism, understanding 
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that consent alone is insufficient to legitimise actions that cause actual bodily harm when a 
prosecution of assault is brought forward.156  
The case of J.A.157 expands upon the ideology of legal consent to sexual activity, a fundamental 
principle of sadomasochism, within the jurisdiction of Canada.158 The inquiry of the court tests 
the mettle of the defence of consent to sexual activity beyond the periphery and common 
principles critiqued thus far. The pressing question of whether a court, in attempting to 
prosecute a sexual assault, would allow consent given before a person becomes unconscious to 
sustain itself as a defence for the acts inflicted upon such a person in their unconscious state. 
This notion of ‘consent given in advance’ is also pertinent within the development of the State’s 
interpretation of sadomasochistic practices between sexual partners that involve a state of 
unconsciousness as an occurrence of the sexual gratification.159  
The nuance of the court’s inquiry in J.A. was hinged upon the alleged sexual assault of an 
unconscious partner. The concept of consent to bodily harm, given by a conscious individual, 
is widely observed by international jurisdictions as being lawful if the activity consented to is 
sanctioned by the State. The cases that inhabit this timeline of consensual sadomasochism and 
related matters involve conscious sexual partners; save for the case of Emmett,160 and so the 
issue of the impairment of a partner’s legal capacity to consent was not a pressing concern for 
inquiry. The case of J.A. strikes a tremor along the legality of unconscious sexual activity; 
questioning the validity of consent to sadomasochism given before the state of unconsciousness 
was brought upon the complainant.   
To begin this inquiry delving into the cornerstones of consent to sexual activity in Canada, 
section 273.1 (1) of the Criminal Code must be mentioned.161 As mentioned earlier, this section 
expressly provides for consent to sexual activity as being that of ‘the voluntary agreement of 
the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question’.162 The importance of this 
provision is that it maintains the voluntariness of the element of consent to the sexual activity, 
at the behest of the complainant. An individual who has given consent is free to voluntarily 
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change their mind and revoke such consent to the sexual activity before, or at the time of the 
act in focus.163 Furthermore, the “sexual activity in question”, as codified within the statute,164 
must be known between the partners in terms of its specific outcome, nature, and action.  
Section 273.1 (2)(b) propels the voluntary,165 conscious element of consenting to sexual activity 
by stating that no consent shall be obtained where “the complainant is incapable of consenting 
to the activity.”166 This provision is instilled to safeguard the sexual sanctity of those who lack 
the mental appreciation in giving actual consent. Where an individual has been induced into a 
state of unconsciousness, their active mind ceases to exist. The unconscious person’s consent 
regarding the activities perfumed upon them will fall into the realm of incapacity in consenting 
to such activities.  
Consent at this stage of the inquiry is cemented as an express and cognitive form,167 given by 
a person with sufficient legal capacity in relation to the actual sexual activity, as prescribed by 
the Canadian criminal law. This reasoning derives by virtue of the aforementioned provisions 
of the Code.168 Implied consent, or advanced consent, is not accounted for within the criminal 
law jurisprudence of sexual assault within Canada. This is also absent from any applicable 
statute, proving that affirmative consent is the minimum threshold of acceptance within this 
developing defence.169  
The complainant (K.D) was a long time sexual partner of the accused (J.A) and the couple had 
a two-year-old son.170 The complainant and the accused had engaged in consensual 
sadomasochism within their sexual tenure, dabbling in the realm of erotic asphyxiation. The 
complainant had noted she understood that the inherent danger of the erotic asphyxiation might 
strip her of her consciousness within the activity.171 The practice of the sexual partners had 
rendered the complainant unconscious for what was believed to be less than three minutes.172 
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The accused inserted a dildo into the anus of the complainant and then bound her hands 
together.173 All of these acts were performed whilst the complainant drifted in a state of 
unconsciousness.  
The complainant had reported to the police of the assault she had suffered by the conduct of 
the accused. Within her video-recorded statement,174 she stated that she did not give her consent 
for the sexual activity that was performed upon her whilst she dwelled within the unconscious 
state. However, at the dawn of the trial, the complainant had abandoned her testimony against 
the accused, stating that she had only made such a statement as the accused had threatened her 
with fighting for the custody of their child.175 
The reasoning of the court in assessing the alleged consensual sexual activity performed upon 
an unconscious person takes centre stage. The court in J.A spearheads a fissure within itself 
between the majority and minority. Both wings of the court had interpreted the elements in 
differing lights.176 The majority, under McLachlin C.J., clung to the interpretation of the Code 
regarding sections that instil the voluntary element of giving and rescinding consent to sexual 
activity at will. The unconscious state had reduced the complainant into a position of 
incapacity, unaware of her surroundings and unable to comprehend the sexual activity that was 
befalling her. The complainant lacked the active mind that is expressly provided from by the 
Code177 in giving consent to sexual activities and to withdraw such consent. Thus, the sexual 
activities that occurred whilst the complainant endured the state of unconsciousness could not 
be sustained by prior consent to such practices. 
‘In some situations, the concept of consent Parliament has adopted may seem unrealistic. However, it is 
inappropriate for this Court to carve out exceptions when they undermine Parliament’s choice. In the absence of 
a constitutional challenge, the appropriate body to alter the law on consent in relation to sexual assault is 
Parliament, should it deem this necessary.178’ 
This viewpoint of the majority stands as a steadfast approach regarding the affinity of the court 
toward the statue drafted by parliament in outlining consent to sexual activity179. The majority 
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could not depart from the reach of the statute, nor was it the intention of the court to create an 
exemption to the prescribed outline of consensual sexual activity. To the majority, a 
prosecution of sexual assault against the accused was necessary based on the deviation of the 
accused’s conduct from the statute.  
The minority, following the dissent of Fish J, saw the case along the converse of this spectrum 
of judicial intrigue. The minority drew their dissent upon the facts, and not on whether an 
unconscious person may validly consent to sexual activity. The minority felt that it should be 
a question of whether a conscious person can agree in advance to engage in sexual activity 
whilst they inhabit an unconscious state.180 The focus of this dissent is to give credence to yet 
another emerging factor within this developing timeline, being that of individual human 
autonomy.  
The Supreme Court of Canada noted, via the minority, that the law seeks to promote the sexual 
autonomy of women and not make decisions for them, for the advanced consent by the woman 
(K.D) is a factor of her autonomy.181 The minority accepted that under section 273.1 (2)(b),182 
the complainant meets the unconscious element dictated within the ambit of the provision. 
However, the minority was of the opinion that the consent given whilst the complainant was 
conscious was valid in relation to the acts she intended to engage in, even if debilitated in her 
unconscious state.183 The minority further assessed that the complainant was aware of the 
sexual activity in the form of erotic asphyxiation and had consented before entering a state of 
unconsciousness.184  
‘I agree that consent will be vitiated where the contemplated sexual activity involves a degree of bodily harm or 
risk of fatal injury that cannot be condoned under the common law, or on grounds of public policy. Asphyxiation 
to the point of unconsciousness may well rise to that level, but the contours of this limitation on consent have not 
been addressed by the parties. Nor has the matter been previously considered by the Court. For procedural 
reasons as well, the issue of bodily harm must be left for another day.185’ 
Although mentioned by the minority, the spotlight upon sadomasochism’s prevalence within 
the barebones of J.A. remains unexplored.186 The omission of the inquiry regarding the practice 
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of sadomasochism, and asphyxiation, in particular,187 could have yielded a clearer 
understanding as to the Canadian law’s acceptance of consensual sadomasochism. The 
exploration of the sexual act of sadomasochism, in the form of asphyxiation that causes actual 
bodily harm, would have been a substantial leap for Canadian criminal law jurisprudence 
regarding acts of this nature, their legal ambivalence and attempted legal interpretation.  
The majority of the court debunked the confusion of advanced consent to sexual activity before 
a consenting individual enters an unconscious state. The Supreme Court could not allow the 
recognition of advanced consent to sexual activity where an individual is rendered 
unconscious; as the ability to rescind such consent is not available for one who inhabits such a 
state.188 This is unlike medical procedures under anaesthetic, where there is a social utility and 
acceptance for the procedure, which brings actual harm upon the patient. The reasoning 
regarding the judgement of the court is derived from the lack of capacity of a complainant to 
appreciate the nature of the acts that befall them during their unconscious state. This is observed 
in stark isolation, for the possibility of the extension of the sexual activity performed could go 
beyond the envisioned consent of the unconscious individual.  
An outlandish debate occurred where the court noted that there are instances where a partner 
kisses their sleeping partner or touches them with the express consent of that partner before 
they enter a state of slumber.189 Even though one partner is asleep, inhabiting a state of 
‘unconsciousness’, such an act cannot be viewed in the same eye of scrutiny as the case in 
question. To the court, this interpretation should further understand that consent itself should 
not strive to criminalise such innocent and normative behaviour between partners. As alluded 
to by the court, the act of sadomasochism practised in erotic asphyxiation is not in accord with 
such common behaviour between sexual partners.  
The importance of the judgement of J.A within this judicial timeline is the prospective reach 
of the principles forged by the court to future sadomasochistic cases that involve the 
unconsciousness of a partner. The practice of sadomasochism occurring in asphyxiation is 
prevalent and hazardous, as noted in Emmett.190 Where a case involving asphyxiation occurs, 
and an individual had consented to sadomasochistic activities to be performed whilst they 
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inhabit an unconscious state, a court that follows the judgement of J.A would have sufficient 
reason to prosecute such practice on the crime of sexual assault. This, however, must be drawn 
from the assessment of the nature of the harm caused and whether such had caused actual 
bodily harm. The prospect of the validity of advanced consent to sadomasochism proves remote 
and unrealistic, based on the inherent risk of the sexual practice.191  
  
2.2.10) 2013: R v Lock at Ipswich Court (Judgement on 22nd January 2013) – England 
Amongst the more recent cases arising from the jurisdictions of Canada and England regarding 
alleged consensual sadomasochism is that of R v Lock.192 This case, though not as extensively 
critiqued as Brown,193 lends a contemporary legal viewpoint on consensual harm between 
adults. 
A consensual agreement, along with a written contract, existed between the participants with 
Mr Lock assuming the role of a dominant, and a female participant (‘Ms X’) assuming the role 
of the submissive ‘slave.’194 The agreement between the parties expressed an emulation of a 
domination scene from the popularised fictional piece, ‘Fifty Shades of Grey.195’  
Ms X, to safeguard her anonymity, had consented to be tied to the floor and whipped upon her 
buttocks by Mr Lock and subsequently suffered bruising.196 The coupled had agreed that the 
safe-word, ‘red’, should be used by Ms X if she felt that the practice became unbearable, 
signalling Mr Lock to cease.197 Ms X did not use the agreed safe-word and after the activity, 
she had sued Mr Lock for damages caused by the injury of the alleged assault. Ms X’s 
testimony is noteworthy, as she stated that she knew she would be whipped in bondage, 
however, she did not anticipate Mr Lock to unleash such a force upon her.198  
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The state charged Mr Lock under section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act,199 seeing 
the charge of assault brought for the commission of actual bodily harm. It is evident that the 
State’s inquiry regarding the possible prosecution of sadomasochism had not shifted from the 
derivative of the Act’s provision, being the materialisation of actual bodily harm.200 However, 
the pertinence of this consideration is the developing viewpoint of public policy concerning 
consensual sadomasochism.201 It should be noted that public policy alone is unlikely to serve 
as the definitive factor of exempting a prosecution, or limiting the criminality of an act; 
however, such may rightly serve in mitigating such.  
The inquiry of the Ipswich Court sought to determine the validity of the consent given by Ms 
X to such a physical practice. Upon an inspection of the case in point, the Court attempted to 
determine whether consent could serve as a defence for Mr Lock concerning the actual bodily 
harm he had caused. The court, navigating through the straits of consent as a defence to the 
harm incurred, gravitated toward surfacing Mr Lock’s criminality in relation to the 
sadomasochistic activities that were practised.202 Consensual activity involving bondage and 
domination in the past would have been met with swift punishment, as was explored in the case 
of R v Brown where the materialisation of actual bodily harm was inflicted upon a participant.203 
Consent as a defence to actual bodily harm caused by a defendant becomes irrelevant, for the 
harm which is practiced is viewed as inherently unlawful.204  
Even though he was charged by the Court, Mr Lock was acquitted from the charge of assault 
arising in actual bodily harm upon the facts of the matter, as the positive actions of Ms X 
confirmed her intention to partake in the sadomasochistic activity.205 In addition, the discussion 
preceding the consensual harm had highlighted the nature of the intended sadomasochistic 
encounter and established a shared desire in sadomasochistic affiliation between the partners.  
In commentary of this relatively recent judgement, it is important to consider the unique 
relationship between Mr Lock and Ms X. The dynamic between the partners was cemented by 
the alleged influence of ‘Fifty Shades of Grey’, being the foundation of sadomasochistic 
exposure to the public at large. Furthermore, in contrast to Brown, which renders consent to 
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sexual violence as an irrelevant defence for an accused, the court considered the positive 
actions of participation of Ms X preceding her bruising by whipping. Ms X had acquired a 
tattoo in support of her sadomasochistic relationship with Mr Lock, reading as “property of 
Steven Lock” above her private region. This is yet another factor of observation as to positive 
act preceding the sadomasochistic encounter that affirms the consent to bodily harm by Ms X.   
It must be noted that the court did not emancipate the practiced consensual sadomasochism 
into a realm of accepted exemptions regarding the materialisation of actual bodily harm in such 
practices. It appears that the court when acquitting Mr Lock had interpreted the case on its own 
facts and merits. In R v Brown,206 the defence of consent itself could not shake the court’s 
tolerance in condoning consensual sadomasochism where actual bodily harm had materialised. 
In Lock,207 actual bodily harm was practiced, yet Mr Lock was acquitted based on sufficient 
doubt observed by the jury regarding his guilt to cement a conviction. The shared understanding 
of the participants, their positive actions of prior agreement and the shared desire of deriving 
pleasure from the practice were accessory considerations to the court’s inquiry.   
It is submitted that the question that lingers regarding the analysis of the practice is ‘at what 
level of intensity shall actual bodily harm, caused by consensual sadomasochism, be tolerated 
by a court?’ The desire to unearth this judicial anomaly within our contemporary age lingers in 
grey hues of its own within the legal spheres of England and Canada. However, there exists 
submissions of legal literature within these jurisdictions that impliedly strive to illuminate the 
current question. If such an act of consensual sadomasochism had occurred in the same vigour 
on par with that of Emmett,208 perhaps the court may have interpreted the validity of the injured 
partner’s consent in a different light. However, the judgement of Lock itself is a testament to a 
court’s interpretation of consent within activities that bring consensual and an understanding 
of the nature of the facts therein.209  
 
2.3 The South African Viewpoint Regarding the Defence of Consent to Bodily Harm 
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The South African perspective of the legal defence of consent is a focus of consideration 
regarding the interpretation of consensual bodily harm. In most instances of human interaction, 
the law does not endorse consensual violence to be inflicted between individuals.210 Consensual 
sadomasochism, throughout the subsistence of this chapter, has derived itself from the 
developments of the international perspectives of Canada and England respectively. What 
appears to be the unanimous judicial interpretation of consensual sadomasochism is that 
consent alone to this practice is not enough to sustain itself as a valid defence where actual 
bodily harm is practiced.  
As noted earlier, consensual sadomasochism, or sadomasochism in general, has not yet 
emerged before the South African judiciary, nor is the definition of this physical act layered 
within South Africa’s criminal law legislation.211 Reeling in the latter developments from the 
English and Canadian courts regarding consensual sadomasochism, the doctrine of public 
policy emerges within the predominantly rigid prosecution of such acts by English and 
Canadian courts.212 The attempt in commenting upon the possible South African perspective, 
regarding the envisioned defence of consent to sadomasochism that brings varying degrees of 
bodily harm, is an incentive for exploration and assessment in our pluralistic society. 
The defence of consent within South African criminal law may yield a favourable outcome to 
an accused who has committed an unlawful act; exempting their alleged criminal behaviour 
upon a warranted justification ground.213 However, as shared by the viewpoints of England and 
Canada, South African law will not allow the defence of consent to sustain itself where the 
harm that is caused is beyond a permitted general limit.214 A limit of consent’s reach must be 
explored in relation to the act in question along with the nature of the harm inflicted. This 
delves into vast networks of investigation and the interpretation of legal principle, taking into 
consideration the materialisation of the harm from the consensual practice, as well as the legal 
recognition of the act itself within our legal system. 
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2.3.1 The Volenti Non Fit Iniuria Doctrine in South African Law  
 
Consent and its ambit as a legal defence in South African criminal law is subject to the 
conscious will of an individual who gives their consent to a particular act.215 The common law 
volenti non fit iniuria doctrine serves as a candid test for the defence of consent to bodily harm 
within the South African legal system.216 Tshiki J, in the case of Plumridge v Road Accident 
Fund,217 elaborated upon the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine in the following stead: 
“If one has regard to the interpretation, particularly the translation to English of the maxim in the South African 
context, anyone who voluntarily assumes the risk cannot later be held to complain if the assumed risk results in 
harm occurring, therefore, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk should be upheld.218” 
The volenti non fit iniuria doctrine sets the stage for consent to bodily harm by participants to 
a physical practice, tied to the notion of a voluntary assumption of risk by the complainant’s 
consent. This doctrine of the ‘justification of harm’ runs in a stream of two separate niches of 
consensual injury that are acceptable within South African law. Both serve as pivotal starting 
points and offer conclusive considerations in assessing consensual sadomasochism, if the 
practice finds itself before the judiciary.  
Firstly, one may consent to a specified injury, such as a specific surgical procedure that brings 
guaranteed bodily harm.219 Informed consent may be raised a defence where the alleged victim 
was aware of the risks involved within the specific physical practice.220 The patient who 
provides their informed consent to the surgery is aware of the precise injury arising from this 
avenue of harm, and so exempts the liability of the doctor.221 Any deviation, or contradicting 
harm, caused by the doctor from the consented injury shall be considered as a breach of that 
patient’s consent.222   
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Secondly, one may consent to the assumption of the risk that an injury may occur.223 This is 
common in certain professional sports that traverse the borders of imminent harm, such as 
rugby or boxing. A rugby player, for instance, voluntarily assumes the risk of an injury 
occurring within the regular scope of a rugby game the moment he, or she, commences with 
the activity.224 An apt description of a rugby injury may be perceived as: 
 “[A]ny physical complaint, which was caused by a transfer of energy that exceeded the body's ability to maintain 
its structural and/or functional integrity and that was sustained by a player during a rugby match or rugby 
training, irrespective of the need for medical attention or time‐loss from rugby activities.225” 
The risk of injury could occur in the form of a sprained shoulder or a broken nose – or any 
other injury that is a reasonable risk to the human body within the regular practice of the 
game.226 The essential facet of this niche of the doctrine is that the harm of the injury is not 
guaranteed to occur, merely there is a risk of such harm materialising, which is accepted by 
participants of the game.227 However, where the injury is outside the general scope of the 
activity consented to; the application of the doctrine will cease to hold any credence as a 
defence for the harbinger-of-the-harm.  
This second niche of the doctrine is difficult when applied to consensual sadomasochism, for 
the assessment of a South African court would be perplexed in attempting to define the validity 
of the act before it can apply any form of legal interpretation in assessing the inherent risks of 
the practice. Furthermore, every practice of sadomasochism is exclusive to the consenting 
partners within their personal and private sexual panoply.228 This shall make the creation of a 
general assessment difficult within the developing South African criminal jurisprudence of the 
practice, as each sadomasochistic encounter shall generally not occur in the same distinction. 
A couple who practices a specific form of harm shall differ in the harm desired by another 
couple to the practice of sadomasochism,229 based on the intended nature of their unique 
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agreements.230 This is substantially inconsistent by comparison to the game of rugby, where 
there is a consistent application of universal and unanimous rules that are binding upon every 
rugby match. Lastly, the concept of the public policy is no stranger to this segment of the 
doctrine.231 In a rugby game, the public will not view certain conduct as unlawful, even if a 
serious injury has occurred, so long as the harbinger-of-the-harm’s conduct was not in 
contravention with the accepted limits and rules of the game. Sadomasochism, even if 
consensual in nature, shall prove odious to assess in the possible existence of ‘harm that may 
occur’, for harm is guaranteed within the inherent nature of the practice.  
A court of South Africa, when interpreting the elevated defence of consensual harm caused 
within sadomasochism, will find a greater interpretative perspective within the first niche of 
the doctrine. Just as medical surgery brings with it a specific and guaranteed bodily harm, so 
too is the harm within a consensual sadomasochistic relationship entrenched. At the advent 
stage, the desired harm is negotiated between the partners when assuming their roles to the 
‘scene’.232 The first perspective of the doctrine operates in a complementary correlation with 
the concept of consensual sadomasochism; where the activity is performed willingly, unforced 
and between consenting adult partners for sexual gratification. The doctrine will align itself as 
a justification to the harm caused within a consensual sadomasochistic relationship if the 
following are satisfied, as laid out in the assessment of the application of the doctrine in Seti v 
South African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd.233 (The applicability of the volenti non fit 
iniuria doctrine is adapted from the aforementioned case to reflect the possible requirements 
for a valid defence of consent to a sadomasochistic encounter): 
(a) “The injured submissive was aware of the harm that will be imposed by the 
dominant, with complete appreciation and the full knowledge of the intensity of the 
harm and its scope. This can be juxtaposed to the level of informed consent that 
exists within medical operations between patients and doctors.234     
(b) The submissive must show a holistic appreciation to the harm that is administered 
by the dominant. Thus, mere knowledge of the envisioned harm, and the possible 
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assumption of the risk of its materialisation is inadequate to spur the sustainability 
of the doctrine as a defence for the dominant.  
(c) The harm that is consented to by the submissive infringes their bodily rights of 
safety, security, and protection; as safeguarded by section 12 of the Constitution.235 
Thus, the submissive must appreciate that their consent to the bodily harm shall 
impliedly waive and limit their Constitutional rights. However, this subjective 
regulation of inherent Constitutional rights by the submissive is not absolute, as the 
bodily harm itself would be assessed by the presiding court. 
(d) The dominant’s exertion of physical force in administering the harm must walk in 
line with the limits created by the submissive’s consent.236 Where the dominant’s 
conduct is converse to the consent of the submissive, regarding the envisioned 
bodily harm, the doctrine cannot be raised as a defence.  
(e) The submissive’s consent must unravel into all avenues of potential harm that may 
arise from the conduct of the dominant. In addition, the agreement of safe-words to 
cease the sadomasochistic practice should be agreed upon in negotiations prior to 
the consensual sadomasochism. These safeguards to the administration of bodily 
harm should be known by both the dominant and the submissive respectively. 
(f) With the concept of informed consent blooming within the volenti non fit iniuria 
doctrine, consent by the submissive to bodily harm must be freely given, and the 
risk of the promised harm from the sadomasochism voluntarily assumed upon the 
submissive’s participation.237 This, once again, propels the prominence of the 
concept of autonomy within South Africa’s stance regarding the volenti non fit 
iniuria doctrine’s applicability as a defence of consent to bodily harm.  
(g) The act of consent to bodily harm is a unilateral act of the submissive,238 echoing 
the concept of real consent. Thus, consent to an injury, or the assumption that a 
harm may occur; must be subjectively foreseen and understood by the submissive 
when interpreting the envisioned harm to be administered by the dominant. Coupled 
with this perspective; a positive action by the submissive, expressing their intention 
to participate, must be followed in support of the envisioned harm. This will cement 
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the positive act of consent; however, such may not give legal validity to the act of 
sadomasochism. For the submissive to effectively initiate a legal act; such as the 
giving of consent to a particular activity, they must be imbued with legal capacity. 
(h) Where the dominant is negligent in their conduct, and a deviant harm arises from 
their actions, the doctrine cannot be raised as a defence. This is hinged upon the 
understanding that the submissive has not consented to the negligent harm caused. 
(i) Based on the unilateral concept of consent, revocation can be concluded at any time 
by the will of the submissive, in this instance, by virtue of a safe-word.239”  
The volenti non fit iniuria doctrine will hold itself as a prominent defence if a case of 
consensual sadomasochism is exposed before the South African judiciary on a criminal charge. 
Where a matter bringing variant degrees of bodily harm is brought before a South African 
court, it would be pertinent to first establish whether consent to bodily harm is permitted within 
the gaze of the law. The second inquiry of a court, in light of the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine, 
would then consult the severity of the consented harm upon the injured partner and, if at all, 
the extent such harm might have upon others who are not a party to the consensual activity. 
 
2.3.2 Consent as a Defence to the Commission of Bodily Harm in South Africa 
 
For consent to qualify as a defence in South African criminal jurisprudence, all of the following 
three requirements must be observed: 
1. The complainant’s consent to the activity of the practice must be acknowledged, or be 
recognised, within the law as a possible defence.240  
The law of South Africa will hold consent to bodily harm as a potential defence if the 
act consented to by a complainant is recognised within the legal system as lawful.241 
This is problematic in forging the legality of consensual sexual violence, as legal 
literature encompassing this practice does yet not exist within the archives of South 
Africa. The criminal law, in turn, does not refer to the practice of sadomasochism in 
legislation or case law. The first requirement of a valid defence of consent appears to 
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fail within the looming plethora of consensual sadomasochism, based on the dearth of 
legal literature within South Africa in aiding the state in defining the practice.              
The difficulty also arises based on the inherent nature of the consensual sexual practice 
itself, the causing of physical and psychological pain in the pursuit of sensual 
gratification.242 Even if undefined within the South African legal nucleus, the law shall 
inevitably brand consensual sadomasochism as the administration of harm by one 
individual unto another, rather than perceiving it as a mutually gratuitous practice.243 
Moreover, if the state is faced with a physically hazardous surfacing of consensual 
sadomasochism, its interpretation may be paralleled to that of a sexual assault, based 
on the intensity of the harm caused.244  
A South African court, as resembled by the precursor international developments,245 
may rightly deny the defence of consent raised for such an unestablished activity that 
endorses violence and bodily harm; even if the practice is consensual.246 This first 
requirement for a valid defence of consent in South African criminal law jurisprudence 
already starts upon an uneasy footing regarding the practice of consensual 
sadomasochism. In an allegation of rape,247 only the absence of consent by one 
individual to the sexual intercourse will bring forward the unlawfulness of the act itself. 
In contrast to the nature of the inquiry within a rape investigation, sadomasochism 
brings with it inherent violence and bodily harm, dependant on the level agreed upon 
between the consenting partners. Thus, sadomasochism, even if consensual in nature, 
will likely be interpreted as that of an assault based on the intrinsically material harm 
that is caused, bolstering the state’s prerogative in restricting the practice of violent 
activities that bring harm within society.  
                                                          
242 P. Cross and K. Matheson ‘Understanding sadomasochism: An empirical examination of four perspectives’ 
(2006) 50 Journal of Homosexuality 134. 
243 National Coalition for Sexual Freedom “Consent and BDSM: The state of the law” (2010),  Retrieved from 
https://www.ncsfreedom.org/component/k2/item/580-consent-and-BDSM-the-state-of-the-law. (Accesed on 
1 June 2018). 
244 D. Pitagora ‘Consent vs. coercion: BDSM interactions highlight a fine but immutable line’ (2013) 10 The New 
School Psychology Bulletin 28. 
245 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
246 See Regina v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710 which highlighted that even though the element of consent is 
established between participants, high-risk physical activities are contrary to public policy and the rights of safety 
that are safegaurded by the State. 
247 Section 3 of South Africa's Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 
defines the crime of rape as "Any person ('A') who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual 
penetration with a complainant ('B'), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.  
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The element of normal medical treatment stands as an essential ember within the 
recognition of the defence of consent to bodily harm by this practice. A medical 
practitioner will be safeguarded from liability based on the ground of justification that 
the patient has expressed the requisite informed consent to proceed with surgery,248 and 
exhibits voluntary conduct in continuing with the procedure.249 The duty of the medical 
practitioner, being the harbinger-of-the-harm upon the potential patient, is to supply 
coherent information regarding the material risks and harm that may materialise from 
the procedure.250 The conveyed information bolsters patient autonomy and brings into 
focus the accountability of the medical practitioner where a deviation occurs from the 
entrenched information.251 Lastly, the immensity of the harm caused, even if it is serious 
in its occurrence, shall exempt liability on a medical practitioner if the procedure 
follows along the straits of the reasonable behaviour of a medical professional. This 
proves that the recognition of certain harmful consensual practices by the state shall 
exempt liability, even in the occurrence of grievous bodily harm.  
This is similar to the role of power exerted by a dominant over a submissive within a 
consensual sadomasochistic relationship. In a correctly performed sadomasochistic 
relationship, the partners negotiate their desired physical actions, agreeing on their 
respective roles. Partners also agree upon that which they wish to derive from the 
practice and the establishment of safe-words to offer a mechanism of restraint is 
adopted. In respect of the assessment of a sadomasochistic dynamic, a submissive 
within a sadomasochistic relationship must give informed consent to the harm desired, 
as explored earlier within the concept of the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine.  
However, the absence of the State’s recognition to this practice proves unfavourable in 
the safeguarding of a dominant who has acquired informed consent to bodily harm. The 
first requirement’s validity to being kindled as a valid defence to consensual bodily 
harm proves ever remote. 
   
                                                          
248 See L. Henley ‘Informed consent - a survey of doctors' practices in South Africa’ (1995) 85 SA Medical Journal. 
249 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 218. 
250 N. Messer ‘Professional-patient relationships and informed consent’ (2004) 80 Postgraduate Medical Journal 
278. 
251 Ibid 278-80. 
49 
 
2. For consent to succeed as a defence for an accused, the consent given by a complainant 
must also be real in its nature.252  
 
This too is a correlation of intrigue in the existence of consensual sadomasochism and 
its possible position of legal standing when overseen by South African courts. In the 
string of cases that have populated this timeline thus far, the majority of the participants 
to the sexual activities had given consent that was real. Even though participants to such 
sadomasochistic practices expressed the manifestation of real consent, this did not 
render the outcome, or the nature, of the consensual sadomasochistic relationships as 
lawful, based on the degree of the harm that was caused.253  
 
Unlike the element of consent that is a requirement for a valid contract,254 consent in 
the criminal law to an activity that causes bodily harm must be given unilaterally by the 
recipient to said harm. Real consent may only be given by an individual who is able to 
appreciate the nature of the act in which they are consenting to; thus, any trace of a 
mental impediment (or corresponding limiting mental factor) shall not be in line with 
this definition.  
 
Consent can be conveyed either expressly, or by an individual’s conduct; falling into 
the realm of implied consent. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act explicitly provides for the concept of real consent regarding sexual 
penetration,255 bolstering the voluntariness of sexual practice itself and criminalising 
actions where one partner penetrates the other without the presence of their active 
consent.256  
 
In reference to consensual sadomasochism, and if a submissive has evoked sufficient 
informed consent to the desired physical activity, the bodily harm caused by the 
consensual encounter can be viewed as satisfactory in terms of ‘real consent’.257  
                                                          
252 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law op cit note 6 at 222. 
253 See Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual harm and public interest’ (1994) 101-09. 
254 Consensus ad idem is the fundamental concept of consent within the law of contract. The lawful ‘mutual 
agreement’ between contractants is sufficient to satisfy this element.  
255 Section 1(3) of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
256 South African jurisprudence, just as the international legal sphere, proves to value and promote the principle 
of individual human autonomy.  
257 See Dhai ‘Informed Consent’ (2008). 
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Dominance and submission are as much of a duality to the practice of sadomasochism 
as a moth is to a flame. This perception of an internal dynamic to real consent regarding 
sadomasochism may turn the second element for a valid defence on its head, upon legal 
inspection by a South African court. Where an individual inhabits a position of 
dominance over another, the submissive to the power dynamic may not evoke real 
consent in the activities practised - based on the intensity of the applied force. This is a 
difficult consideration to reveal a fruitful radiance of real consent by a submissive, 
when under the control of a dominant, within a sadomasochistic encounter. The 
following discussion attempts to sculpt a rear window within the vehicle of real 
consent’s applicability in consensual sadomasochism: 
 
Even if the submissive has evoked informed consent to the bodily harm, and expressed 
voluntary conduct to participate, the sheer force of the dominant within their sexual 
demographic may restrict the voluntary withdrawal of the given consent by the 
submissive.258 Such was the claim of ‘Ms X’ in the case of R v Lock;259 where she had 
expressed real consent to the sadomasochistic practice of whipping but received a far 
more grotesque and forceful harm than she had envisioned, based on the dominance 
exerted by Mr Lock.260 As noted by Burchell, there exists a tedious domain of murkiness 
between consent and ‘mere submission’ to an act.261  
 
Where a South African court is exposed to a set of facts that are similar to that of R v 
Lock, a submissive’s consent to bodily injury within the sexual relationship must be 
explored in correspondence with the definition of real consent to bodily harm. The 
voluntary withdrawal of consent to the harm caused by the sadomasochistic practice is 
alluded to within the established practice of safe-words. Where a submissive utilises 
this mechanism, it proves that it is the intention of the submissive to withdraw from the 
practice. The nature of a safe-word can be described as:  
 
                                                          
258 Simester et al. Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (2016) 788. 
259 R v Lock at Ipswich Crown Court (Judgement on 22nd January 2013).  
260 See Akhtar ‘Sado Masochism and Consent to harm: Are the courts under undue pressure to overturn R v 
Brown?’ 
261 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 223. 
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‘[A]n agreed upon word, phrase, or signal that immediately overrides the power dynamic in play and 
indicates the desire to stop the BDSM act or interaction in progress.262’ 
 
This safety mechanism serves as a bolstering factor of encouraging the voluntariness to 
the sexual practice by the submissive, and in turn, giving flight to the applicability of 
real consent. However, the dominance brought upon the submissive still remains a 
pertinent factor of consideration in curtailing the use of the safe-word, or the failure of 
the safe-word itself to restrict the dominant’s behaviour. The safe words sanctity may 
not always be appreciated and respected by the dominant, for there are no other 
convincing factors that could prove to a South African court that the submissive’s 
retraction of consent to bodily harm was truly given in its real form. Thus, the 
applicability of a safe-word in conveying real and effective consent to participate in the 
sadomasochistic activities may not always occur within the nature of this sexual 
practice.  
 
Moreover, real consent within sadomasochism can be viewed as a possible two-tiered 
concept. Firstly, it will involve the consenting to a physical force of the informed 
sadomasochistic practice that shall bring a measure of harm. Secondly, and if such is 
desired by the partners, it relates to the mutual consent regarding the practice of sexual 
intercourse. What emerges from this is yet another factor of development that is 
necessary to explore by a South African court in dealing with such a legally shrouded 
practice. This shall probe the extent of a submissive’s real consent to the entirety of the 
sexual practice itself. In turn, a court should attempt to examine the use and 
effectiveness of a safe-word, to not only cease the sadomasochistic activity but whether 
it may nullify the consent to sexual intercourse as well.  
 
Real consent exists in a stark continuum within a consensual sadomasochistic 
relationship, as the example of the use of an agreed safe-word by the submissive shall 
express a voluntary rescindment of the practice and attempt to negate the physical 
aggression caused by the dominant. Where the voluntary abrogation of consent to 
                                                          
262 Sagarin et al., as cited in Pitagora ‘Consent vs. coercion: BDSM interactions highlight a fine but immutable 
line’ 29. 
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bodily harm, in the form of sadomasochism, is not respected by the dominant; this will 
result in a non-consensual act of violence suffered by the submissive.263  
 
‘There is a difference between consent and submission; every consent involves a submission; but it by 
no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.264’  
 
3. A complainant who has the requisite capacity to consent to the activity in question is 
capable of expressing legally recognised consent. 
 
This last, yet fundamental notion of valid consent relates to the appreciation, by a 
complainant, to understand and accept the nature of the envisioned consensual harm. 
South Africa’s legislative forerunners regarding this cognitive element of appreciation 
by an accused are drawn from sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act.265 Just 
as the exemption of a court’s conviction upon an offender who cannot appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their criminal conduct, conversely exists the nullification of a 
complainant’s consent where one lacks the requisite legal capacity to appreciate the 
nature of the act that they are consenting to.  
 
The South African criminal law jurisprudence is forged upon a stoic anvil regarding the 
recognition of a complainant’s conscious mind, operating in a manner that is capable 
of both approving and revoking consent to physical activities that may cause bodily 
harm. A complainant who is capable of evoking the aforementioned requirements 
radiates consent that will be legally recognised by a South African court and 
entrenching a possible defence for an accused to the bodily harm that was caused. 
However, where a complainant lacks this cognitive appreciation, impaired by either 
youthfulness, intoxication or a mental illness, the final requirement of valid consent to 
bodily harm shall not be satisfied.266 A South African court, if subjected to a matter 
concerning consensual sadomasochism in regard to the third element of this defence, 
                                                          
263 Ibid 32. 
264 Citing Coleridge J in Day (1841) 9 C & P 722 at 724, as cited in Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 223. 
265 Sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977  highlight the mental incapacity of an accused 
to appreciate the the nature of the criminal proceedings and their criminal liability respectivley. This weighs 
heavily on the viewpoint of mental capacity of an accused within South African criminal law. 
266 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 229-30. 
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will have sufficient general legal literature in the form of case law and legislation to 
cover the ambits of the exceptions to legal capacity.267  
 
In retrospection of the Lock case, the criminal capacity of Mr Lock was established on 
part of the appreciation that he had in inflicting actual bodily harm. Even though his 
partner was aware of the nature of the consensual harm, Mr Lock still suffered 
prosecution. However, even with the establishment of the requisite forms of capacities 
of both participants, Mr Lock was acquitted as his partner was aware of the nature of 
the harm and her consent had sustained itself during the subsistence of the activity. This 
is an example of an overseas perspective regarding the establishment of the capacity to 
consent to harm and the acknowledgement of the criminal capacity of an accused. Such 
may allow for cognisance and similarity if a South African court were to find itself in 
a similar situation and to determine the outcome based on the facts of the specific 
matter. 
 
The issue of an unconscious complainant is pertinent regarding the practice of 
consensual sadomasochism by asphyxiation, as was seen in the Canadian case of R v 
J.A.268 The criminal law will not recognise the consent of an unconscious person and 
any act committed upon a debilitated individual is deemed to be committed without 
their consent.269 The practice of erotic asphyxiation is an interesting parallel to the 
concluding element of the defence of consent. Asphyxiation may not always bring 
unconsciousness; however, the risk of a complainant inhabiting this state is heightened 
by such a practice.270 This consideration must be drawn by a court to avoid the 
ambivalence expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when faced with an 
unconscious partner to consensual sadomasochism, and the actions that follow when 
they inhabit this state.271  
 
                                                          
267 Youthfulness, intoxication, unconsciousness, and the existence of a mental defect or illness have been 
developed and judicially critiqued by South African courts within the criminal sphere. (See the Child Justice Act 
78 of 2008; Section 1 of the Criminal Law Ammendment Act 1 of 1998; Section 8 of the Mental Health Care Act 
17 of 2002).  
268 See R v J.A. 2011 SCC 28. 
269 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 230. 
270 K. Busby ‘Every breath you take: Erotic asphyxiation, vengeful wives and other enduring myths in spousal 
sexual assault prosecutions’ (2012) 24 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 328. 
271 R v J. 2011 SCC 28 at para 66. 
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The concept of advanced consent proves to be problematic within this node of the 
defence of consent to bodily harm where an individual is rendered unconscious. If 
sexual intercourse occurs whilst a complainant is unconscious, the validity of advanced 
consent will not hold any reliance as a defence within South African criminal law to 
such a physical act. This is because the complainant is unable to appreciate the nature 
of the risk of the actions inflicted upon them, based on their incapacity to consent to the 
act in focus.272  
 
The South African legislative framework regarding such sexual practices that occur 
upon an unconscious individual would define these interactions along the lines of rape, 
as expressed in section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act.273 For actions that do not involve the sexual penetration of the 
unconscious partner, but manifesting itself in physical inflictions that bring bodily harm 
or serious bodily harm, the accused shall likely be liable for the varied crime of assault.  
 
 
2.3.3 ‘I Hurt Myself Today’ – If Consensual Sadomasochism Is Found Before A South African 
Court 
 
To interpret consensual sadomasochism from a jurisprudential perspective within South 
African law, the extent of the state’s acceptance as to the intensity of the harm caused must be 
illuminated. The understanding that each sadomasochistic activity, practised between 
consenting adults, is uniquely tempered by the sexual desire of the partners is already a growing 
rumination of courts from England and Canada. Thus, to avoid rewording that which has 
already been explored earlier, and to sculpt the possible South African perspective in-line with 
the aforementioned jurisdiction’s viewpoints, relevant varying degrees of consensual bodily 
harm must be considered.274  
The consideration of Donovon loomed in a period of prosecution for those that fell within the 
English law’s precedent;275 being the causing of harm or injury which is ‘more than transient 
                                                          
272 E. Craig ‘Capacity to consent to sexual risk’ (2014) 17 New Criminal Law Review 133. 
273 Section 3 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
274 "Capacity to consent to sexual risk," 119. 
275 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
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and trifling’.276 However, in light of submissions by courts that have followed the 
contemporary, yet vague, notion of public policy; this judgement proves to create a myopic 
and dwarf-like standard for the interpretation of a consensual harm or injury; as such is already 
outlined by the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine in South Africa.277 The aged and out-dated 
precedent of Donovan shall not strengthen the South African perspective regarding the legality 
of harm caused by consensual sadomasochism, as it sets the bar of consent to bodily harm at a 
minimal threshold.278 The vagueness of this judgement by the English court, even if an injury 
is impermanent, appears to be disjunctive when juxtaposed to other state-sanctioned practices 
that result in the occurrence of grievous, or serious, bodily harm in both the public and private 
sphere.  
The consensual act of tattooing administers a sufficient amount of bodily harm, occurring in 
the bruising of the human dermis, and the release of blood is not an abnormal feature of this 
practice.279 The South African criminal law jurisprudence regarding this avenue of consensual 
harm allows for a concord in the exemption of liability for the tattoo artist, based on the inherent 
harm of this lawful activity. It seems absurd to liken this activity to the prosecution of an assault 
arising in serious bodily harm, or grievous bodily harm, as such would open the floodgates of 
the courts to disgruntled customers who had suffered harm or injury when acquiring their 
tattoo.280 The consent to such an injurious physical practice is deemed to be legal, so long as 
the requirements of the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine are satisfied between the complainant 
and the accused.281  
South African law, unlike England and Canada, does not expressly outline ‘actual bodily harm’ 
– which serves as the fundamental point of consideration within the array of judgements 
regarding consensual bodily harm. However, the current criminal law of the country does 
outline an assault occasioning in common assault and assault with intention to do grievous 
bodily harm. The latter of the varying degrees of an assault could encompass the categorisation 
                                                          
276 S. Bielefeld ‘The culture of consent and traditional punishments under customary law’ (2003) 7 Southern Cross 
University Law Review 144. 
277 Roux v Hattingh (636/11) [2012] ZASCA132 (27 September 2012) at para 28. 
278 R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498. 
279 A. Messahel and B. Musgrove ‘Infective complications of tattooing and skin piercing’ (2009) 2 Journal of 
Infection and Public Health 11. 
280 As noted by Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 215. 
281 Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 (4) SA 764 (A) 779. 
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of the harm from varied sadomasochistic practices,282 as mentioned by the courts of England 
and Canada when interpreting consensual harm. The mere causing of bodily harm alone from 
a consensual sexual encounter appears to wither within the current methodology of South 
African criminal law if an act of consensual sadomasochism finds itself before a court. The 
volenti non fit iniuria doctrine chronicles the principles of autonomy and public policy as being 
sufficient to sway a South African court’s perspective regarding the legality of this physical 
practice, based on the considerations of permitted bodily harm.283 Grievous bodily harm may 
be likened to the reach of actual bodily harm in the creation of a limit to the harm caused from 
a consensual sadomasochistic relationship if falling into the vicissitudes of a South African 
court.284  
Therefore, a standard of assessment as to the commission of the varying forms of bodily harm 
by consensual sadomasochism cannot exist where the act itself is unclassified. If a South 
African court affords consensual sadomasochism the recognition of a sexual act of expression, 
rather than an assault, perhaps categories of accepted limits to bodily harm may be established. 
The nature of the consensual harm exists as one of the many building blocks of an informed 
decision by a court in considering the seriousness of the practice as a whole. A consensual 
relationship may exist as the cornerstone for an autonomous sadomasochistic activity that 
brings physical injury upon the submissive;285 however, such may not necessarily be deemed 
as lawful when interpreting the degree of harm that is caused.286  
                                                          
282 See the case of S v Ngubeni (A459/2008) [2008] ZAGPHC 178 (17 June 2008) at para 25, where the court 
considers both the crime of grievous bodily harm and the element of intention on the part of the accused in 
administering such serious bodily injury upon a complainant.  
283 Seti v South African Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd (10026/2009) [2013] ZAWCHC 109 (8 August 2013) at 
para 23. 
284 See section 265 (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985 C. 46. 
285 S.R. Schmeiser ‘Forces of consent’  (2004)  32 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 3 - 38, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=440660 (Accessed 13 June 2018). 
286 The English case of Regina V Emmett [1999] Ewca Crim 1710 once again shines on as a noteworthy submission 
as to the disregard of a consensual sadomasochistic relationship that brings actual bodily harm. The harm caused 
by the infliction of asphyxiation and burning of the submissive proved to materialise in actual bodily harm, and 
that which resulted as a serious injury within the perception of the ever-developing concept of public policy. 
Where a similar injury is caused from a sadomasochistic relationship that is practiced within South Africa, such 
would fall within the echelons of grievous bodily harm. Just as the English court was faced with interpreting the 
consensual relationship, not exclusively to the harm caused, but also in consideration of public policy to such a 
practice; so too would a South African court’s inquiry be entrenched. The case of R v Lock at Ipswich Crown Court 
(Judgement on 22nd January 2013) also draws upon the behest of the doctrine of public policy in tempering a 
court’s judgement in the contemporary interpretation of an act of consensual sadomasochism that brings a 
measure of actual bodily harm upon a person. This emerging factor of assessment is not absolute and is 
transparently reviewed upon the facts of each case. Thus, where an individual engages within a consensual 
sadomasochistic relationship that brings, or promises, a harm such as the death of the submissive; this will 
automatically fail as a legally recognised consensual sadomasochistic relationship. See also Hanna ‘Sex is not a 
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The South African Criminal law would be justified in the restriction of an adult’s capacity to 
consent to a particular act that brings imminent harm of a gargantuan risk to the safety of a 
person; and in this inspection, it would appear to expand within the concept of the commission 
of serious, or grievous, bodily harm and death.287 The fine line of the emerging concept of 
individual human autonomy,288 bolstered within the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine, is trampled 
underfoot if the State chooses to adopt a visceral and restrictive prerogative in choosing to 
outlaw a sexual act of this nature; based on the belief that such is uncharted, socially 
ambivalent, or frowned upon.289 The latter reflects the viewpoint of many authors from the 21st 
century regarding the stance of the House of Lords in R v Brown,290 the once quintessential 
piece of legal literature in overlooking the defence of consent to bodily harm in the pursuit of 
sexual gratification.291 It should also be noted that the majority of the House of Lords also 
emphasised the concept of a social utility that must be drawn from sadomasochism for it to be 
considered within the bracket of accepted exemptions to the commission of actual bodily 
harm.292 This, once again, proves to dwindle as a notion of importance within the developing 
timeline of consensual sadomasochism, along with the already established perceptions of the 
South African criminal law’s stance regarding consensual bodily harm.  
This circle of contemplation spirals into the facts of each unique sexual encounter by the 
participants, and such, as explored by the developing international timeline, shall not override 
the defence of consent to bodily harm purely on the harm caused. The defence of consent to 
grievous bodily harm within a sadomasochistic activity that falls within the jurisdiction of 
South Africa will be left for the consideration of the relevant court, based on the factors that 
include for the nature of the consensual relationship, public policy, and the principle of 
individual human autonomy in relation to such.  
 
                                                          
sport: Consent and violence in criminal law’ (2001) 42 Boston College Law Review 241, expressing that “On the 
other end, the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from death.” This proves that even if the 
violence is consensual within the relationship, such may violate ‘normative’ legal behaviour and public policy 
considerations. 
287 S v Sikakane (B/Dh3625/08) [2009] ZAGPJHC 10 (14 April 2009) at para 6. 
288 D. Arnold ‘Vagueness, autonomy and R v Brown’ (2015) 1 UniSA Student Law Review 103. 
289 Craig ‘Capacity to consent to sexual risk’ (2014)121. 
290 Moulds ‘Is society still shackled with the chains of a 1993 England? Consent, sado-masochism and R v Brown’ 
79.  
291 I. Leader-Ellitot ‘Sadomasochists unshackled?’ (2015) 1 UniSA Student Law Review 98. 
292 Bielefeld ‘The culture of consent and traditional punishments under customary law’ 145. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
The submissions of this chapter are derived from the views of judges, precedent, statute and 
other common law regimes that need not be mentioned again. After shedding insight into the 
consensual nature of sadomasochism from both the spheres of England and Canada, it is 
evident that consent to actual bodily harm is the minimum threshold for a court to intervene 
within the private sexual practice. The gravity of the developing timeline of the international 
precedents adds persuasive value to the possible South African perspective of these practices, 
juxtaposed in light of the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine being the paragon facet for an 
accused’s defence of consent to bodily harm. What is drawn from this once murky lake of 
judicial ambivalence are the illumination of the factors of public policy and the human rights 
of the autonomous sexual partners, locked in consensual sadomasochism. 
Even when the precursor precedents expire, whether such is usurped by the coming of age of 
public policy, or the notions of a court are influenced by the developing factor of individual 
autonomy; somewhere within the private confines of a shared room, radiating in tune with 
informed consent, lies the hope of a new legal sanctuary for this sexual practice.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE FORGING OF PUBLIC POLICY AND 
DEVELOPING SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES WITHIN THE 
LEGALITY OF CONSENSUAL SADOMASOCHISM 
 
“A government can be no better than the public opinion that sustains it.” -  Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 32nd 
President of the United States of America.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In an attempt to decipher the criminal law’s perspective of consensual sadomasochism between 
adult partners within South Africa, the inspection of the international judicial precedent within 
the preceding chapter spurred the surfacing of public policy as a prominent consideration of a 
court’s inquiry of consensual harm caused. To the developing international considerations, 
prosecution of an injury caused by a consensual sadomasochistic act, bringing either actual or 
serious bodily harm, should not be tempered by the assessment of the harm alone. The 
developing trend for courts from both Egnland and Canada is to consider the hazy allure of the 
ever-changing principles of public policy. This chapter shall highlight the prominence of the 
application of public policy in reinforcing a prosecution for consensual sadomasochism, 
derived from the legal principles that have evolved within the relevant international spheres. 
England’s affinity for applying public policy when assessing the harm caused by consensual 
sadomasochism shall be reviewed by the judicial viewpoints of ‘no good social use’ and ‘the 
public benefit’ of the consensual acts. These legal perspectives shall be contrasted to the current 
position of England regarding the demographics of the contemporary social sphere’s exposure 
to the sadomasochistic material and whether the prominence of such material may restrain the 
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spearheading of public policy in achieving a prosecution. Lastly, the influence of the 
pornography industry, depicting sadomasochistic and BDSM pornography within the public 
sphere, shall be interpreted in light of relevant legislative aids. This inquiry shall consider the 
possible influence that such material has upon the private sexual behaviour of the public.  
The willingness of implementing the doctrine of public policy in sadomasochistic cases arising 
in the Canadian criminal law jurisprudence shall be mirrored by a similar orbit as that of 
English law. The Canadian law’s stance on the ‘social utility’ of the practice of sadomasochism 
shall be considered in light of sexual material available to the public at large, along with other 
contemporary cornerstones of relevant statutory and social intrigue. This consideration will be 
projected by the initial failure of the courts in departing from a consistent loop of blanket-
interpretation to all sadomasochistic occurrences under past public policy considerations. This 
will pave the foundation of the criminal law jurisprudence of Canada regarding such 
occurrences by the eventual blossoming of the contemporary outlook that was brought forward 
in Regina v Price.293   
Lastly, public policy considerations of South Africa will be interpreted in light of the 
Constitution and its supporting retinue of legal concepts that give effect to fundamental public 
policy considerations. This shall be drawn from the applicability of the boni mores criterion 
and the concept of Ubuntu as champions to public policy perspectives within South African 
law. The exploration will attempt to paint a clearer portrait of what the current public policy 
truly is and the reach of this concept to cases that involve harm to the public. This shall summon 
insight into the gravity of the legal moralism of the community at large, and whether public 
policy will be extenuated by South African courts in adding to the legal-arsenal of the State’s 
possible prosecution of acts that cause public harm. This, in turn, will spur the outlook of 
community harm and Constitutional imperatives of ensuring public safety. Finally, this will 
attempt to ascertain whether a South African court, if faced with a matter that brings such harm, 
would allow for the triumph of public policy considerations over the autonomous actions of 
the consenting adult partners.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis examined relevant cases from both Canada and England regarding the 
assessment of sadomasochism and the varying degrees of consensual bodily harm. Such shall 
not be revisited, and only relevant policy considerations will be plunged into this chapter’s 
realm of legal examination. The concord of implementing public policy by both the English 
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and Canadian courts are harnessed as a decisive factor in the justification of the State’s 
prosecution of sadomasochism; albeit with scrutiny and much debate along the ripples of 
time.294 To determine the relevance of public policy within this grey-area of criminal law, an 
exploration into the foundations of the concept must be explored.  
The High Court, in the South African case of Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO 
defined the concept of public policy as: 
‘[Just as] its synonyms, boni mores, public interest and the general sense of justice of the community – is not a 
static concept, but changes over time as social conditions evolve and basic freedoms develop.295’ 
The aforementioned consideration illustrates that the public interest is a synonym for public 
policy,296 along with the allotting of the boni mores criterion within this niche in South African 
law. At its core, the evolution of time moulds the transition of public policy to be malleable 
within the current paradigm of social perspectives and in the direction of an authoritative 
creation of values, objectives, and goals within the public at large.297 Guidelines in developing 
and honing policy considerations of the public should be created upon the needs of the public 
itself.298  
Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr stated within his epigram, ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose’ which loosely translates as ‘the more things change, the more they remain the same.299’ 
This stands within a cacophony against the principle etymology of public policy, as the nature 
of public policy is not static.300 Instead, public policy exists as a panoply of the Constitution of 
South Africa.301 Therefore, the State is under a duty of care to the public at large in order to 
facilitate the constitutional foundations that influence the public sphere and to prevent against 
such foundations befalling harm and infringement.  
                                                          
294 The case of R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 endures as a much debated node within the legality of consensual 
sexual violence and its permissibility within a legal system. 
295 Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO [2006] ZAWCHC 65; 2006 (4) SA 205 (C) (24 March 2006)  at para 
24. 
296 See Curators, Emma Smith Educational Fund v University of Kwazulu-Natal [2010] ZASCA 136; 2010 (6) SA 518 
(SCA) which confirms the comprehension of public policy as the 'public interest', at para 40. 
297 N.L. Roux ‘Public policy-making and policy analysis in South Africa amidst transformation, change and 
globalisation: Views on participants and role players in the policy analytic procedure’ (2002) 37 Journal of Public 
Administration 425. 
298 Ibid 421. 
299 V. Bhargava ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose [the President's Page]’ (2013) 51 IEEE Communications 
Magazine 6. 
300 Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO [2006] Zawchc 65; 2006 (4) Sa 205 (C) (24 March 2006) at para 
24. 
301 Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); 2007 (7) BCLR 691 (CC) at para 28. 
62 
 
 
3.2 England 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
 
The stance of the English criminal courts, in the years of consensual sadomasochistic inquiry, 
projects that the individual autonomy rights of adults are far from absolute where one consents 
to and performs activities that result in actual bodily harm, or greater.302 The case of R v Coney 
paved the English common law’s perspective on the relationship of the doctrine of public 
policy to activities that bring actual bodily harm.303 The practice of bare-knuckle fighting was 
held to contradict the values of the public interest and that the very acceptance of the magnitude 
of actual bodily harm would vitiate consent itself, rendering such a practice as an assault.304 
Thus, a criminal offence was borne in Coney, despite the participant’s willingness, eagerness, 
unequivocal consent, and desire to participate in the activity in question. Further, this also 
attempts to dissuade the public itself from supporting and witnessing such a ‘sport’. The 
common law stance of Coney, and the applicability of the doctrine of public policy in 
perceiving a consensual practice to be unlawful; presents itself as almost a defining factor for 
a criminal court’s inquiry in determining lawfulness.  
In Attorney-General’s Reference,305 the court entrenched that certain public practices fell 
within accepted exemptions to a prosecution where actual bodily harm, or greater, occurs from 
a consensual physical relationship. However, the English criminal law jurisprudence cemented 
the perspective of Coney;306 stating that consensual injuries, which occur in actual bodily harm 
or greater, are contrary to public policy considerations of preventing against harm unto others 
and cannot be validly consented to.307 The State renders this activity as an assault, based on the 
intensity of the harm caused by the intentional conduct of the accused.308 This thus proves that 
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an accused could not avoid criminality, despite the consent and willingness of the participants 
to the practice.309 
Public policy in England has rooted beliefs in the concepts of ‘social utility’ and ‘good reason’ 
in attempting to justify activities that cause measures of bodily harm within the public.310 There 
have been numerous developments in English law, as mentioned under Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, which are accepted by the courts of the land as exemptions to the inherently 
unlawful harm that is practiced between consenting adults. This is inspired by the displacement 
of the activities that have garnered a measure of social acceptance and utility within the 
foothills of public policy.  
The emergence of the defence of consent to bodily harm by consensual sadomasochism proves 
to fail as a justifiable social exemption by the judiciary England in the context of the act itself, 
for the interests of public safety rebukes such harmful practices on the absence of any apparent 
social benefit.311 What is pertinent about this submission is that it inflates the brewing cloud of 
the doctrine of public policy within the jurisprudence of England, carving inroads into both the 
public and private sphere of autonomous adult interaction as desiring a ‘social benefit’ from 
sadomasochism for it to be legally valid. The interpretation of public policy at this judicial 
juncture proved to be as far reaching as to the very sanctums of individual private settings,312 
as was later confirmed in R v Brown.313 
The judgement of Brown struts and frets within this judicial comparison in a lingering aura of 
the desired critique regarding the emergence of public policy within the judiciary’s 
interpretation of consensual sadomasochism. The majority of the House of Lords, in the 
reliance of the doctrine of public policy to prosecute the actions of the accused sadomasochists, 
saw the act as cruel and barbaric, unsettling within a civilised society and harmful to the public 
at large. Lord Templeman of the majority, as quoted earlier, perceived sadomasochism as ‘evil’ 
within a moralistic society.314 The impetus of Lord Templeman’s viewpoint serves as a caveat 
to those that would indulge in such ‘pleasures by violence’ that bring actual bodily harm, 
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entrenching the prosecution of this practice that was, and is, perceived as divergent to public 
policy and failing to fall within the framework of social utility.315  
The issue that arises capriciously from the majority viewpoint in Brown, as noted by Kerr,316 is 
the implementation of what is considered by the judiciary to be ‘in the public interest’; by virtue 
of a proposed ‘moralistic’ criminalisation of sadomasochism. This stance nestles within the 
thicket of State paternalism as an over-arching dictator in restricting the autonomy of 
consenting adults.  
Lord Templeman, acting as a custodian for public policy and public safety, vied for a moralistic 
proposition for the prosecution of consensual sadomasochism, as such existed within sectors 
of ‘cruelty and evil’. His supporting retinue of Lords, Jauncey and Lowry, brought forward the 
paternalistic perspective that the State may intervene within the private sexual activities of 
adults where such is merged with violence to derive gratification, and capable of inspiring 
public violence. To Lords Jauncey and Lowry, the State has a prerogative in controlling and 
safeguarding the exposure of the general public to violent conduct that bears no ‘social utility’, 
that which has the potential of ‘corrupting others’ within the said public. Albeit consensual, the 
majority deemed the intentional application of force that causes bodily injuries for sexual 
gratification to be an inherent failure of any ‘social utility’ and unable to add substantial and 
compelling ‘good reasons’ for the harm itself. 
The dissent of Lord Mustill and Slynn gnawed at the validity of the implementation of public 
policy as a factor of legal consideration of the court prosecuting consensual sadomasochism. 
To Lord Mustill, the interests of the community in examining the legality of the case at hand 
should not be done on default application by a court; rather, such should be inspected upon a 
case-by-case basis upon individual merits. The doctrine of public policy is a pertinent factor 
for the uprooting of violent conduct that has seeped through the crannies of the social 
demographic; however, the judicial granite to combat such conduct must also give way for civil 
libertarianism, as put forward by the minority. 
The reason for Brown’s perpetuity as an ongoing debate, tied to public policy considerations 
within the prosecution of consensual sadomasochism, is the application of state paternalism 
lassoing the private sphere of individual autonomy within immediate judicial scrutiny.317 The 
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justification of public policy as a factor for prosecution and conviction of the sadomasochists 
is tailored within a lucid tier of what was considered ‘moral’ by the majority of the House of 
Lords. The position of the majority, by one fell swoop of their gavels, attempted to safeguard 
the community at large by prosecuting a minority group’s actions that caused ‘moral harm’ and 
endangered the health and safety of the public at large. The House of Lords, in attempting to 
shield the public from knowledge of this practice, inevitably opened a Pandora’s Box of its 
own making, as the sadomasochistic practices were widely publicised upon the prosecution.  
As laden with complexities and debate as the House of Lord’s judgement was, the contrast of 
the legality of public policy applied in R v Wilson is a reflection of the ‘black and white’ judicial 
frontier of interpretation within English law.318 The court understood that public policy 
considerations would not favour a prosecution of the accused to the crime of actual bodily 
harm, as the action fell within an exempted practice of consensual bodily harm, being that of 
tattooing. What arises from this submission of public policy, exempting criminal sanction upon 
a husband who had carved his initials upon the buttocks of his wife, proves that there are 
established categories of accepted exemptions to a prosecution of actual bodily harm that will 
be favoured and tolerated as non-criminal by the English doctrine of public policy.319  
Just as the myth of Janus, with two heads facing December and January respectively, the 
judiciary found actual bodily harm to be either inherently unlawful; based on the harm caused 
by the consensual practice within society, or exempt from criminal sanction where such harm 
fell within a niche of acceptance by means of social utility or social cognisance. The stark 
duality between Brown and Wilson in applying public policy as a deciding factor to the 
unlawfulness of consensual harm exposes a multitude of social and moral facets considered by 
the respective courts.  
One of the factors in safeguarding societal and public interests by the House Lords in Brown 
was to prevent against the real risk of HIV infections,320 whereas such was not the consideration 
of public policy in Wilson, as such was viewed in light of tattooing.321 As paternalistic as the 
majority judgement of the House of Lords may be, such has come under the scrutiny of 
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implementing a criminal sanction at the moral behest of the individual Lords themselves,322 
rather than the values entrenched by the criminal law and the doctrine of public policy. Both 
cases involve consensual harm occasioning in actual bodily harm, yet Wilson went by 
unpunished, as the conduct of the participants were deemed to be ‘within the norm’ of socially 
sanctioned forms of bodily harm (tattooing) between consenting adults.   
Furthermore, the House of Lords found justification in its comparison of the violence within 
the sexual practice to the violence within a recognised sport. In light of the doctrine of public 
policy, a decisive test of the exemption of actual bodily harm caused in recognised contact 
sports is viewed as incidental to the game.323 The objective of the sporting activity is to win the 
game, and any form of sporting violence is not done in revelry.324 Consensual sadomasochism, 
in light of the assessment by the doctrine of public policy as raised by the House of Lords, 
administers a form of violence that is pursuant of hedonism. The two philosophies of violence 
exist in separate planes within the application of public policy by the courts.  
The House of Lords, exposed by the majority judgement, put forward a consideration for the 
necessity of a prosecution of an unidentified practice, such as sadomasochism, that has an 
objective to inspire violence, which brings actual bodily harm for sexual gratification. It is not 
as simple as defining the rules of sporting activities which are regulated by codes and governing 
bodies, whereas sadomasochism is generally structured and regulated by the participants 
themselves. The State shall allow such authoritative bodies to control sports, yet restricts 
individuals to control their private and consensual sadomasochistic activities. Thus, the court 
in Brown regarded public policy considerations to supersede that of sexual expression. W 
Wilson stated interestingly that: 
‘It is arguable that the House of Lords decision in Brown should be treated not as a test case for sexual 
freedom, but for the idea that even a tolerant, pluralistic society must enforce one fundamental residual moral 
value.325’ 
The judiciary of England, post-Brown, proved that it would not allow the public to intentionally 
injure and inspire the recreation of an act of violence. However, as evidenced in Wilson,326 such 
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may be exempt from punishment where there are sufficient ‘good reason’ and ‘social utility’ 
for the purpose of the conduct. These two pivotal prodigies of the English law’s stance bring a 
double-edged sword into the assessment of consensual harm. Public policy is an ever-evolving 
and developing principle, that which is projected within a kaleidoscope of relevant legal 
developments. The legal approach of the judiciary in applying the doctrine of public policy is 
an important facet of the approach of a court when hearing a matter regarding consensual 
sadomasochism.  
The English judiciary, and its readily implemented doctrine of public policy is populated by 
judicial intrigue regarding the existence of other avenues of legal focus. The judgement of 
Brown gave no quarter for individual autonomy, as the House of Lords wished to give credence 
to the interests of public health and morality. Thus, to the House of Lords, the public interest 
must encompass that which is morally shared by the community at large and the 
implementation of state paternalism exposed the sexual behaviour as contrary to such 
principles. However, as the years of judicial development grew within the country, the 
understanding of that which is ‘morally frowned upon’ did not essentially demand criminal 
prosecution to be rigidly implemented by courts.327  
A transparent and guided definition by a court regarding the actual definition of public policy 
within England appears to be omitted by the judiciary as far as the Attorney General’s decision 
is concerned. Moreover, the compelling factor of prosecution for ‘no good reasons’ to a 
practice that brings degrees of harm exists within an obscurity of fact if the act in question 
cannot satisfy the ‘good reasons’ requirement, rendering such as prima facie criminal. Thus, 
the discretion of the judiciary becomes a noteworthy factor of consideration when interpreting 
the entirety of public policy in determining the legality of consensual sadomasochism that 
causes actual bodily harm. Therefore, without a clear illumination on what a ‘good reason’ is 
within the concept of the England’s public policy, the possible perspective of the judiciary’s 
personal prerogatives are allowed to sprout and sculpt a final decision based on such liberty. 
The causing of actual bodily harm remains the commanding benchmark of judicial intervention 
when public policy is concerned, leading to the prosecution of sadomasochistic activities. The 
findings at the judicial juncture, catapulted by the court in R v Brown, proved that even the 
private activities of consensual conduct fall within a trembling crescendo of State intervention, 
by virtue of the proposed public policy considerations.  
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The Law Commission of the country contended the stance adopted in Brown upon its 
consultation of public policy’s proposed footing regarding consent to actual bodily harm in the 
criminal law.328 The Commission observed that no immediate interference by courts into the 
private lives of the consenting sexual partners is necessary, provided the interests of society 
and the public are upheld and protected within the sexual dynamic. The Commission went on 
to acknowledge that the nature of sadomasochism involves humiliation and/or physical 
violence to attain sexual gratification, and heighten the desired sexual experience of the 
partners.329 The Commission advocated for a clearer definition of consensual sadomasochism 
and evidentially strays away from the approach adopted by the House of Lords. This was done 
in hopes of bolstering a clearer social meaning to consensual sadomasochism and its accepted 
limits in the eyes of English law. To the Law Commission, the public interest may be utilised 
to interpret the participants’ individual rights of autonomy with the sexual relationship.  
The Commission, drawing inspiration from the academic opinion of Bamforth,330 illustrated 
that the social definitions of the practice of sadomasochism should ideally derive from those 
who participate in such activity.331 Bamforth concludes by surfacing a point of interest, which 
nudges the doctrine of public policy forward within this stream of criminal law, asserting that 
sadomasochism should be interpreted within its sexual nature, rather than the violence it stirs 
within the private relationship. The Commission’s proposal for reforming the reach of public 
policy within the legality of consensual sadomasochistic relationships is assessed in the 
following measure:  
‘[No one] may give a valid consent to seriously disabling injury, but subject to this limitation the law ought not 
to prevent people from consenting to injuries caused for religious or sexual purposes.332’ 
This endures as a testament to the growing consideration of individual autonomy of the 
participants to sadomasochism, and the State balancing its duty to safeguard the fundamental 
rights of its citizens by placing either exemptions and/or limitations on consensual activities 
that were earlier deemed as criminal. The State’s decision to prosecute a ‘seriously disabling 
injury’ that arises during sexual intercourse between consenting partners is derived from the 
sheer intensity of the harm caused that may affect the public at large, rather than the harm 
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inflicted upon the consenting parties.333 However, the Commission exposes that public policy 
may prove to be a zealous leap in the determination of a threshold to the nature of the harm 
that may be permitted within a private sadomasochistic relationship, where there is no ‘serious 
disabling injury’.  
Such a mustering of the doctrine of public policy, implemented in accordance with individual 
autonomy and sexuality rights, could serve in overturning the ambiguity of Brown’s proposed 
policy considerations for a prosecution of consensual sadomasochism. Professor David 
Feldman,334 as mentioned within the Commission’s report, challenges the notion of public 
policy establishing a ‘social utility’ in violent practices such as boxing, but automatically 
discrediting the violence within sadomasochism.335 The Law Commission, by propelling 
Feldman’s opinion, submits that by endorsing sexual expression within the public sphere, the 
prevailing personality rights of the participants to sadomasochism may allow for a more 
favourable judicial interpretation of the practice.336  
 
3.2.2 The Influence of Sadomasochistic Material in the England 
 
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act of the United Kingdom offers a momentary detour 
from the exploration of case law and allows for contemporary insight into the opened 
floodgates of sexual material within the public.337 Various forms of sexual imagery and material 
are no cypher to human society, as erotic artwork, architecture, and literature have existed since 
time immemorial for most civilisations and are available, even freely, to the public at large.338 
Adult sexual content and material have emerged in a ‘gold-rush’ influx within the very fabric 
of Internet web pages and social media outlets alike. The pornography industry stands as a 
multi-billion dollar global industry within the labyrinth of the Internet-age, and continues to 
grow exponentially in such a medium within the public sphere.339  
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With such technological advancements, pornographic material within the contemporary society 
is accessible in high-quality formats, at the fingertips of the viewer.340 The depiction of such 
explicit sexual material on such a vast medium proves that the concept of sexual liberalism is 
a growing perspective within society at large;341 expressing a multitude of preferential choices 
for the viewer to the nature of pornography in which they desire.342 The sexual emancipation 
of pornography, as assessed by Kutchinsky within his report Pornography, Sex Crime, and 
Public Policy,343 expresses the need for sexual arousal that has  
‘[A]wakened and strengthened a latent need for erotica among many people.344’ 
Drawing inspiration from the aforementioned viewpoint, the nature of erotica has progressed 
in the desires of audiences to include for a greater panoply of ‘rough, aggressive, and 
demeaning’ forms of pornography, departing from the ‘vanilla’ porn of old.345 Shor and Seida 
put forward two paramount assertions regarding the increase of physical aggression within 
modern-day pornography346 that is prevalent within the contemporary public sphere. Such are 
integral within the fundamentals of this chapter’s focus of public policy considerations to the 
legality of consensual sadomasochism. This asserts to put forward the contemporary 
perspective of whether the viewers, within the public itself, show an affinity toward this trend 
of sexual aggression between partners.  
The first assertion is that modern-day pornography is presumably injected with far more 
aggressive physical behaviour, especially toward women, and growing in prevalence with each 
passing year.347 The second assertion of the academics suggests that the rapidly rising wave of 
physically aggressive pornography is due to the preferences and demands of the viewers 
themselves.348 These assertions lend novel developments to the consideration of the public’s 
exposure to sexual practices involving physical aggression, be it from the pulling of hair, to the 
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spanking of a sexual partner, or to much more aggressive forms of sadomasochism.349 Thus, 
the assertions of Shor and Seida project that it is the public who inevitably alter the evolution 
of the sexual ecosystem within the pornographic industry itself, based on the desire and demand 
for more physically aggressive pornographic depictions.  
Under section 63(2) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, the criminalisation of 
possession of ‘extreme pornographic imagery’ is put forward.350 Section 63(7) further bolsters 
this notion by stating:  
‘An image falls within this subsection if it portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, any of the following— 
(a) an act which threatens a person's life,          
(b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, 
(c) an act which involves sexual interference with a human corpse, or      
(d) a person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal (whether dead or alive) and 
a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person or animal was real.351’ 
This emphasises the legislature’s stance, inter alia, on sexual material that depicts a danger to 
the safety of one’s life and bodily integrity. Such an illustration is a tremendous springboard 
for the legislative organs of England in codifying the importance of health and safety within 
the public domain, for the statute acknowledges that sexual imagery may entice the public to 
recreate that which they are exposed to. The ambit of section 63, correlating to sadomasochism, 
works as a caveat to those that would recreate activities that bring the suffering of life and the 
injury of the body within sexual fantasies.352 The practice of consensual sadomasochism, if 
agreed upon by the participants, may rightly bring such danger to the sexual partners within 
their sexual dynamic, as contained within the aforementioned provisions of the Act.353 
Indirectly, the legislature of the England takes yet another step in quashing any appeal to the 
consensual bodily harm caused by sadomasochism by the partners’ inspiration of sexual 
material depicting such.354  
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As mentioned earlier, the availability of pornographic material within the public sphere is 
widespread by the ease of accessibility via the Internet.355 The influx of aggressive pornography 
may be viewed as the herald to sadomasochism’s introduction at a heightened level within the 
public.356 This carries significant social value as the general public can no longer be viewed to 
be ignorant to the practice of sadomasochism where there is sufficient information of its 
prevalence within its social landscape. 
The Act is not without salvation for those subject to a prosecution under section 63.357 The 
statute further sets down section 66,358 which serves as a defence for those that have participated 
in consensual sexual acts that are inspired by ‘extreme’ pornographic material.359 Consent is 
once again a pertinent factor to English’s legislature and its translation of extreme sexual 
acts.360 This is problematic for the development of England’s judicial perspective in light of the 
doctrine of public policy and its viewpoint on consensual sadomasochism. This is not attributed 
to the surge of aggressive sexual material made available within the public,361 but to that of the 
leading precedent, the juggernaut known as R v Brown.362 The reach of the House of Lord’s 
precedent is radiant within the provision’s ambit in criminalising actual bodily harm that may 
arise from a sadomasochistic encounter,363 even where such is induced by the sexually 
aggressive material.364 Thus, it is not the intention of the legislature to endorse sexual violence 
to be practised within the public, even if such is already mingled within the public sphere by 
the aggressive and extreme sexual material.  
The legislature’s accommodation of a defence for an accused, who has participated in the 
provision’s outlined sexual activities,365 are not absolute, yet such may be sustained as a defence 
under section 66 (A2) where the requisite elements are satisfied.366 An accused to an assault 
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that emanates in actual bodily harm from the sadomasochistic relationship may successfully 
satisfy the defence nestled within the section where the participants have actively involved 
themselves within the depicted practice. Secondly, the accused must satisfy that the activity 
did not occur in non-consensual sexual penetration, or harm, between the participants. A 
consensual sadomasochistic encounter that is induced by the material available to the public 
has the possibility of allowing for the exemption of a prosecution by a court, based on the 
exemptions contained within section 66 (A2). However, if the appropriate English court applies 
the principles of Brown, public policy considerations would not allow for such a defence to be 
valid, based on the harm being morally divergent to a civilised society.  
Evidentially, England’s growing judicial archives of legal literature relating to consensual 
sadomasochism stands as monolith point of considering public policy’s role in this legal niche 
of consensual harm. The once champion judicial stance of Brown, implementing facets of 
public policy to prosecute consensual sadomasochism, appears to be challenged as legislation 
and social awareness itself have emerged to outline the very nature of consensual 
sadomasochism in a flurry of accessible forms and current public prerogatives.  
 
3.3 Canadian Perspective  
 
3.3.1 Overview 
 
The doctrine of public policy is not elusive within Canadian criminal law jurisprudence, and 
such has been applied well before the emergence of sadomasochism, which causes actual 
bodily harm, by the Canadian judiciary. The focus of this segment is the extent of public 
policy’s reach when a court is assessing sexual violence that results in actual bodily harm, or 
greater.  
To set the stage for the Canadian perspective of the utility and impetus of public policy in 
determining the possible criminality of consensual sadomasochism, the case of R v Jobidon 
shall be explored.367 Jobidon mirrors that of the Attorney General’s Reference from the English 
perspective, applying the doctrine of public policy to nullify the consent of individuals who 
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engaged in consensual brawls.368 This arrives at a definitive peak of what is viewed as safe 
consensual physical activity whilst interpreting the nature of the harm caused as being that 
which the doctrine of public policy shall not condone. Thus, even genuine consent to actual 
bodily harm may be vitiated where public policy triumphs with a greater societal call.369 The 
common law position of applying policy considerations to nullify consent where the harm 
administered is ‘beyond transient and trifling’ appeared to be a harm-driven inquiry by the 
court.370  
The early application of public policy within the criminal law jurisprudence of Canadian law 
proves to be akin with the English Law’s stance. Individual autonomy to engage in such fist 
fights are balanced against the compelling public interests of safety and security against said 
harm. Steed categorically divides the factors of inquiry raised by the majority in Jobidon into 
four brackets within public policy,371 which are assessed in light of the ‘public interest’ and 
‘societal norms’ perspective.372 Steed, interpreting the majority of Jobidon, observes:  
(1) ‘The social uselessness of fights.373’  
(2) ‘The concern that fights lead to larger breaches of the peace.374’ 
(3) ‘The importance of deterring fist fights.375’ 
(4) ‘The moral need to discourage intentional hurting.376’ 
The first policy consideration exists in congruency with the English Law’s stance of a ‘social 
utility’ for the consensual physical practice that brings actual bodily harm. Where such an 
activity lacks a social usage, Jobidon clearly entrenches that public policy finds no good reason 
in permitting a practice that causes serious bodily injury amongst consenting adults.377  
The second policy consideration projects that the judiciary implants the doctrine of public 
policy to ensure that public disarray, in the form of the breach of the public peace, does not 
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occur in the wake of activities that may bring serious bodily injury and harm to the public 
domain. 
The third policy consideration stressed the importance of the paternalistic approach that the 
judiciary will take in limiting the individual autonomy of the consenting adults to such 
activities by applying public policy to deter against consensual fistfights that serve no social 
utility.  
Lastly, the final policy consideration focuses on a moral need, which is intrinsic within the 
public, to discourage intentional hurting amongst the members of the public. This consideration 
ripples across the pond of the Canadian perspective in determining that which the public views 
as ‘moral’, empowering a court to uproot activity that brings a ‘moral’ harm, or threatens the 
sanctity of public morality and integrity. The same consideration of preventing against moral 
harms was raised in R v Brown, however, that being the identification of a compelling 
justification for public policy’s limitation of individual autonomy; even where the harm 
practiced is branded as ‘immoral’. The majority in Jobidon contended that civilised societies 
are embedded within the understanding that the intentional causing of actual bodily harm, or 
greater,378 is contradictory to the morals of the society and such is not only supported by the 
common law but also drawn upon within the Canadian Criminal Code itself.379  
Jobidon effectively expresses that public policy did not recognise apparent consent to bodily 
harm as a form of effective consent in relation to the harm that is caused.380 This stretched an 
over-arching branch of State paternalism that limits individual autonomy to private and/or 
personal activities, in order to instil a consensus regarding the manner in which individuals 
should be treated within the public domain. The Canadian Law Reform Commission, in its 
1984 working paper titled ‘Assault,381’ explicitly outlines that one’s consent will not be valid 
where ‘serious bodily harm’ arises from the consensual practice.382 
The case of R v Welch serves as the penultimate precedent (for its current timeframe) in 
assessing consensual sadomasochism in Canadian law.383 Here, the considerations of public 
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policy played a decisive role in the court’s approach in prosecuting the sadomasochistic actions 
of the accused. This sparks the ignition of the possible restriction of autonomy once more by 
the application of public policy and the methodology of a criminal court in prosecuting 
consensual sexual violence that brings actual bodily harm.  
The court in Welch applied a ‘Social Utility principle’, which attempted to ascertain whether 
the private sadomasochistic actions had any place within the public domain as an exemption to 
prosecution. The court followed Jobidon’s majority viewpoint in light of public policy, 
interpreting the harm caused from the sadomasochism to be against public morality and found 
no ‘good reasons’ for consensual sadomasochism, arising in actual bodily harm, to be tolerated 
by public policy considerations.  
Where lawful sporting injuries occur, even if such injury parallels the bodily harm caused in 
Welch, public policy may be justified in permitting such an injury as lawful, as the sport is 
recognised with a measure of social acceptance.384 So too is mere hurting a consideration of 
relaxation to the Law Reform Commission of Canada and such is permitted as a defence of 
consent to said harm that occurs in this form.385 Public policy perspectives of Canada at the 
time of Welch focused greatly on the causing of actual bodily harm, or serious bodily harm, as 
being an invalidator of consent to such activity. This, once again, highlights the similarity to 
English law where the general benchmark for a prosecution of said harm is the materialisation 
of actual bodily harm.  
However, the Ontario Court in Welch was alive to the nature and context of the severe harm, 
assessing its advent by the root practice between the individuals to determine whether such 
may fall within an exemption to the considerations of public policy.386 A therapeutic surgery is 
within public’s interest to permit the causing of severe harm, without liability for the surgeon, 
bolstering the social utility prevalence of the act itself, along with the policy considerations of 
the Law Reform Commission in differentiating between permitted and outlawed practices of 
consensual bodily harm.387 The nature of the actual bodily harm that was administered upon 
the complainant in Welch could not uphold consent to actual bodily harm,388 as the accused had 
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not acted in a manner of a recognised social purpose,389 or practice, to the policy considerations 
of the public.  
Public policy’s applicability in Welch did not attempt to add consensual sadomasochism that 
brought actual bodily harm into an exemption category and the court noted that: 
‘Although the law must recognize individual freedom and autonomy, when the activity in question involves 
pursuing sexual gratification by deliberately inflicting pain upon another that gives rise to bodily harm, then the 
personal interest of the individuals involved must yield to the more compelling societal interests which are 
challenged by such behaviour.390’ 
Welch itself instils state paternalism over individual autonomy by promoting that public interest 
wishes to preserve social order, preventing the spread of violence and injury and forming 
compelling viewpoints of the public peace.391 The perspective of violence inflicted for sexual 
gratification was considered as a moral harm within the Canadian public; affecting the sanctity 
of the human body and sufficient for the Ontario court to utilise public policy as a 
sledgehammer in eradicating the defence of consent to actual bodily harm from the practice.392 
Therefore, the common law authorities and the statutory powers did not permit sadomasochism 
to elude the reach of the considerations of public policy and sought to eradicate sadistic 
behaviour within Canada, especially when tied to sexual activity.  
 
3.3.2 The Influence of Sadomasochistic Material in Canada 
 
The relevant and final case to date in Canada, offering a transitional public policy viewpoint 
within a Canadian court, which interpreted the extent of harm arising from an injury by 
consensual sadomasochism, is that of Regina v Price;393 commonly referred to as the ‘Sweet 
Productions’ case. A critical inspection of this case is necessary to show the metamorphosis of 
public policy within the Canadian legal demographic, entrenching sadomasochism as a 
potential scion to the doctrine itself.  
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The facts of the case and the methodology employed by the court in approaching the legal 
issues are noteworthy, bringing into the fold of legal inquiry the prevalence of the porn industry 
within Canada, delivering videos that involve sadomasochism and other atypical sexual 
practices into the public sphere. The fibres of fact emanating from Price questions whether the 
established ideals of public policy in preventing against moral harm,394 administered from the 
sexual violence between adults in Canada, still existed as a viable point of entry for a court to 
effect a prosecution under section 169 of the Criminal Code.395  
Mr Randy Price had owned a pornographic studio called ‘Sweet Productions’ that created,396 
distributed and circulated a number of pornographic films (referred to as the ‘Eleven Videos’) 
within the public sphere;397 depicting actors engaging in bondage and discipline, dominance 
and submission, sadism and masochistic activities.398 Such was alleged by the prosecution as 
falling into the realm of the obscene material, capable of corrupting the morals of the public399. 
Once again, the stressing of sadomasochistic practices as being a facilitator of the corruption 
and impairment of the public’s morals unravels before a Canadian court. Section 163(8) of the 
Canadian Criminal Code dictates: 
‘For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of 
sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall 
be deemed to be obscene.400’ 
The statute explicitly reflects the perception of the Canadian legislature in outlawing the 
publication of sexual content within the public sphere depicting, inter alia, violence and 
cruelty; which ultimately forms the subsistence of a sadomasochistic relationship. However, 
the Criminal Code was enacted before the advent of the Internet’s boom and the widespread 
pornographic material from this medium. 401 The court noted that up to seventy-three percent 
(73%) of Canadians at the time of the Sweet Productions case had access to the internet, a vast 
number of the populous itself ;402 and that an estimate of at least seventy (70) Internet sites 
existed which depicted BDSM and sadomasochistic content at that time.403 The court also noted 
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that the available websites, that publicised such depictions, portrayed imagery and content that 
included ‘more extreme’ forms of sadomasochism.404 These submissions by the court, even if 
bound by the appropriate sections of the Criminal Code,405 illustrate that the exposure of BDSM 
and sadomasochistic activities had already infiltrated the Canadian public sphere and had 
grown exponentially by the boom of the Internet-age.  
The court was also alive to the growing prevalence of BDSM and sadomasochistic influences 
within the entertainment industry, as numerous films depicted extreme sexual violence and 
sexual abuse between adults.406 The current age of societal expansion had brought the advent 
of BDSM centres within the Canadian public, where individuals could pay to observe or to 
partake in the consensual sexual activity.407 In a period of fewer than ten years since the 
judgment in Welch was passed, the court in Price appeared to be synthesised to the developing 
social recognition within the public sphere to sadomasochism and related activities. Thus, the 
considerations of public policy in determining whether the ‘Eleven Videos’ constituted obscene 
material that is capable of prosecution was considered by a string of expert testimonies from 
variant individuals linked to the legally ambivalent practice.  
The experts called upon by the court included police officers, medical practitioners and 
sadomasochists. Their prior exposure to the practices of BDSM and sadomasochism proved 
paramount in assessing the nature of the ‘Eleven Videos’ and whether the depictions had 
deviated from the general norm of accepted sadomasochistic behaviour.408 Expert witness Dr 
Moser submitted that the depictions had not deviated from normal human sexual behaviour,409 
and fell within the general normative values of the BDSM and sadomasochism community 
(‘The Kink Community’). The court, by effectively allowing an inquest of relevant fact and 
assessments by experts, arrived at a summit of clarity by submitting that sadomasochism and 
BDSM were not obscure practices within the current Canadian public.410  
The tipping scale of societal assimilation with the practices of sadomasochism and BDSM 
came from the testimony of Mr McDonald, a retired police officer of the Vancouver Police 
Department who had endured skirmishes with such activities during his tenure in law 
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enforcement.411 The practice of inflicting violence unto a consenting partner for sexual 
gratification had evolved within public policy itself and entered the echelons of social 
acceptance to Mr McDonald.412 This contradicts the stance of the Canadian court in Welch 
where it was viewed that sadomasochism, and related activities, caused a moral harm to the 
public as such had not found a footing within the societal sphere.  
As noted earlier, dictates of the doctrine of public policy would not desire harm to be 
administered between individuals for ‘no good reasons’, or endorse a practice that carries no 
‘social utility’. The ‘Sweet Productions’ case revolutionises this perspective by broadening the 
test of what the current public policy tenants should permit within the ever-growing societal 
sphere of adult interaction.  
The alleged sexual obscenity of the ‘Eleven Videos’ was juxtaposed to the tests created under 
existing Canadian law in determining a footing of such material’s tolerance within public 
policy of Canada.413 The case of R v Butler confirmed the Canadian parliament’s reach by 
criminalising both the distribution and sale of obscene material, in line with section 163 of the 
Criminal Code.414 Butler further entrenched the considerations of public policy to safeguard the 
morals of the Canadian public at large by limiting the individual autonomy of a group that 
threatens a moral harm through such obscene publication. The court in Price tactfully made 
mention to Butler in that alleged obscene material must not only involve a dominant sexual 
characteristic, but such must be an ‘undue’ exploitation of the sexual depiction itself to be 
classified as obscene.415 The Canadian approach of determining whether a publication of sexual 
obscenity satisfies the ‘undue’ characteristic and sufficient to cause harm to the public are: 
(1) the Community Standard of Tolerance test;     
 (2) the Degradation or Dehumanization test;      
 (3) the Internal Necessities test.416  
The community standard of tolerance test proved to be the litmus test of inspection to assess 
the Eleven Videos. Such attempts to determine what the Canadian public wishes exclusively 
to the community as a whole, not a minority group. Based on the standards held in Welch, the 
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Canadian community has evolved and developed in line with BDSM centres of intrigue and 
the vast array of internet sites. This proves that the community exists in a contemporary 
perspective  
The court, in attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ‘Eleven Videos’ 
constituted obscene material, sought to ascertain whether the current Canadian public would 
see the videos as obscene, thus failing the Community Standard of Tolerance test. To the court, 
expert opinion solidified that the ‘Eleven Videos’ constituted normal sexual behaviour, and in 
tune with the general modus operandi of a normal sadomasochistic relationship and its variant 
practices.417 The exposure of the Canadian community to the surge of BDSM centres available 
to adults and the promotion of such similar content in fictional portrayals inhabited multiple 
facets of society and proved to be yet another factor that eased public policy considerations 
toward a tolerance of the extreme and graphic sexual content of the ‘Eleven Videos’.418 The 
court stressed that the prevalence of the porn industry, along with fictional films depicting adult 
sexual interactions that existed at a greater extremity than the ‘Eleven Videos’, were sufficient 
in illustrating that such content had reasonably impregnated the social demographics of the 
Canadian public at large based on the ease of the material’s accessibility.419  
The Provisional Court of British Columbia could not hold the ‘Eleven Videos’ as obscene 
material, as it was the current public policy of the Canadian society that had embedded similar 
behaviour in a measure of tolerance within its growing ambit. The nature of the harm that 
existed within the ‘Eleven Videos’, to the public at large, was not incompatible with the current 
standards of tolerance within the Canadian social demographic. The court noted that such was 
condoned based on the avalanche of the community-assessment factors. However, where 
extreme sexual conduct and violence are portrayed together, contradicting the tests created to 
assess societal tolerance and other state-protected rights, such material must be deemed 
immediately harmful to the public. Therefore, from the established tests, any material that 
depicts sexual practices as being degrading and dehumanising, shall fail the societal tolerance 
perspective test.  
The Price case, as judicially exploratory and substantive for Canadian jurisprudence regarding 
the applicability of public policy to sadomasochism, did not promise the dissipation of all 
criminal charges over future sadomasochistic cases where actual, or serious, bodily harm 
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occurs within Canada. The case is, as it should be remembered, a resoundingly positive 
application of the ever-changing societal norms to a generally scrutinised form of sexual 
expression.  
 
3.4 South African Perspective  
 
The strides of the English and Canadian courts in utilising the doctrine of public policy when 
critiquing a case involving actual, or serious, bodily harm from the practice of sadomasochism 
may serve as the architect of a South African’s court inspiration if faced with a similar criminal 
law dispute. Even if a South African court is yet to hear such an acute criminal matter, the 
judiciary is still equipped with substantial legal aids of its own to effect a sound application of 
the doctrine of public policy to consensual activities that cause actual bodily harm, or greater. 
By virtue of the Constitution’s transformative nature, and support from the existing judicial 
concepts, such as the boni mores and Ubuntu, a coherent analysis regarding public policy’s 
tolerance of consensual sadomasochism may be synthesised.420  
 
3.4.1 The Boni Mores Criterion 
 
The supremacy of the Constitution of South Africa has ushered through a resounding judicial 
polymath of public convictions that weigh heavily upon the common law boni mores 
criterion.421 The criterion has a predominant role in the South African law of delict, and also 
appears within the law of contract, yet such is not a readily applied doctrine within the criminal 
law. However, based on the consideration of harm upon the public, the boni mores is viewed 
as a suitable reference point for a South African court in assessing the nature of a consensual 
practice when juxtaposed to the policy considerations of the community at large.422 To apply 
the wide-reaching ambit of the criterion, and its possible interpretation of consensual 
sadomasochism; its advent, definition, and purpose shall be explored. It is in inspiration of 
these considerations of public policy in light of the Constitution, which has seen the South 
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African legislature and Law Reform Commission make much-welcomed reforms in relation 
to, inter alia, the death penalty, the decriminalisation of sodomy, the legalisation of same-sex 
marriages, and the legalisation of substances such as cannabis.  
The criterion dates back as early as second-century Roman law,423 where Roman men enjoyed 
a perpetual period of freedom of actions, save such freedom was limited to the boundaries 
created by the overarching quotidian morals of the community at large;424 coined the ‘boni 
mores’. The boni mores included both the legal convictions and moral affiliations of the 
community, infused with written and unwritten legal convictions; and any interaction that 
deviated from these standards were deemed as contra bonos mores.425 Zimmerman, assessing 
the definition of the boni mores by the Roman jurist Papinian, accounts for the historical 
perception as being:  
‘The sense of duty and the natural affection towards gods, parents or near relatives, the respect or esteem enjoyed 
by a person in society and the innate sense of shame: these are the types of values which had from ancient times 
held together the community at large, and which in their entirety constituted the unquestioned and self-evident 
core of the boni mores.426’ 
Hence, the criterion strives for the preservation and upkeep of the morals of a particular 
community. Encumbered within this moral bracket lies the shared belief of public health, 
dignity, safety, and care.427  
The validity of consensual sadomasochism can be scrutinised in light of the boni mores 
criterion, which is now embedded within the South African Constitution; as accounted for in 
the case of African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel and Tours CC.428 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal noted that both the common law criterion, known as the boni mores, 
and the doctrine of public policy have become “deeply rooted” within the Constitution and its 
values.429  
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Thus, the validity of consent shall be contra bonos mores,430 or immoral, if the act in question 
extends beyond the threshold of the moral convictions of the community. The boni mores 
effectively limits one’s autonomy where there are greater societal convictions in favour of the 
moral and legal order of the community. Therefore, based on the legal system of South Africa 
and its Roman-Dutch roots, the common law criterion is a prolific avenue to support the 
interpretation of public policy’s weighting upon consensual sadomasochism.  
Since consensual sadomasochism has no legal definition within the South African legislature, 
public policy’s position within this issue, supported by the boni mores criterion, will serve as 
an avant-garde node for South African jurisprudence in defining the practice. The boni mores 
criterion stands as a historic and battle-hardened commander in projecting the morals of the 
current South African public and its eventual stance if consent to actual bodily harm by the 
practice of sadomasochism arises. South African courts will not permit the validity of the 
defence of consent to a practice that is contra bonos mores,431 as was explored in chapter 2. 
This eclipses the individual autonomy of the participants to the practice and inevitably bolsters 
public policy considerations within South Africa in preventing against a practice that harms 
the fundamental morals of the community.432 Thus, the doctrine of public policy, acting through 
the vessel of the boni mores criterion, sets an objective legal standard within South Africa that 
places the morals of the public above that of individual morals where harm occurs.433  
The morals of the community stem heavily from the deep-rooted constitutional perspectives, 
especially by the portentousness of the Bill of Rights as the forerunner in South Africa’s legal 
moralism. The Constitution conjures legal norms that tower as the archetypical forms of 
morality and offer clarity regarding the importance of specific human rights owed to the 
community of South Africa, reflecting the prevalence of the boni mores criterion once more.  
The dearth of information regarding consensual sadomasochism in South Africa proves to 
restrict the boni mores criterion’s full applicability. However, the consent of an individual to 
sexual violence to derive mutual gratification would ultimately focus on the violence itself as 
being contra bonos mores, as the act defiles the moral tenants of the constitutional society, 
being the infringement of bodily safety and security.434 The prevailing legal norms of morality, 
                                                          
430 A. Strode et al ‘Boni mores and consent for child research in South Africa’ (2015) 8 SA Journal of Bioethics and 
the Law 22. 
431 Ibid 23. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Section 12 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
85 
 
in general, will inevitably be met by a fissure in the state’s viewpoint on controlling violence 
between citizens, and on the other hand, the state’s viewpoint in permitting consensual sexual 
intercourse between consenting adults. Violence in the public sphere, that is without ‘social 
utility’ or ‘good reason’, would be ancillary to the boni mores, however, Canadian law has 
made mention that the rise of BDSM and sadomasochistic content has grown exponentially in 
the contemporary society.435 The prevalence of BDSM culture exists within the confines of 
many Internet sites that are accessible within South Africa, highly deviant to the freedom of 
expression afforded within the Apartheid regime.436  
The major driving force behind Internet censorship within South Africa is the Films and 
Publications Act,437 highlighting the criminalisation of child pornography that depicts an 
individual under the age of eighteen (18) performing sexual intercourse, participating in sexual 
acts, or exposing parts of their body that would classify as sexual exploitation.438 The Act 
broadly and substantively depicts the legislature’s outlook on the sexual exploitation of 
children within the porn industry, yet makes no mention of adult pornographic depictions. This 
may be interpreted as a permitted form of publication within the public sphere, so long as the 
contents of publication are in line with the Constitutional cornerstones that echo the rights to 
personhood and is reflective of the boni mores of the country as a whole.  
Therefore, where an adult pornographic video depicts the infringement of, inter alia, human 
dignity such would be divergent to the Act itself.439 The Act goes as far as classifying certain 
sexual depictions that infringe and degrade human dignity, and portray extreme violence, to be 
‘XX’ depictions.440 Thus, the Act aims to instil the Constitutional perspectives of bodily safety, 
security, and integrity; whilst also projecting the safeguarding of children’s rights and the 
criminalisation of any publication that would infringe such. Therefore, the moral convictions 
of the society (‘boni mores’) of South Africa show a development in adult sexual expression, 
however, such is constructed upon a bedrock of constitutional perspectives, which seek to 
protect children from the nature of these publications.441  
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The resonance of the boni mores criterion is capable of endorsing the current moral beliefs of 
the public at large by the evolution of the legal sphere that encapsulates its applicability. 
Therefore, where a matter arises which contradicts the proposed boni mores of the South 
African public, the courts would be best suited in considering each case upon its own merits 
within the guidance of current legislation and societal concerns that have evolved and 
developed concurrently to find a justifiable application of the criterion’s worth.442 The boni 
mores is thus not a separate moral creed that dictates a desired behavioural pattern from the 
public, rather, it is an assimilation of essential and ‘everyday ethics’ that endures as a 
commonality in all progressive legal systems.443  
 
3.4.2 Ubuntu  
 
In 1996, the implementation of the Constitution ushered South African customary law into the 
statutory reserve, tacitly implying that the notion of Ubuntu is capable of application, where 
applicable,444 by courts of the country.445 This exclusive South African jurisprudential concept 
is derived from the customary law, yet its definition is ambivalently defined to many authors.446 
In an attempt to highlight the functionality of Ubuntu within the current constitutional age, 
viewpoints from prevalent authors and case law will determine the concept’s gravity upon 
public policy.  
Ubuntu may refer to an ‘African’ way of life; tempering the perspective that society itself must 
promote,447 inter alia, humaneness,448 human dignity, and equality; which are deemed to be 
intrinsic,449 rights irrespective of an individual’s gender, race, health or status within the 
public.450 Like other constitutional concepts, which form moral and ethical bedrocks within the 
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public at large, the concept of Ubuntu is contained within the same viewpoint of applicability 
for all South Africans.451 Hence, the allotment of the aforementioned definition proves that the 
concept may be implemented across the multifaceted legal sphere of South Africa, weaving 
together common notions from different cultural groups to promote a public standard of shared 
legal moralism. Based on its constitutional lineage, the concept of Ubuntu may be readily 
applied by a court to reflect the values and notions of the South African public to new and 
developing legal issues.452 At its deepest root, the jurisprudential concept emphasises a 
reverberating policy consideration that strives to treat all members of the public with 
compassion and a respect to their inherent humaneness.453 Thus, it is apparent that Ubuntu is 
no mere principle of law; it is a concept that dictates a reputable and broad value system for a 
desired public standard of living.454   
The pertinence of this exclusive African concept facilitates South African jurisprudence to 
create its own standard of public policy assessment, unique from that of England and Canada. 
The concept echoes, inter alia, that the right to human dignity within the public is paramount.455 
The once elusive definition of Ubuntu may be illuminated to clearer heights in light of the 
constitutional and social prerogatives of maintaining and upholding human dignity.456 From a 
South African source of expected public conformity, the phrase ‘Umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu’ 
reflects the ethos of the concept.457 Thus, from this phrase alone, a holistic community 
perception of human dignity forms the basis of Ubuntu’s extensive applicability.458  
Therefore, the constitutional value of human dignity, contained in section 10 of the Bill of 
Rights,459 serves as a precinct for Ubuntu to the benefit of the South African public in its 
entirety. The relatively youthful constitutional democracy of South Africa allows for the 
blooming of the public’s viewpoint on a shared notion of legal moralism.460 Therefore, any act 
that would infringe, inter alia, human dignity, or degrade its virtue, would be contrary to 
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Ubuntu, based on its public convictions. This was prevalent in the first landmark case for the 
concept of Ubuntu’s far-reaching applicability, and possibly the most notable of its panoply, 
being that of S v Makwanyane.461  
The case illustrated that even criminal conduct,462 occasioning in murder within the public 
sphere, does not dehumanise and strip the perpetrator of their fundamental human rights when 
appearing before a court. Mokgoro J stressed the humaneness of what the concept of Ubuntu 
wished to enshrine within the Constitutional democracy of South Africa.463 Morality and the 
safeguarding of essential constitutional rights that define personhood appear to endure at the 
essence of public policy of South Africa.464 Therefore, Mokgoro J projects that human dignity 
and life cannot be diminutive within the Constitutional era of South Africa.465  
Langa J adds weight to public policy’s inspiration from the concept of Ubuntu, drawing upon 
the safeguards of human dignity and the sanctity of life within the public by the support of its 
shared values. Langa is of the opinion that a person within such a community-centric 
environment must also treat others within said community by the same measure of mutual 
respect and freedom they themselves are afforded.466 Therefore, there is a positive duty of care 
upon each individual within the South African public to realise, promote, and endorse the 
fundamental and essential rights that also belong to other members of the public.467 This is 
inspired from the inherent rights of personhood belonging to each individual within the public 
and a gleaming reflection of the age of Constitutionalism.468  
Langa J further highlights that ‘violent conflict’ is sufficient to send shockwaves through the 
public domain, capable of rendering the members of the public to denounce that which the 
concept of Ubuntu wishes to enshrine, and possibly call for retributive punishment against the 
offender.469 However, the blood-stained history that pre-dates the liberation of the nation, which 
taints the memory of the Apartheid regime,470 unveils the torrential loss of human life in days 
past. It is evident, based on the cardinal nucleus of the Constitution itself,471 that reconciliation 
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and respect for the rights of even the ‘worst among us’ is a paramount juncture for the 
community as a whole to practice.472 Therefore, it is submitted that that the Constitutional 
inferences and safeguards may be extended to protect the rights of individuals who have 
committed unlawful acts.473  
The existence of the death sentence is interpreted as ancillary within the new South African 
democracy and the values of the public at large; and so S v Makwanyane runs in the leagues of 
progressive judicious steps for the concept of Ubuntu and its characteristic of enshrining the 
right to life and human dignity within the public.474 To the Constitutional Court, even a criminal 
offender may not be stripped of their inherent constitutional rights, adhering to the public norms 
and values of the entire South African demographic at large.475 As noted by Netshitombon,476 
Ubuntu’s involvement in the case of S v Makwanyane serves as an ‘extra textual-aid’ to the 
deciphering of fundamental human rights, contained within the Constitution, and ultimately 
serving as an unwavering benchmark for the essential standards within the South African legal 
and public systems.477 
Evidently, by exploration of both the jurisprudential avenues and case law, Ubuntu expresses 
a moralistic aptitude within the South African legal system by significantly influencing public 
policy of the land in adopting its values of humaneness.478 Therefore, public morality is honed 
in a luminous glare of possibility within the concept’s vast application to fundamental human 
rights that are deemed inexhaustible. Metz,479 however, identifies that some viewpoints 
question the validity of certain considerations of Ubuntu as being deviant to public morality in 
the ever-growing public policy of South Africa.480 Metz outlines that in terms of public 
morality, the concept of Ubuntu may fail to achieve an outcome that is ‘publically-justifiable’ 
in the judicial decision-making process by the courts,481 resulting in an indistinct formalisation 
of legality. In addition, the entrenched ‘collective community’ viewpoint of Ubuntu has come 
under scrutiny by the concept’s challenging of individual autonomy and freedom.482 The notion 
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of a collective community and shared morals is at the centre of the Constitution of South 
Africa.483 This is further emphasised by the hyper-accelerated notion of society’s triumphant 
majoritarianism within the contemporary dynamic.484 Lastly, the public morality’s purported 
diminishment by Ubuntu’s conceptualisation may be due to its runic and ancient traditional 
origins, unfit for the ever-changing public frontier of a new South Africa.485 The salient driving 
force of the concept is its advocacy for the predominant values of the public by the protection 
of ‘social and communal rights,’486 yet such may discriminate against the constitutionally 
enshrined individual dignity of certain members of the public through the concept’s 
application. 
To expect Ubuntu to be clearly defined, based on its multifaceted application through various 
spheres of South Africa, is a jaded refute to its developing legal pedigree.487 Clearer definitions 
of the concept are inevitably destined to surface through further judicial intrigue and 
contributions, and it is paramount to note that the South African public is not bound by a single, 
concrete definition of the concept, but open to its broad expanse.488 Ubuntu’s chartering within 
public policy tugs at heartstrings of numerous constitutionally promised rights, but none more 
so than the over-arching safeguard upon the rights to life and dignity within the public.  
The former president of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki stated in his 2005 Heritage 
Day address: 
‘We have not done enough to articulate and elaborate on what Ubuntu means as well as promoting this important 
value system in a manner that should define the unique identity of South Africans.489’  
The uniqueness of the concept allows for an assimilation of a multiracial and multicultural 
South Africa that instils the values of ‘compassion, justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and 
humanity in the interests of building, maintaining and strengthening the community.490’ Ubuntu 
nonchalantly nudges those within the public to reveal their involvement within the community, 
projecting their humaneness and enriching the rights of those that share the social environment 
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with them.491 Therefore, the concept of Ubuntu strives to eradicate moral harm caused between 
community members by inspiring intrinsic humanitarian values within the public’s recognition. 
In reflection, Ubuntu’s influence over public policy in South Africa creates a unique and 
enduring model of human life and dignity by its zealous endeavour in inspiring wide-scale 
public compassion,492 unity and kindness.493 This is paralleled to what the former president, 
Nelson Mandela, once said; rippling across the countless centuries yet to be: 
‘For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom 
of others.494’ 
 
3.4.3 ‘Living on a Thin Line’ - The South African State’s Prevention of Harm against the Public  
 
The revelations of the boni mores criterion and the concept of Ubuntu shovels deep into the 
central jurisprudential focus of public policy within South Africa; unearthed as being the 
prevention of community harm and the maintenance of public morality. This is a shared notion 
for the jurisdictions of the England and Canada respectively, for both countries have relied 
upon the extension of the mutating principle of public policy when applied to this acute 
criminal law dispute.  
South Africa’s legal sphere has developed considerably by its nuanced deciphering of incidents 
that bring community harm of variant intensities that call for Constitutional guidance. 
Reflecting on the applicability of the South African Constitution, Section 12 guarantees the 
right to a person’s bodily integrity, by virtue of the freedom and security of the body.495 This 
statutory safeguard highlights the State’s deterrence of harmful conduct between persons in 
both the public and private sphere, entrenching firstly the freedom and security of an 
individual’s body and secondly,496 preventing against the commission of bodily and 
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psychological harm.497 Therefore, any harm that would obliterate and infringe the freedom and 
security of a person’s body and mind would be adverse to the constitutional provision.498 
Section 12(1) (d) dictates that an individual may not be tortured in any way,499 as such practice 
is contradictory to the ethos of the Constitution and the policy considerations that have 
developed within the public of South Africa. The noteworthy enactment of the Prevention of 
Combating and Torture of Persons Act by the South African legislature is an offshoot of this 
provision.500 To the state, even though equipped with Constitutional safeguards and deterrents, 
torture was still prevalent in multiple facets of society.501 To effectively prevent against the 
manifestation of torture, which brings physical and psychological harm unto the victims, the 
‘anti-torture Act’,502 facilitates for the identification of the fundamental human rights of the 
victim,503 and the administration of a sound prosecution against the perpetrator.504 The Act 
shows the progressive stance of the state in enacting legislation that safeguards against harm 
in both the public and private sphere from acts of torture by lending even greater legislative 
support to Constitutional imperatives.   
The case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
Intervening),505 herein referred to as Carmichele, is a noteworthy submission regarding the 
obligation of developing the common law in line with the Bill of Rights. Carmichele also 
exposed the duty of care upon the State and its police service to prevent against the harm that 
would befall endangered minority groups within society.  
Straying from the veil of facts of the case, and drawing attention upon the focal issues before 
the court; the duty of a court or tribunal to develop the common law,506 so that it runs in tune 
with the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’, is provided for under section 39(2).507 
It is evident that the Bill of Rights is the keystone for the embodiment of the values of the 
Constitution, and in turn, the inspiration for the authority of public policy’s standards. By virtue 
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of this chain of influence, the Bill of Rights proves to influence the public’s philosophy on 
human interaction and conduct. Thus, the common law of the land should reflect the ethos of 
the Bill of Rights in its entirety, and such may be facilitated by placing an obligatory mantle 
upon a court where the common law has deviated from the interests of justice.508 Therefore, 
where the common law reflects the Bill of Rights, it would manifest the principles of public 
policy, which is directly proportional to the Constitutional cornerstone. 
The court also stressed the State’s duty of care over its citizens in both the public and private 
sphere, especially to those that belonged to minority groups, such as women, children, and 
divergent sexualities. It is noted that the mere recollection of societal preferences and policies 
of the public are not sufficient to create a duty of care;509 rather, such is conjured where a 
defendant ought to have taken positive steps to protect and uphold their obligations to the 
plaintiff, by preventing against harm, or the infringement of such a plaintiff’s essential 
constitutional rights.510 The court also noted that via both national and international 
legislation,511 there was a positive duty of care upon the members of the South African police 
service to protect, inter alia, the public well-being, safety, and to prevent against crime and the 
upkeep of law and order.512 More so, the argument of the plaintiff accounted for women falling 
within a heightened niche of care for their safety and security,513 owed by the state and its 
relevant protective bodies.  
The decision in Carmichele reverberates the duty of care upon the South African state, and its 
police service, in mitigating the harm that might befall those at risk to constitutional 
infringement. Inevitably, this forces the state to take proactive steps in developing its own 
common law to propel the Constitutional rights to, inter alia, life and human dignity, which 
are inherent to all members of society.  
Without evading section 39 of the Constitution, which played a paramount role in the inquiry 
of Carmichele, the provision itself caters for the relevant court to consider international or 
foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.514 This may strengthen a court’s inquiry by 
taking judicial and legislative directions from corresponding judgements within international 
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law. In addition, the court in Carmichele skilfully consulted section 173 of the Constitution, 
exposing that the Constitutional Court has inherent power to develop the common law within 
the interests of justice,515 akin to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court of South 
Africa. Thus, the potential of the Constitution, in preventing against harm to society’s 
fundamental rights, can develop the common law harmoniously to the ethos of the Bill of 
Rights and the policy considerations of the public at large.  
The case of Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies, Amici Curiae),516 herein referred to as Masiya, exists as a shining reflection of the 
state’s development of the common law definition of crimes in order to create constitutional 
certainty and the combating of potential societal harm. Masiya stressed the need to develop and 
expand upon the common law definition of rape so that its actuality reflects the values of the 
constitutional order;517 along with realising the current public policy considerations of 
preventing against harm within the community. Nkabinde J notes that the crime of rape is a 
recipient to severe judicial scrutiny.518 This is based on the moral and social perspectives that 
observe the decay of the victim’s constitutional rights of,519 inter alia, bodily safety and 
security, dignity and equality.520 Nkabinde J expressed that the common law definition of rape 
should be developed to not only be restricted to the non-consensual vaginal penetration of a 
female victim by a male offender, but must also accommodate for the non-consensual anal 
penetration by a male offender. This stance supports the inherent rights to personhood, owed 
to the victim and forges a contemporary, constitutionally accepted definition within the public’s 
interests of justice.  
Langa CJ builds particularly in support of Nkabinde J’s submissions, however, states the 
stifling of the common law definition of the crime demands a contemporary South African 
understanding. Langa CJ notes: 
‘[F]irst that rape is about dignity and power and second, that anal rape is equivalent to vaginal rape.521’ 
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Langa CJ proposes that the crime of rape should also be extended to include the anal penetration 
of a male victim to be considered upon the same scale as that of a female victim. This judicial 
stride proposes that the Constitutional Court itself will holistically consider the equality of the 
citizens of South Africa, whilst upholding its duty to protect the public from mass infringement 
and harm by implementing a gender-neutral definition. Langa CJ’s attempt at broadening the 
submissions of the court, and in facilitating the development of the common law, has embedded 
the public’s safety as paramount within the Constitutional order of South Africa.522  
Just as the case of Carmichele dealt with the constitutional alignment of inconsistent common 
law rules,523 Masiya follows along the daunting abbey of developing the common law of the 
land so that it reflects the spirit of the current South African legal position.524 To support the 
measures adopted in the aforementioned cases; the court, in Du Plessis v De Klerk,525 imports 
a Canadian viewpoint from the case of R v Salituro, which states the following: 
‘Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the 
country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared.526’ 
The legislature serves as the primary forerunner at the heart for the law reform model of South 
Africa.527 However, even if the legislature stands at this legal equinox, the judiciary endures 
upon the battlefront of legal inquisition and cannot allow the common law to fall into a realm 
that is outside the current moral and societal pillars of the public.528 
Section 171(1) of the Constitution, in invalidating any law,529 electrifies an appropriate court 
of inherent power or conduct,530 which is contradictory and inconsistent with the Constitution 
and its values. The aforementioned provision proves that the Constitutional artillery empowers 
an appropriate court to sever any contradictions that may infringe constitutional imperatives by 
seeking an order from the Constitutional Court.531 This extreme measure was not adopted in 
the case of Masiya, for the common law definition of rape was not invalidated, rather, it was 
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expanded upon so that the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights could be observed.532 
The tapestry of legality, explored and developed within the case of Masiya, weaves with the 
thread of substantive review that the judiciary may implement in bringing the common law in 
line with the perspectives, values and morality of the current South African legal age.533  
Ultimately, and after consideration of both Carmcihele and Masiya, the State allows for the 
judiciary to endorse the promised quintessence of the Bill of Rights in matters that deviate from 
this legal bedrock. In so doing, the judiciary may take proactive measures in preventing against 
the harm that might occur by developing, or striking away, the common laws that are 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and other paramount social and moral tenants. This legal 
advancement resonates in cognisance to the extent the South African judiciary, as empowered 
by the legislature, to act in the interests of justice and preventing against, inter alia, physical 
and psychological harm.534 By reconciling the concept of harm to legality, the judiciary of 
South Africa is equipped with an inventory of provisions that determine the extent of its 
involvement in matters that would infringe and cause ‘harm’ to the spirit, purport, and objects 
of the Bill of rights.535 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The commentary of this chapter walked with legislative and judicial insight regarding the 
applicability of public policy to practices that would contradict the core values that invigorate 
a legal system. The hunt to find a clear footing of public policy in contemporary matters that 
bring consensual sadomasochism proves that the concept of public policy itself is an ‘arrow’, 
and a court merely draws upon a broad legal-quiver and fires where it sees fit. The practice of 
consensual sadomasochism, in light of the considerations of England and Canada, allows for 
the steady progression of the concept in the wake of the developing legislative incentives, social 
factors, and shared public values that influence a legal system.  
English and Canadian precedents and legislation unmasks the once monotonous and outdated 
judicial application of public policy and forces the relevant courts to apply the existing public 
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policy upon its own merits, in the vigil of the public’s exposure to a practice. The commonality 
throughout the three jurisdictions that were explored reveal that it is public policy’s primary 
focus to prevent harm from befalling those within the State’s protection and to bolster the 
values that are held dear by the greater public sphere. However, the extent of this consideration 
is influenced considerably by the changing moral and social fibres of the respective public 
itself, building an immunity to the once scrutinised and condemned behavioural forms that 
might have existed before the modern legislation and case law arose.  
The legislative bodies of the respective jurisdictions and corresponding support from Law 
Reform Commissions appear to exist as a springboard in the retrospective critique of public 
policy and its involvement in a court’s prosecution where consensual sadomasochism has 
occurred. At the summit of this investigation, the changing public policy considerations, 
impregnated by the influence of the porn industry and other media outlets, views 
sadomasochism in a less offensive manner based on its prevalence within the current 
international public domain. However, the harm that is inflicted within the sexual encounter, 
to both the participants and society respectively, is still a paramount consideration for a court’s 
inquiry. Therefore, any infliction of harm that is deemed too severe and contradictory to the 
current public policy considerations would advocate for a prosecution of the consensual 
conduct. 
The South African perspective of propelling public policy considerations takes an orthodox 
approach in deriving itself heavily from Constitutional entitlements; afforded to the individuals 
that populate both the public and private sphere. The boni mores criterion and the concept of 
Ubuntu serve as a codex in support of public policy by demanding the objective unification of 
public conduct that can be viewed as objectively justifiable. The South African considerations 
of public policy propose a momentous leap for the safeguarding of the public safety and the 
rights of the citizens that incubate the tethers of society. It is evident that the Constitution itself 
caters for the reform of the common law rules that would infringe the fundamental rights 
promised to citizens within both the public and private spheres.  
Ultimately, this stance develops the common law so that it may reflect the South African 
Constitutional imperatives, and in turn, concurrently electrifies public policy’s safeguarding 
against harm. Therefore, the South African perspective of protecting against public harm 
entrenches a heavy-rain of Constitutional supremacy that serves as the harbinger of the current 
public policy considerations by chartering the lengths of adaptive, internal legal development. 
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The criminalisation of consensual sadomasochism, by the implementation of public policy, 
may advocate that such a measure is a necessary stride in protecting society from widespread 
harm. However, this adoption may cause the prosecution to infringe the fundamental rights of 
the participants to the practice. At the heart of this finding, it appears that the individual 
autonomy rights of certain citizens will inevitably yield to the broader interests of the public. 
Therefore, the balancing-act of individual human rights against the interests of the State is in 
dire need of investigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE NASCENCE OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
AND OTHER PREVALENT HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE 
INTERNATIONAL AND SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
STANDARDS 
 
‘Autonomy... is freedom to develop one's self - to increase one's knowledge, improve one's skills, and 
achieve responsibility for one's conduct. And it is freedom to lead one's own life, to choose among 
alternative courses of action so long as no injury to others results.’ - Thomas Szasz 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The roots of autonomy have existed since high antiquity and have endured in the pursuit of 
ascertaining a definition of its purport amongst jurists.536 The phenomenon of autonomy, if it 
may be deemed a ‘phenomenon’, is an inhabitant of other fundamental human rights such as 
privacy, freedom and security of the person, freedom of expression and the right to human 
dignity.  
This chapter will explore the prevalence of the right to privacy and a justifiable invasion of a 
person’s privacy by the State. In addition, the freedom of one’s expression will be construed in 
light of autonomy’s premise of ‘self-governance’ and its extensity within the contemporary 
society. The concept of human dignity shall also be dissected within the objective and 
subjective construct of human desire and affiliation. The right to freedom of expression will be 
consulted and its correlation to consensual sadomasochism. Limitations of the aforementioned 
rights will be explored by considering the viewpoints of English and Canadian law as well as 
South African law. Lastly, the exploration of the inventory of autonomy rights shall provide a 
rubric of legal literature in determining the extent of the protection for the practice of 
consensual sadomasochism under these components.  
 
                                                          
536 D. van der Reyden ‘The right to respect for autonomy Part I’ (2008) 38 South African Journal of Occupational 
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4.2 The Jurisprudential and Legal Automation of Autonomy  
 
Immanuel Kant identified human autonomy as a factor that serves as a custodian for self-
actualisation.537 Kant observes that all individuals possess autonomy,538 yet its true advent takes 
flight the moment an individual undergoes rational self-consciousness through personal 
experiences and interactions.539 This self-determination, embedded through personal 
understandings, perceived through one’s very own senses, forms the bedrock of the Kantian 
principle of autonomy. In turn, Kant ignites the argument that an individual may be able to 
interpret moral values and respect legal authority imposed upon them only once they realise 
their personal autonomy, to the dispensation of the rational will.540 Therefore, the Kantian 
theory projects that autonomous behaviour is the reflection of personhood and exists as a 
supreme principle.541  
It is paramount to illustrate that autonomy cannot exist without the presence of an individual’s 
personhood.542 Personhood, and its inherent qualities,543 must be established as a precursor to 
autonomy’s development, influencing the concept’s applicability to human self-actualisation. 
Chapter three of this dissertation introduced the concept of personhood when delving through 
both the Constitution and the boni mores criterion within public policy, as is applicable within 
South African law.544 The rights that are inherently conferred upon the premise of personhood 
include, inter alia, dignity, freedom of expression and privacy.545 These are outlined in the Bill 
of Rights and serve as the pillars of focus for the duration of this chapter.546 These rights of 
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personhood influence the development of a person’s identity and set in motion the possible 
legal formulation and recognition of personal autonomy.547  
The term ‘autonomy’ endures in prevailing perpetuity within our current age,548 encompassing 
a spectrum of differing perspectives within spheres of applicability in society. The essence of 
the concept of autonomy dictates the self-governance of an individual to his or her own whims 
and desires. Jordaan observes the breakdown of the term from its Greek origins, 549 ‘auto’ (self) 
and ‘nomos’ (law).550 Evidently, the conjoining of these terms forms the theory of ‘self-law’, 
one that is imposed by individual persons over their own actions, constituting personal ‘self-
actualisation,’551 and the manifestation of free will.552 This enforces the internal and personal 
dominium that a person has over their body and mind, free from the hindrances of external 
influences.553 McQuoid-Mason notes that in medical law,554 patient autonomy is an integral 
consideration within the doctor-patient relationship. He notes further that the ethical command 
and legality of the autonomous decisions of patients must be ‘informed, independent, and 
respected.555’ Rossouw,556 inter alia, accounts for a patient’s autonomy as being the authority 
of said patient in exercising their informed consent regarding their medical interactions.557 
Therefore, the objective assessment of a person who exhibits the direction and appreciation of 
their personal actions shall constitute a reflection of autonomy.558 Autonomy proves to be 
existent in those who can exhibit the ability to appreciate the nature of their actions.559  
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Autonomy, as a human right, is not expressly contained within the South African 
Constitution,560 but rather, its existence is implied by the characteristics of specific rights to 
personhood, as outlined within the Bill of Rights.561 The extent of a person’s autonomy, 
however, is not absolute within the confines of a democratic republic, such as South Africa. 
Section 36(1) of the Bill of Rights expressly provides for the limitation to rights of personhood 
if such is performed in a manner that is reasonable and justifiable.562 In addition, where such a 
limitation of fundamental rights is desired by a court, the nature of the limitation must take into 
account the considerations of ‘human dignity, equality, and freedom’ that exist within the open 
and democratic republic of South Africa.563 When attempting to limit fundamental rights, a 
court must be alive to: 
‘(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.564’ 
This provision serves as a testament of the South African legislature’s steps in controlling a 
person’s freedom of autonomy by following a justifiable limitation process within an open and 
democratic society. This consideration of an ‘open and democratic society’, which facilitates 
for individuals to express personal autonomy, was explored by Ackermann J in the case of 
Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO(herein referred to as Ferreira). 565 Ackermann J 
observes that the concept of an ‘open society’ suggests, 
‘[T]hat individuals are free, individually and in association with others, to pursue broadly their own personal 
development and fulfilment and their own conception of the “good life”.566’ 
This viewpoint from Ackermann J in Ferreira paves the foundations for autonomy’s 
developing consideration within the South African legal sphere and the respect afforded to 
                                                          
560 See S v Jordan (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) (CCT31/01) 
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corresponding human rights, inherent to all persons.567 Even though Ackermann J, as noted by 
Jordaan,568 makes no express mention of the word ‘autonomy’ in his stance, such is still a 
pivotal leap for this period of South African case law in entrenching the concept as an avenue 
of inquiry by a court in relevant human rights matters. The assertion that an individual has the 
freedom to mould his or her very own personal development in the direction of the life they 
wish to lead is a testament to the consideration of the freedom of autonomy.569  
Consent has been explored within Chapter two of this dissertation and its elements and 
fundamentals shall not be revisited here. However, the very element of consent facilitates for 
the blossoming of autonomy, based on the notion of individual freedom. The landmark 
judgement on consensual sadomasochism in R v Brown proposed that the concept of autonomy 
is very much alive within the consideration of the criminal law jurisprudence.570 However, 
consent to bodily harm, which brings varying degrees of physical harm, may limit the extension 
of one’s personal autonomy where one indulges in acts of sadomasochism that causes (what 
the law and boni mores consider as) prohibited degrees of bodily harm.571 As expressed in 
Chapter two, this has been accepted by the general viewpoint of both English and Canadian 
courts as the materialisation of actual bodily harm.  
The South African case of Barkhuizen v Napier contemplates the freedom of one’s autonomy 
within the law of contract,572 which can be extenuated to the criminal law’s outlook as well. 
Ngcobo J identifies that autonomy may be defined as: 
‘[T]he ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a 
vital part of dignity.573’  
What is noteworthy from this submission is that freedom of autonomy and freedom as a broader 
human right are two distinct conceptions. A person may be imbued with the Constitutional 
right to freedom, yet the extent of his or her autonomy may restrict the enjoyment and 
expenditure of such freedom. However, the virtue of personal autonomy caters for an individual 
to expend their freedom, even if such is to their ‘own detriment,574’ based on their personal 
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will. This concept of personal will to the freedom of contract bolsters the Constitutional 
prerogatives of human dignity,575 and supports that autonomy is a facet of dignity within the 
South African viewpoint.576  
The South African Constitution does not expressly mention the right to autonomy, yet its 
definition may be inferred from specific rights that are inherent to personhood. The case of NM 
v Smith shows that:577  
 ‘[By] recognising the role of freedom of expression in asserting the moral autonomy of individuals demonstrates 
the close links between freedom of expression and other constitutional rights such as human dignity, privacy and 
freedom.578’ 
Therefore, the right to freedom of expression,579 and its overlap with human dignity and 
privacy, treads hand-in-hand with the concept of autonomy. The Constitution projects its 
inherent understanding that persons do not endure as mindless husks, rather, they inhabit bodies 
that exist within communities of South Africa.580 This highlights that the conduct expressed by 
these persons, derived from their inherent rights of personhood, shall be specifically driven by 
their personal will, and not by the influence of the State, or any other external source.581  
Jordaan expresses a reflective commentary on the case of NM v Smith by highlighting the 
communal,582 or ‘socially integrated’,583 measure of autonomy within the South African legal 
sphere. It is observed that the measure of an individual’s personal pursuits,584 within the ‘overall 
framework’of the democratic society of South Africa,585 serves as a developing conception of 
a court to the freedom of autonomy as a whole.586 This positive action by the legislature in 
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conferring such fundamental human rights propels the inherency of autonomy within the 
greater social sphere.587  
 
4.3 Relevant International Instruments of Human Rights and other Supporting Pieces 
of Legal Literature  
 
4.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
The atrocities that were committed against human life before and during World War IIlingered 
in ongoing debates as a pale reflection of the possible path of destruction humankind could 
embark upon if not fully dedicated to a universal credo of morals and principles that respect 
human rights.588 The General Assembly of the United Nations put forward the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights(herein referred to as the ‘UDHR’) in the year 1948,589 serving as 
an overarching contemporary Magna Carta of inexhaustible human rights of the modern 
world.590  
The UDHR strategically worked as a legal ‘grimoire’ of reassurance in entrenching and 
propelling shared values of human rights within the international legal spheres of the world. 
The paramount focus of the UDHR is hinged predominantly upon the inherent human dignity 
and individualistic self-worth of each human within a free and protected society.591 There is 
thus a positive obligation upon each supporting nation, along with its organs of state, to 
promote the values and purport of what the Declaration seeks to instil.592 Glendon describes the 
UDHR as being: 
‘[A] yardstick by which nations and peoples can measure their own and each other’s progress.593’ 
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Such is a simplistic, yet far-reaching submission as to the strength of the Declaration’s 
unification of a shared international perspective of the preservation and upkeep of human 
rights. 594 The thirty Articles that populate the UDHR serve as forerunners to the rights of, inter 
alia,595 freedom, safety, privacy, and dignity for all humans of the world.596 The Declaration 
goes as far as to accommodate for both the social and economic rights of a person 
respectively.597  
It is essential to note that the Declaration has no binding effect upon the legal vocation of the 
nations that abide by its principles;598 its premise is simply to endorse a collective understanding 
of the shared values to human rights across the world. A testament to the gravity of the 
Declaration is evident within the numerous constitutions of the nations that are supporters of 
its ambit. Fundamental elements such as the right to life, liberty and security of the person,599 
freedom from slavery and forced servitude,600 restrictions upon torture and inhumane 
practices,601 equality,602 and the right to privacy and freedom from an arbitrary interference,603 
have found themselves within the reverberating certainty of constitutional support from the 
nations to the Declaration604.   
 
4.3.2 European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Deriving itself from the influence of the UDHR, the European Convention on Human 
Rights(herein referred to as the ECHR) exists as a supporter of the upkeep and protection of 
human rights within Europe.605 The ECHR states that the member-nations to the Convention 
are under a positive obligation to realise and respect the human rights of all persons within their 
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jurisdiction.606 This first Article paints a supportive mirroring of the UDHR’s premise, allowing 
for the flowering of a unified understanding of all nations to the Convention. 
The European Court of Human Rights (herein referred to as the ECtHR) was established under 
Article 19 of the Convention,607 creating a permanent court that serves as the highest front to 
the access of justice in matters of human rights violations. The ECtHR may hear any matter 
that brings forward flourishes of human rights violations within any of the member states that 
are party to the Council of Europe.608 This proves that the Convention is far more herculean 
than a mere credo of desired treatment by governments over people, but rather, the Convention 
forms a multi-faceted legal outlook on the safety and enforcement of fundamental and protected 
human rights.609  
The progressive value of the Convention entrenches, even if not openly expressed,610 the 
facilitation for the access to justice where human rights violations have occurred.611 Therefore, 
the ECtHR thrives as a manifestation of the will of the ECHR, serving as an instrument for the 
safety and upkeep of human rights. Ultimately, the ECtHR endures as a descendant of the 
UDHR, based on the latter’s resounding influence upon the consideration of human rights 
within the modern world.   
 
4.3.3 The South African Constitution 
 
The Constitution exists as the supreme law within the South Africa and binds together an array 
of fundamental legal tenets.612 Under Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights endorses 
the fundamental human rights of all South Africans in a distinctive outline. For the fulfilment 
of this chapter’s focus, only corresponding rights contained within the Bill of Rights shall be 
expressed in the hopes of propelling the eventual South African perspective to consensual 
sadomasochism that brings harm upon the participants. 
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As an introductory submission of the pertinence of the Bill of Rights, Section 7 states that: 
‘(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.  
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere 
in the Bill.613’ 
This submission vigorously establishes South Africa’s support of human rights by allowing for 
the Bill of Rights to shine on as an instrument of prominence. The rights of freedom, equality, 
and dignity,614 resurface as common threads to the UDHR’s primary outlook upon human 
rights, proving615 that the Bill of Rights is a noteworthy standard-bearer of the Declaration.616 
Section 7(2) of the Bill of Rights places a positive obligation upon the South African state to 
safeguard and facilitate the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights that are inherent to every 
person.617 Once again, such echoes the South African Constitution’s resounding compliance 
with yet another international standard of care for the sanctity of human rights of all persons. 
Thus, the Bill of Rights can be held as the custodian for the democratic age of South Africa by 
its initiative of enshrining the fundamental rights of all persons in South Africa by means of a 
supreme legislative authority.618  
However, a noteworthy consideration regarding the Bill of Rights is the previously mentioned 
‘Limitations Clause’.619 As accounted for earlier, Section 36 allows for the limitation of human 
rights, where such is ‘reasonable and justifiable’,620 within an open and democratic society.621 
The Bill of Rights thus expressly provides for a mechanism of control of certain human rights, 
juxtaposed objectively to the limitation of such. The term ‘reasonable and justifiable’ treads 
within a defined Constitutional test for the possible limitation of a human right by an 
appropriate court.622 Such is a delicate task as the test itself is strict within its definitional 
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ambit.623 If the court were to implant the limitations clause, such will expose the harm of the 
limitation upon the individual’s right, and on the other end of the spectrum, the importance in 
the protection of the public benefit and interests regarding the limitation.624 O’Regan J 
considered the intensity of an intervention by an appropriate court when assessed to different 
matters calling for the limitations of rights: 
‘The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must 
be.625’ 
The proportionality between the right that is limited, and such a limitation’s benefit to the 
broader and more compelling concerns of the state, must be objectively constructed within the 
relevant grounds of Constitutional justification. From a theoretical point of view, the 
limitations clause bolsters the implementation of the law of general application, following set 
and authorised legal norms that may limit a right contained within the Bill of Rights; provided 
that such is ‘reasonable and justifiable within an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.626’ 
Therefore, individual human rights within the South African legal system are bestowed by a 
Constitutional certainty, yet the absolute nature of such are far from concrete in light of the 
existence of the ‘Limitations Clause within the Bill of Rights.627’ Consensual sadomasochism 
that brings certain degrees of harm upon a person involves the entanglement of specific 
personality rights that must be examined. For the duration of this chapter, the rights to 
privacy,628 dignity,629 and freedom of expression shall be explored in their broader definitions 
and their specific roles within a consensual sadomasochistic encounter.630  
 
4.4 The Right to Privacy 
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Aside from its existence within precursor international human rights instruments, such as the 
UDHR,631 the right to privacy is an on-going and ever-developing virtue across multiple legal 
systems within the current age. Within the South African Constitutional framework, privacy 
can be viewed as a realm of liberty632 for each individual person, moulding a perspective of 
personal autonomy and freedom within the ambit of the right itself. This, however, is a mere 
superficial definition of privacy within its Everest-like conceptualisation. 
The UDHR accommodates for a person’s right to privacy in Article 12, expressing that no 
arbitrary interference may infringe such a personality right. 633 However, Van der Bank notes 
that the right to privacy,634even if promised within the legal ethers of many jurisdictions, proves 
to be far from absolute. The focus of ‘privacy’s end’, or its limitation, shall be a driving focus 
of this subchapter.  
Under the arch of Section 14 of the Bill of Rights, nestled within the Constitution,635 all persons 
have the right to privacy and its corresponding safeguards.636 The right to privacy seeps into 
the corresponding perspective of individual freedom and the virtue of human dignity being 
upheld within an open and democratic State.637 Cheung,638 by virtue of this submission, asserts 
that dignity is ‘part and parcel’ to privacy and should be recognised as an interconnected 
personality right.639 These Constitutional rights exist separately, yet conjoined by the links of 
personal autonomy of the individual. The right to privacy, forming a unique and individualistic 
flourish across one’s individualistic personality, is broadly interpreted into multiple definitions 
depending on the contextual viewpoint of the word and its application.640 Townsend identifies 
that the reach of the right to privacy encompasses, inter alia, the exclusiveness of: 
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‘[T]he physical space around a person, freedom of thought, control over one’s body and information about 
oneself, and the right to make private decisions without interference.641’  
Townsend’s tacitly implies the interconnected nature of autonomy to the enjoyment of the right 
to privacy.642 Townsend further sheds light on the three classifications of privacy, the first of 
which is physical privacy.643 This may also be referred to as ‘spatial’ privacy,644 allowing an 
individual to relish in the freedom of their personal space to the exclusion of others. A common 
example of such is a person enjoying the solitude of their personal home without an 
unwarranted intrusion by another. Secondly, Townsend identifies decisional privacy as being 
another pillar to the right.645 This entails that the consideration of privacy exists in the decision-
making process of all persons and their ability to render an effective and independent ‘self-
defining decision’,646 without external or ‘rear-window’ input. Thirdly, the final facet to 
privacy’s expansive definition includes for informational privacy.647 This is coined as ‘personal 
data’ and various jurisdictions have implemented legislative controls to safeguard the use, 
dissemination, and publication of such content.648 The reasonable expectation of control and 
protection over the personal data of an individual, by one who is in possession of such content, 
depends significantly on the nature of the data and the content of its information.649 Along the 
string of variant nodes of personal data that exist in recognised forms of classification, those 
that appear to be pivotal in terms of data protection and security are, inter alia, the name, age, 
financial position, and any identifiable photographs of a person.650  
The three classifications of the right to privacy are entwined in a categorisation of similarity 
and complimentary worth. As noted by Townsend,651 without an over-arching definition of 
privacy, the flexibility of the right’s interpretation may take multiple forms of inquiry where 
individualistic scenarios bring a dispute regarding privacy rights. It is clear that individual 
autonomy runs in an unhindered footing within the right to privacy, proving to be connected 
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with the right’s inherent purport.652 By the exploration of the ‘three pillars of privacy’, it is 
noteworthy to observe that the right seeks to deter against invasions into the personal space of 
an individual, regardless if such occurs within the private or public sphere.653 Furthermore, the 
right to privacy acts as an artefact of legal certainty in the hopes of curtailing the publication, 
and dissemination,654 of unauthorised personal information held by another .655  
The Canadian pieces of relevant legislation that deal with the right to privacy are the Privacy 
Act,656 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act respectively.657 
The Privacy Act seeks to assert the definition of personal information, arriving at a juncture of 
such content being ‘information about an identifiable individual.658’ The Act thus endorses the 
safeguard over private information that may be linked to an identifiable person by the 
implementation of a list of noted forms that such information may take.659 The Act expressly 
allows a person to claim access to information belonging to them,660 held by the Canadian 
government.661 This accommodation is a testament to a person’s right to privacy in Canada, 
achieving the lengths of compelling the State to comply with such provisions where personal 
information is concerned.  
The case of R v J.A tested the concept of privacy and autonomy that existed within adult sexual 
relationships within Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that:662  
‘Respect for the privacy and sexual autonomy of consenting adults has long been embraced by Parliament as a 
fundamental social value and an overarching statutory objective: Keeping the state out of the bedrooms of the 
nation is a legislative policy, and not just a political slogan.663’ 
The Court, however, was alive to the consideration that the right to privacy is not etched in 
absoluteness.664 The Court allowed for physical and decisional privacy to take flight between 
adult sexual partners, as such is a manifestation of personal autonomous will.665 The Court also 
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agreed that private consensual sexual behaviour between adults should not be the recipient of 
prying eyes from the State. However, an intrusion into the private realm of adult interaction 
may be permitted where the activity that is practised brings a significant degree of bodily 
harm,666 exposing a reasonable and justifiable limitation upon the right to privacy. 667  
The position of English law also adds valuable weight to the assessment of the right to privacy 
from an intentional outlook. The significance of the Human Rights Act fostered the 
development of the country’s legislation,668 in line with the ethos of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.669 Within this structural legislative framework,670 the right to privacy is 
realised as an essential personality right that is deserving of respect. Article 8 of the Act,671 
affords for the respecting of the privacy of all individuals within their private and family life,672 
to the exclusion of unwarranted intrusions and interferences673. However, even with such a 
laudable piece of legislation, Van der Bank observes that an individual cannot bring an action 
against an invasion of privacy within the jurisdiction of England.674 There is no absolute right 
to privacy within English law,675 and thus, where an alleged ‘breach of confidence’ occurs, 
there is a dearth of defined remedies to facilitate the concept’s worth. Tort law (the law of delict 
in South Africa) may achieve an appropriate measure of recourse where one’s privacy is 
infringed within England,676 and the alleged invasion of privacy shall be determined by the 
long-reach of measures prescribed by the European Council.677  
The case of Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom (herein referred to as Laskey),678 
saw the appeal of the sentence passed by the House of Lords in R v Brown within the ECtHR.679 
The appellants argued that the state had infringed their right to privacy, promised under Article 
8 of the ECHR.680 To the appellants, the stance of the European authority favoured the 
protection of the private lives of citizens that belonged to ‘Member-States’ of the 
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Convention.681 The right to privacy was supported within the appeal, proving that the English 
Law’s stance in prosecuting private and consensual sadomasochism may have infringed the 
privacy rights of the participants.682  
The ECtHR consulted the judgement of the House of Lords in R v Brown and was alive to the 
fact that the current legal system of England permitted consensual adult interactions,683 which 
occurred in a private setting, so long as such interactions did not bring actual bodily harm.684 
Therefore, the realisation that the legislature of England is imbued with a discretionary outlook 
in applying the criminal law, even in private adult interactions, is hinged upon the directives of 
public policy considerations.685 The ECtHR also noted that the prosecution of the appellants’ 
actions, derived from the perspective of privacy, had inevitably caused a media frenzy. The 
publication of the private sadomasochistic activities had rippling effects across the lives of the 
appellants, bringing dismissals from their respective employers and even psychiatric treatment 
was needed for Mr Jaggard.686 
The applicants alleged further that the ‘unlawful and unjustifiable interference’ of their private 
life by the criminal law of the country had also curtailed their right to sexual expression.687 
However, the ECtHR ruled that no infringement of Article 8 had occurred, for the intrusion of 
the state within the private sexual relations of the consenting adults was justified by the harm 
that was caused between the participants. The State’s involvement within the private lives of 
the sadomasochists fell within a compelling ground regarding the call for the greater public 
morals to triumph.688 Clearly, the ECtHR asserted that Article 8 is not an absolute right that 
entrenches privacy,689 nor does it create amnesty for all forms of private sexual expression.690 
Therefore, the limitation of the right to privacy in the case of Laskey proves to be necessary 
within the ‘confines of a democratic society’ based on the actual bodily harm caused within 
the private sexual dichotomy.691 
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The clear-cut stride of the ECtHR in Laskey is merely the penultimate dispute that is tied to the 
considerations of the respecting for one’s private life within the jurisdiction of England. The 
case of Mosely v News Group Newspapers (herein referred to as Mosley) is a reflection of the 
strain upon the respect to privacy within England and a noteworthy submission to explore in 
determining the contemporary development of the right itself.692 This submission contains 
elements of the sanctity for one’s private interactions and the publicity of such within the media 
at large. The case was brought in the English High Court, where Max Mosley, the retired 
president of the automobile club Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile, complained about 
a newspaper article, written and published by the News Group Media, which outlined an 
activity of his private life.693 The headline of the 2008 issue was titled:  
‘F1 BOSS HAS SICK NAZI ORGY WITH 5 HOOKERS.694’  
Mr Mosley complained that such was not an ‘orgy’, but rather, a party. He further complained 
that the News Group Newspapers had published personal pictures that depicted his 
participation in the private interaction. Additionally, Mr Mosley had sued for the publication 
of a video, which was secretly recorded, that depicted his participation within the interaction. 
This video was published in what was deemed a ‘follow-up’ article by the News Group 
Newspapers.695 The cause of action brought by Mr Mosley was a breach of confidence, 
stemming from the unauthorised disclosure of personal information.696 This was derived solely 
from a person’s right to privacy, as afforded and promised under Article 8 of the ECHR.697 
The basis of Mr Mosley’s argument was not only supported by the claim that the published 
material was inherently sacred and private, but also that the participants to the sadomasochistic 
relationship were bound by a pre-existing agreement of confidentiality within their private 
interactions.698 The aforementioned submissions cater for the creation of what may be viewed 
as a ‘reasonable expectation to privacy’. For purposes of this submission’s fluidity, the 
investigation into the leakage of the alleged private material and allegation of a ‘Nazi orgy’ 
will not be explored. Rather, focus shall be drawn upon the issue of the extent of a reasonable 
expectation to privacy within English Law.  
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The existing law, at the time of Mosley,699 facilitated for the protection of personal information 
where such is entwined in a reasonable expectation of privacy.700 The High Court noted that 
such a measure is taken to safeguard the ‘autonomy, dignity and self-esteem’ of a person whose 
private information is compromised.701 The ECHR expressly provides for the privacy,702 and 
freedom of expression of a person, within the lawful confines of the designated State’s 
legislative framework.703 It appears, from the very wording of the Convention, that the extent 
of these rights are determined by what is ‘necessary within a democratic society.704’  
By consideration of Mr Mosley’s complaint that the published material was private and 
confidential, the Court asserted that once confidential material enters the public domain, the 
confidentiality of its nature is lost.705 Furthermore, the court paid mention to the law’s 
‘protection of confidence’ being a concept that must be upheld by the public interest in matters 
of privacy.706 However, the public interest, and its diversion in matters of privacy and 
confidential information is a sphinx of many heads. One facet of the public interest advocates 
for the protection of confidential and private material belonging to individuals, whereas a 
countervailing public interest may demand the disclosure of private material if such is 
necessary within a democratic society. Therefore, the public interest is simultaneously both 
herald and foe of the sanctity of private information, as such is dependent upon the nature of 
the information. Further, the position of the public interest proves to be directed by the nature 
of the disclosure regarding the private information. Here, the case of Mosley considered 
whether the private sadomasochistic encounter, disclosed by the News Group Newspapers to 
the public, fell sufficiently within the public’s interest to warrant such a disclosure as valid.707  
The Court asserted that Article 8 of the ECHR accounted for privacy within sexual 
relationships, between consenting adults within their private confines.708 The Court also 
referred to the case of Dudgeon v United Kingdom,709 where it was held that there must be 
compelling reasons for the intrusion of a public body under Article 8.2,710 for the private sexual 
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activity between consenting adults may be viewed as a crucial ingredient of one’s personal 
life.711   
Based on the affording of privacy’s ambit to private sexual conduct, it was evident to the Court 
that it was not for the State, or any other entity, to publicise private conduct where no 
consequential contravention of the criminal law has occurred.712 Even though the sexual 
activity engaged by Mr Mosley involved sadomasochism, he was still entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR.713 The sadomasochistic interaction had 
occurred within the confines of a private property between consenting adults, involving 
activities of ‘bondage, beating, and domination.714’ The issue of whether these activities were 
worthy of the public interest was trampled underfoot by the Court’s ruling. The wide-scale 
publication of Mr Mosley involvement in the sadomasochistic activities did not fall within the 
public interest, for no matter how morally divergent such activity may seem to some, the 
developing jurisprudential sphere of the English law provided minimal cause for a justifiable 
intrusion within this private sexual venture.715 The court ruled that the News Group Newspapers 
had infringed Mr Mosley’s right to privacy and damages were awarded in the Claimant’s 
favour.716 
A commentary on the Mosley judgement is essential at this stage of development regarding the 
right to privacy in England. Mr Mosley’s triumph may be viewed as a reverberating ripple upon 
the waters of England’s privacy law jurisprudence, broadening the concept of the public 
interest to be viewed holistically and to afford the requisite protection for privacy where 
necessary and in line with existing legal rules and norms. The case of Mosley is far from a 
landmark decision within English law’s barrage of skirmishes with consensual 
sadomasochism. It is, however, fluorescent in its virtue of the right to privacy, especially in 
sexual activities, and the deterioration of one’s reputation where such privacy is infringed 
without just cause. 
Mr Mosley had not yet finished his legal saga of dispute after the conclusion of his first case. 
He then approached the ECtHR in Mosley v The United Kingdom.717 alleging that the country 
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had a positive obligation to safeguard his privacy, for the State had failed to create a legal duty 
upon the media publisher, News Group Newspapers, to notify him of their intended publication 
of his affairs.718 Further, Mr Mosley complained that had such a duty existed upon News Group 
Newspapers, he would have been notified before the publication was made, affording him 
sufficient time to acquire an interim junction to prevent such private material from eluding 
him.719  
Between the scorn and damage to his personal reputation by the original publication of his 
private sadomasochistic acts, it is viewed that Mr Mosley’s appeal to the ECtHR was to effect 
a necessary and pertinent change within England’s privacy laws.720 Clearly, Mr Mosley’s 
argument for the creation of a legal obligation by the incorporation of a pre-notification system 
imposed upon individuals intending the publication of another’s private material, would greatly 
enshrine the respect for privacy in England.  
The Court was aware that the focal point of privacy was derived significantly from Article 8 
of the ECHR;721 however, the Court was tasked to analyse whether such an obligation of a legal 
duty of pre-notification could be derived from this Article. The Court took heed of the nature 
of the facts, which exposed an intimate and private ‘variant sexual activity’, being that of 
sadomasochism.722 However, the submission of the respondent argued that if a pre-notification 
obligation would be adopted, the volume of interim junctions would manifest in great quantity, 
severely impairing the freedom of expression of the media and other news outlets.723 Therefore, 
the emerging consideration of Mosley v The United Kingdom is the balancing act afforded 
between the right to freedom of expression,724 and its relationship to the respecting of privacy.725  
To the Court, Article 8 propelled the respecting of one’s private and family life, but also 
compelled the State to take positive steps in allowing a person to enjoy the full extent of their 
privacy.726 However, it was emphasised that a clear balance must be struck between the right 
to privacy and freedom of expression, evolving from the consideration that an equilibrium of 
respect for these rights may be achieved by the consideration of the State’s interests and the 
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interests of the public. The media wing of the State must be given an aura of positive 
recognition and support with regard to the publishing of material that relates to the facilitation 
of the public interest.727 Such a role is not that of a ‘guard-dog’ of public virtue and mirth, but 
rather, a harbinger of contemporary issues that relate to the lawful transmission of the public 
interest within a defined boundary in which the media and press may operate.728 As noted by 
the Court, the media and press of the country are regulated by its own internal rules and 
procedures,729 adherent to freedom of expression and in line with the respecting of a person’s 
private life.   
The Court ruled that Article 8 did not compel the England to implement a pre-notification 
obligation in its duty to uphold and respect the privacy of its citizens. Even though the Article 
promotes for the effective safeguarding of privacy, such does not dictate that a pre-notification 
obligation is essential for the realisation of personal privacy in one’s private life. The freedom 
of expression consideration, attempting to effect a fair balance of rights, proves that expression 
is not only confined to the media-wing of the State but also unravelling into the sphere of 
‘political reporting and serious investigative journalism.730’   
From this, it can be ascertained that the satisfaction of the obligation upon the Respondent, in 
its bolstering of the respect of private life,731 was the awarding of damages as a suitable remedy 
for Mr Mosley in his first case in the English High Court.732 Thus, the Court unanimously ruled 
that the absence of a pre-notification obligation does not violate the respecting of a person’s 
private life by the Respondent and such could not be imposed by the State to effect its duty 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. To the Court, apart from the possible emergence of a chilling 
effect, a pre-notification obligation would inevitably treat all future publications by a media 
outlet as a reflection of Mr Mosley’s scandal.733 Therefore, where the obligation to respect the 
right to one’s privacy fails within the jurisdiction of England, a suitable remedy may be derived 
from the law of tort (delict) in the form of damages.  
Even though the right to privacy is implanted within the South African Constitution,734 the 
‘public benefit’, or public interest, is a prominent limiting factor of the right to privacy in 
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certain matters.735 As a preliminary remark, the Constitutional Court in Bernstein v Bester NO 
stated: 
‘Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity. This implies 
an absence of acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in this state.736’ 
Such a broad definition of privacy, and its permissibility for autonomous behaviour by 
individuals, provides for a superficial guiding network for the true extent of the right within 
the South African legal framework. However, as noted by the Constitutional Court, the 
certainty of the right to privacy, and its limitations within the South African legal system are 
perplexed in the understanding that: 
‘Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and 
activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.737’ 
Public benefit or ‘public interest’, as it was referred to in the case of Mosley v News Group 
Newspapers,738 allots itself within the conceptualisation of the right to privacy. These 
considerations dictate that a viable and pressing social concern will warrant the exposure of 
what is considered ‘private information’. Madala J, in the South African case of NM v Smith,739 
importantly noted that: 
‘This protection of privacy in my view raises in every individual an expectation that he or she will not be interfered 
with. Indeed there must be a pressing social need for that expectation to be violated and the person’s rights to 
privacy interfered with.740’ 
The public benefit, if arising as a pressing social need for the limitation of the right to privacy, 
may rightly call for justifiable intrusions within the public sector.741 Journalists and other media 
outlets within South Africa are empowered to cover aspects of an individual’s social life, 
provided such coverage does not cause the serious impairment of one’s personality rights.742 
However, an invasion within the private sanctum of an individual’s life, revealing intimate 
information, shall require a pressing reason or concern to warrant social exposure. Therefore, 
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the private sphere of individual interactions is fortified in a far more mammoth-like defence 
regarding the right to privacy. As explored by Steiner,743 in the reflection of the ‘Limitations 
Clause’ of section 36 of the Constitution,744 a proportionality test regarding the limitation of 
the right to privacy in each individual case is paramount for the interpretation of the right when 
juxtaposed to other substantial interests of the State.745 The test, as accounted for by Steiner, is 
to determine whether a justifiable limitation of the personality right to privacy is sufficient.746  
The case of Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council conjures a defined checklist 
to determine when an intervening party has justifiably limited the right to privacy in South 
African law.747 This submission supports Steiner’s proportionality test, demanding a 
heightened level of justification on part of the intervening party where, inter alia, any of the 
following elements arise:748  
a) Where private information has been obtained by an intrusion or in an invasive manner.749 
b) Where private information correlates to intimate aspects of the person’s life.750 
c) Where personal data is provided by a person, yet is used for an outcome that is ancillary to the envisioned 
transmission of the personal data.751 
It is apparent that an intrusion into one’s private life may bring more than just the limitation of 
the right to privacy, but also involves the sweeping of other fundamental personality rights into 
dispute. The Constitutional tunic of privacy within South Africa, if not absolute, still provides 
for a stringent approach where an intervening party breaches the confines of one’s private life. 
Ultimately, the remedies afforded by the English courts,752 where an unjustified invasion of 
one’s private life occurs, serves as the forerunner in an effective safeguard for personality 
rights,753 such as privacy. As considered by Burchell,754 the law of delict, and its remedy of 
awarding damages to an injured party would stand as an enduring beacon of the pragmatic 
approach in the protection of personality rights. This will test the Constitutionality of the right 
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to privacy based on the facts of each matter and seeks to find an equitable balance when 
weighed against the right to freedom of expression and the public interest.755 
 
4.5 The Right to Human Dignity 
 
As a prelude to the exploration of the legal concept of human dignity, its ancient roots, which 
have existed amongst multiple civilisations since classical antiquity, are an amicable starting 
point for the reflection of this enduring concept. Take, for instance, Alexander III of 
Macedon,756 who, after defeating Darius III of Persia,757 set his gaze upon the Hindu-Kush in 
the hopes of traversing what was then considered the ‘known world’. The conflict with the 
ancient Indian kingdom of Pauravas is a mere notch upon the decorated pommel of Alexander’s 
military exploits,758 yet the methodology of human dignity was tested here when Alexander 
defeated King Porus of Pauravas at the Battle of the Hydaspes.759 When a captured King Porus 
was brought before Alexander, he was asked how he would like to be treated, for a prisoner is 
no different to a slave. Porus replied: 
‘[As] a king would treat another king.’ 
The request of Porus greatly influenced Alexander and reminded him of his prisoner’s position 
before the battle. By understanding Porus’s inherent dignity, Alexander freed the captured king 
and elevated him to serve as a vassal-king, or ‘aide-de-camp’, in the Ancient Macedonian 
Army. The recount of Alexander and Porus proposes an antediluvian conceptualisation of both 
‘Dignitas’ and what would later be called ‘human dignity’. These two paramount 
considerations give flight to the focus of this subchapter and the ongoing evolution of the 
concept of human dignity. As an introduction for both jurisprudential abstractions, Steinmann 
describes the historical stance on Dignitas as:760  
‘[A]n acquired personal status in a specific social framework.761’ 
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Therefore, Dignitas, and its etymology from both Latin and Greek alludes to the qualities of 
honour, moral dignity, embellishment, personal-esteem, and respect.762 This can be extenuated 
to a preceding reputation of respect that is associated with an individual who occupies a specific 
position with a social setting. Steinmann goes on to recognise that the concept of Dignitas in 
Roman times existed within the following segments:763  
a) A hierarchical consideration of significant social standing in the variant upper classes 
of civil life within the Republic of Rome.764 
b) A concept, or standard, of honourability and integrity to effect ‘the unlocking of the full 
possibilities of life765.’ 
c) Existent within those that occupied the echelons of high public office, inhabiting such 
positions based on their acts of virtue, integrity, military prowess, or sacrifice to Roman 
society.766 
d) A factor of assessment that existed within the law of the Republic of Rome as being the 
yardstick test where compensation is required.767 
e) Belonging to the Roman government, or the ‘entity that was Rome’, as a paragon 
virtue.768 
From this submission, it can be viewed that Dignitas was the manifestation of a person’s social 
standing within society, facilitated with the qualities of honour, virtue, integrity and respect. It 
served as an intangible and embellished social portrait of an individual who was deemed 
worthy of such status. The subjectivity of Roman citizens, and those that came before them, in 
awarding Dignitas based on the chivalrous actions of a few, would change substantially in the 
decades to come. The concept of Dignitas echoes a disjunctive regime of equality within 
Roman society and the private sphere of that ancient dynamic. The infringement of one’s 
Dignitas, as noted by Steinmann from this common law regime, would give rise to an iniuria.769 
This may be defined as an insulting display of behaviour or conduct, allowing for delictual 
liability against the wrongdoer.770  
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These tiny embers of early jurisprudential notions regarding the concept of ‘dignity’ led to the 
eventual progression of what was later acknowledged as Dignitas hominis by the Stoic 
philosophers of Greece.771 Dignitas hominis is the consideration of an imbued universal 
elevation of dignity for each person of the world by virtue of their inherent humanity; allowing 
for the key factor of reasoning to serve as the benchmark test of dignity.772 These steps of 
jurisprudential intrigue are honed by the objective understanding that the human race 
collectively has inherent dignity.773 This is indicative to the notion of that which separates us 
from all other inhabitants within the natural world; that being the cognitive ability to exercise 
reason. Jordaan notes that the quality of reasoning is of ‘immeasurable value’,774’ which 
facilitates and allows for self-growth of every human. This submission also supports the 
validity of personal autonomy by one’s exhibition of reason, which is viewed as an accessory 
to the concept of Dignitas hominis. 
The rise of the concept of human dignity is an extension of the Dignitas hominis, embedding 
the moral notion of ‘absolute inner worth’,775 demanded by each person within the elevation of 
his or her personal interactions and derived from their inherent humanity.776 Human dignity is 
further supported by the philosophical claim of distinguishable humanity,777 which is viewed 
as intrinsic to each human upon birth,778 originating from the virtue of a person’s capability of 
reasoning and free, autonomous, will.779 This rests upon a potential jurisprudential quagmire of 
thought; attempting to ascertain whether human dignity is existent only as a right, or if it stands 
within the duality of a value that demands respect and obligatory conformity in its protection 
from others.780   
To shed light upon the conceptualisation of dignity, the UDHR is an early quintessential canvas 
of human rights,781 entrenching inherent human dignity within its preamble by recognising that: 
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‘[The] inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.782. 
Such is a testament to the prevalence of the inherent nature of human dignity from an 
international standpoint, for the UDHR is a codex of the essential human rights of the modern 
world.783 Furthermore, this expresses that human dignity is the bedrock of many other rights, 
inclusive of the right to freedom. Article 1 itself endorses the dignity rights belonging to each 
human upon their birth.784 This reflects the inherent, or intrinsic, nature of the right to human 
dignity and its resonance within a universal jurisprudential value system. Thus, dignity’s 
inherent nature serves as an aid to the formation of one’s personality by giving flight to other 
personality rights .785 Further, Article 23 proposes the socio-economic rights of every person 
and notably accounts for the ‘favourable remuneration’ of an employee.786 This is done to 
bolster the deliberation of what may be considered ‘favourable remuneration’, sufficient for a 
person to lead a family life ‘worthy of human dignity.787’ This nuanced submission, 
encapsulated by the broad parameters of what is perceived as ‘human dignity’ within the 
Declaration,788 projects that dignity is holistic and spread into multiple facets of human life. 
Dignity to the Declaration is thus not singly a right but also exists as a broad value, which is 
carved within a reciprocal obligation of promoting such interests.  
Human dignity is expressly provided for within the Bill of Rights, found in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.789 This proved to be a momentous leap for the 
jurisprudence of South Africa, as the past Apartheid regime had denied the commonality of 
human dignity between different race groups.790 Under section 10, the right to dignity reads as 
follows: 
‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.791’ 
This is a manifestation of the State’s recognition of an individual’s inherent worth, 
unanimously applied to all persons in support of their individualism. The South African 
                                                          
782 See preamble. 
783 Ibid. 
784 Article 1. 
785 P. Kain ‘Kant’s defense of human moral status’ (2009) 47 Journal of the History of Philosophy 88. 
786 Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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perspective on the legality of human dignity is converse to the ancient hierarchical concept of 
Dignitas.792 Jordaan,793 Goolam,794 and Steinmann have respectively identified that human 
dignity exists as both a value and right within the South African legal framework.795 Even with 
an express Constitutional provision, dignity has had trouble finding a clear and defined footing 
within the South African legal system. Ackermann J, in the case of National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, supports this by stating that: 
‘Dignity is a difficult concept to capture in precise terms.796’ 
This is attributed to the chameleon-like duality in which human dignity finds itself in, one 
moment interpreted as an enforceable right,797 the other, as a collective set of values. The latter 
allows human dignity to serve as the cornerstone in the linking of other personality rights,798 
based on its inherent nature.799 From the perspective of human dignity standing as a value 
within the South African legal system, its endurance as a moral custodian for the interpretation 
of other human rights, by virtue of section 39(1) of the Constitution,800 is noteworthy. The 
‘Interpretation Clause’ allows for the value of human dignity to stand as a benchmark in the 
assessment of a court,801 or tribunal when interpreting the contents of the Bill of Rights to 
promote the values of an open and democratic society that respects and endorses human 
dignity. Secondly, a normative reflection of the value of human dignity exists as a pivotal legal-
analyser when applying section 36(1) of the Constitution.802 Thus, the value of human dignity 
serves as an overarching archetype of the investigation in the determination of whether a 
fundamental right may be limited.803  
Section 10 of the Constitution creates a tacit bulwark against its own infringement by ushering 
through the prerogative of the respect and protection for a person’s right to human dignity, 
owed by the State and others within the Republic of South Africa.804 Therefore, a remedy is 
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available to one whose right to human dignity has been infringed, being that of crimen 
iniuria.805 Burchell analyses that the crime of crimen iniuria arises where one unlawfully and 
intentionally impairs the dignity, or privacy,806 of another person.807 This will allow the relevant 
court of inquiry to objectively determine whether one’s dignity or privacy, has been unlawfully 
infringed808. In doing so, the relevant court must also take into account the aggrieved party’s 
individual human dignity, which will stem from a subjective analysis of personal ‘self-worth’ 
of the person.809 Therefore, as autonomy is an accessory element to human dignity,810 the 
subjective, autonomous display of such a person’s human dignity must be explored when 
considering the crime of crimen iniuria.811 The victim to a crime of crimen iniuria must 
subjectively feel that their dignity, or privacy, has been unlawfully violated by the conduct of 
the accused.812 On the other end of the spectrum, the objective test of the court must assess 
whether a reasonable person in the victim’s position would feel equally offended by the 
conduct of the accused.  
The principles from the case of S v Makwanyane promote the commonality of human dignity 
as a fundamental Constitutional right and value, forming the backbone to personality rights 
within a free and democratic society.813 This, in turn, spurs the realisation of the right to human 
dignity as a juncture of intrinsic human worth. The right to human dignity coincides with other 
rights including, inter alia, privacy,814 equality,815 and freedom.816 As stated by O’Regan J in S 
v Makwanyane: 
‘Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are 
entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other 
rights that are specifically entrenched in… [the Bill of Rights].817’ 
                                                          
805 Moon and Allen as cited in Steinmann "The Legal Significance of Human Dignity" (2016) 159, 160. 
806 This, once again, shows human dignity’s close correlation with other rights, namely privacy, and the stance 
taken within the South African common law to punish one who has violated another’s right to dignity or privacy. 
807 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 632. 
808 Ibid 634. 
809 Ibid. 
810 Jordaan ‘Autonomy as an element of human dignity in South African case law’ (2009) 10. 
811 Crimen iniuria is inherited within the South African legal system by the country’s common law roots to Roman 
Law. 
812 Aphane v S (A621/2007) [2009] ZAGPPHC 264 (10 September 2009) at para 9. 
813 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
814 Khumalo v Holomisa (CCT53/01) [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) (14 June 2002) 
at para 27. 
815 See preamble of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
816 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 155. 
817 At para 328. 
128 
 
It is also appropriate to note that the concept of human dignity within South African 
jurisprudence is not only hinged upon the determination of individualistic human worth. As 
accounted for by Yacoob J in the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom noted: 
‘There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational values of our society, are 
denied [to] those who have no food, clothing or shelter.818’ 
This submission gives credence to the fact that the South African outlook on human dignity is 
not only confined to a psychological avenue but also trickles within the realm of the protection 
of physical dignity.819 These are beaming reflections of the socio-economic rights, as provided 
for by the UDHR in the recognition of the completeness of human dignity.820  
Therefore, human dignity in South African law strides as a holistic conceptualisation of the 
inherent worth of every person within their unique paths and singularities.821 Further, the right 
to human dignity bolsters the maintenance of essential, physical measures that add to a person’s 
dignified way of living. The right to human dignity and its constructs are far-reaching, outlining 
its protection and safety with an emphasis upon the intrinsic endorsement of the right for each 
individual. 
 
4.6 The Right to Freedom of Expression 
 
Amongst the array of content found within the Bill of Rights, the right to freedom of expression 
is also promised within the contemporary South African society.822 In a reflection of South 
Africa’s censored past,823 it was necessary for the new Constitutional democracy to facilitate 
for the autonomous expression of citizens, inevitably linking to other specific rights afforded 
for under the Bill of Rights. O’Regan J, in the case of South African National Defence Union 
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v Minister of Defence,824 supports the new-age Constitutional value of the right to freedom of 
expression by evaluating that: 
‘[Freedom of expression] is closely related to freedom of religion, belief and opinion (section 15), the right to 
dignity (section 10), as well as the right to freedom of association (section 18), the right to vote and to stand for 
public office (section 19) and the right to assembly (section 17). These rights taken together protect the rights of 
individuals not only individually to form and express opinions, of whatever nature, but to establish associations 
and groups of like-minded people to foster and propagate such opinions. The rights implicitly recognise the 
importance, both for a democratic society and for individuals personally, of the ability to form and express 
opinions, whether individually or collectively, even where those views are controversial..825’  
Consequentially, this statement from O’Regan J is a fundamental deciphering instrument in the 
determination of the merit of the right to freedom of expression.826 Freedom of expression co-
exists with the interlocking of other constitutionally protected rights that are propelled upon 
the spire of one’s personal autonomy. This value system of imperial constitutionalism promotes 
that freedom of expression works to instil the foundations of the new democratic society by 
allowing one’s expression to serve as a defining facet of their personality. This enhances 
collectivism between those persons with similar interests and beliefs and adds flourishes of 
diversity within the democratic society, based on the autonomous dispensation of one’s 
freedom of expression. 
A momentary detour regarding the exploration of the South African law’s stance is necessary 
to expose the International perspectives regarding the right to freedom of expression. Under 
the UDHR, Article 19 asserts that all persons are entitled to freedom of opinion and expression 
without prejudice, or interference, from others.827 The Declaration’s textual definition of the 
right to freedom of expression works as a forebear for the ECHR,828 reflecting its prominence 
within the legal spheres of its member-nations in Europe.829 Article 10(1) promises the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression to the exclusion of inferences by another.830 This provision 
is clearly inspired by the esteem of the UDHR, yet the ECHR also codifies a limitation to the 
right, which was not accounted for by the Declaration.  
                                                          
824 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence (CCT27/98) [1999] ZACC 7; 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC); 
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Under Article 10(2), it is expressed that the freedom of one’s expression is not an absolute 
right, as the right itself creates reciprocal duties upon the holder when exercising such a right.831 
Limitations upon the right to freedom of expression shall occur if prescribed by the law and 
necessary within a democratic society. This consideration of an internal limitation exists as a 
dichotomy within the right to freedom of expression itself, further supported in the interests of; 
inter alia, the protection of health and public morals, the protection of private information, the 
protection of the reputation of a person and the prevention of crimes.832  
The resonance of the ECHR amongst its member states within Europe displays a proud panoply 
of enacted legislation to support the Convention’s ethos. England is a signatory to the 
Convention and demonstrated its compliance by the enactment of the Human Rights Act.833 
Before the Human Rights Act, there was a dearth of statutory support for freedom of expression 
within the country.834 Such protection over the right was initially derived from the country’s 
common law regime, allowing for the liberal interpretation of the freedom of one’s opinion and 
expression at this node in judicial history.835 The dawn of the English statutory regime, which 
accommodated for the right to freedom of expression, codified the right under section 12 of the 
Human Rights Act.836  
The Human Rights Act does not impose any limitations upon the right to freedom of 
expression, it merely provides for a remedy where the right is infringed. The absence of any 
limitations clause to the right to freedom of expression may be attributed to the impact of 
Article 10(2) of the Convention,837 clearly defining the possible limitations of the right where 
necessary. England allows for a flurry of freedoms that constitute an expression; be it in the 
form of political speech, educational and intellectual expression, and artistic or literary 
expression.838 Media outlets, publishers, and newspaper groups also enjoy the right to freedom 
of expression within England, albeit along a tightrope that is balanced against the right to 
individual privacy.839 Interestingly, the judiciary of England, in the case of O’Shea v MGN 
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Ltd,840 held that the publication of a pornographic advertisement in dispute, no matter how 
morally divergent such may be to some groups within the public, constituted a valid exercise 
of a publisher’s freedom of expression within the contemporary legal framework.841  
Canadian law accommodates for the right to freedom of expression within its Constitution 
Act,842 outlining the right within the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Freedom of 
expression exists as a fundamental freedom, in tow with its analogous counterparts such as 
freedom of thought, opinion, and belief.843 Therefore, freedom of speech is not the only measure 
of freedom afforded by the Canadian legislature, for freedom of expression is a broad and 
diverse concept that is greatly emphasised. An expression may exist within a multitude of 
possibilities, stemming from an activity, gesture, song, dance or any other display that exhibits 
a meaningful expression by the maker.844 The Canadian case of R v Ghomeshi unravelled in 
wide media coverage, involving the famous CBC Network host, Jian Ghomeshi, who was 
accused of assaulting three women in non-consensual sadomasochism on three separate 
occasions.845 Mr Ghomeshi had argued that the activities were consensual and raised the 
defence of ‘kink’,846 stating that it was his freedom of expression to engage in sadomasochism. 
Interestingly, Mr Ghomeshi was acquitted of all charges of assault, as the defence was 
successful in discrediting the credibility of the complainants’ sworn statements.847 The 
importance of Mr Ghomeshi’s trial exposes that freedom of sexual expression may arise in 
unpalatable forms to some, but may yet still endure as a valid form of expression nonetheless.848 
The South African law’s stance on the right to freedom of expression displays similarity to the 
legal perspectives of English and Canadian law. Apart from a person’s verbal expressions, non-
verbal expressions, such as gestures, carry just as much significance within the legal dynamic 
of South Africa. So too is freedom of artistic creativity,849 enduring as a protected form of 
expression and serving as a broad and expansive autonomous concept. This form of expression 
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includes for the creation of, inter alia, films, music, dance, and paintings within the open and 
democratic society of South Africa.850 However, the vastness associated with the freedom of 
expression within South Africa is not an absolute right. Under section 16(2) of the Constitution, 
the right to freedom of expression may be limited within the occurrence of the following:    
‘(a) propaganda for war;  
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or  
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause 
harm.851’ 
The importance of section 16(2) is that it imposes a duality within the right to freedom of 
expression. The internal limitation mechanism, reflective of the ECHR’s prerogatives of the 
extent to one’s freedom of expression within a democratic society,852 serves as a candid muse 
for the new-age Constitutional order of South Africa. Freedom of expression may be enshrined 
as a fundamental freedom, yet the intention of the South African legislature clearly seeks to 
keep in check the extent of a person’s freedom of expression to prevent harm from befalling 
others within the democratic society.853 A definitive bar on avenues of freedom of expression 
appears to be necessary within an ‘open and democratic society’,854 for the prevention of 
physical and psychological harm exists as a definitive value for the State to uphold. 
Furthermore, the internal limitation of the right to freedom of expression is implanted to 
preserve the rights to equality,855 and dignity, within South Africa,856 propelling the intertwined 
nature of freedom of expression to other constitutionally guaranteed rights.857 In the case of 
Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International, it was understood that 
section 16(2) is only as expansive as its defined limitations: 
‘It follows clearly that unless an expressive act is excluded by section 16(2) it is protected expression.858’ 
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Therefore, if a form of expression does not fall within the allocated limitations of section 16(2), 
such may be deemed as a protected form of expression. However, where a form of freedom of 
expression eludes the categories outlined within section 16(2), the ‘Limitations Clause’ of 
section 36(1) of the Constitution would rise to combat this.859 The approach of the broad-
sweeping ‘Limitations Clause’ would harness the implementation of the law of general 
application to limit the right to freedom of expression if such is necessary and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society.860 However, freedom of expression is a right that is entwined with 
others in the Bill of Rights. A limitation on expression may likely cause a ‘domino-effect’ and 
limit the extent of a complimentary right. If a court were to apply section 36(1) to freedom of 
expression, such must be done with the justified appreciation that other rights may be 
curtailed.861 Furthermore, where freedom of expression is in conflict with another right or 
interest, a proportionality test shall be implemented.862 This allows a court, in the inspiration of 
the ‘Limitations Clause’,863 to assess the right in its entirety. This will be done to determine an 
objective and justifiable limitation to a right that is secondary to the preceding right, assessed 
upon a case-by-case basis.  
The nature of the right to freedom of expression is clearly not absolute, yet the outlined 
prohibitions of section 16(2) do little to endorse what may be permissible as a fair 
representation of one’s freedom of expression where minority sexual expressions arise.864 
South Africa has had a troubled past in the recognition of LGBT rights, yet steadily shows its 
growing support of these minority groups by enforcing their shared rights of dignity and 
equality, giving flight to their freedom of sexual expression.865 The freedoms of sexuality 
afforded to minority sexual groups, in light of their vulnerabilities within society,866 are 
protected under the constitutional dispensation.867 Freedoms of sexuality also find safeguard in 
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provisions of non-discrimination and equality concerning the right to,868 inter alia, freedom of 
expression.869 
Those that partake in sadomasochistic activities may be judged as a minority sexual group and 
deserving of a heightened degree of protection by the law in the safeguarding and realisation 
of their fundamental rights. Alas, the scarcity of legal recognition over this sexual practice does 
little to support the South African law’s definitive standpoint if such a dispute arises. The nature 
of sadomasochism is to express physical violence in the attainment of sexual gratification.870 
By the application of section 16(2) of the Constitution,871 the causing of violence in the 
exercising of one’s expression will allow for a limitation of that freedom. Additionally, an 
expression that causes, or entices, harm within the public will also be limited. Therefore, the 
possible expression of sadomasochism within the South African legal sphere immediately fails 
within the textual analysis of section 16(2) itself,872 based on the violence of the practice and 
the harm that is entrenched between partners.  
However, the immediate curtailing of sadomasochism as a form of sexual expression should 
not be applied unanimously by a blanket-like imposition. As accounted for in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, there are variant forms of sadomasochism that involve differing scales of violence 
and harm. Some of these practices are accepted as lawful manifestations of consensual violence 
within the contemporary spheres of the world. Therefore, an objective inquiry into the 
expression of sadomasochism should be conducted upon the merits of each case if found before 
a South African court. If sadomasochism were to be interpreted as an expression of sexual 
intercourse, it is probable that the limitations of section 16(2) would not be applicable, as such 
would constitute a sexual expression and not one of violence.873 Ultimately, the distinction of 
the practice of sadomasochism, existing as either a sexual or a violent form of expression, will 
be hinged upon the investigation of the relevant court upon the merits of the individual case 
itself. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
The prominence of individual human rights assumes a heavyweight role within the inquiry of 
courts from both the international and national legal spheres when interpreting a spectrum of 
legal complexities. Individually, each person enjoys the liberties associated with their inherent 
rights of human dignity, privacy, and freedom of expression to convey their unique and 
autonomous will. Autonomy thus exists as a golden thread between the rights that were 
explored in this chapter, woven into the fabric of these statutory provisions in its omnipresent 
uniqueness. This, in turn, provides the schematic for the virtue of human dignity; assessing that 
even if the concept is inherent for every human, a personal, or subjective, reflection of human 
dignity will also be protected. The right to human dignity oozes into both privacy and freedom 
of expression, amongst the myriad of other rights.  
It is within human dignity that a person may subjectively pursue and express their will, whilst 
being afforded the necessary privacy to enjoy the culmination of these rights. Upon the chain 
of explored rights within this Chapter, the ciphering of sadomasochism within these 
fundamental spheres takes shape. The pursuit of sadomasochism may rightly form the basis of 
one’s human dignity and self-worth,874 based on the subjective affinity in the expression of the 
practice. Secondly, and feeding off the structure established by human dignity, privacy to 
experience one’s autonomous will is a necessary component of one’s personality.875 Lastly, 
freedom of expression, significantly influenced by an individual’s personal desires, will thrive 
in a private setting that respects these personality rights in juxtaposition to the allowance 
permitted by the State. Sadomasochism, dependent on the intensity of the violence expressed 
by the partners, may exist as a valid representation of a person’s freedom of sexual 
expression.876     
It comes as no surprise that both the national and international legal systems have implemented 
legislation and other prerogatives for the enforcement and protection of fundamental human 
rights. Take, for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,877 whose humble foot-
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876 See R v Ghomeshi 2016 ONCJ 155. 
877 UN General Assembly "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 
136 
 
wrappings influenced the European Convention on Human Rights.878 This set off a 
reverberation of shared values of human rights throughout the contemporary legal systems of 
Europe. So too does the archetype of human rights exist within the Constitutional age of South 
African law, standing within a colosseum of promised rights under the Bill of Rights.879 The 
extensity of human dignity, privacy, and freedom of expression do not prove to be absolute 
within a legal system, even if such may promised within legislation. This is immersive within 
the duality of the balance between personality rights and the compelling interests protected by 
the State; for laws are codified to uplift that which is open, justifiable, and democratic to a 
society, not to unfairly erase the rights and freedoms of people.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE VICISSITUDES OF THE PRACTICE OF 
CONSENSUAL SADOMASOCHISM EXISTING AS A 
VICTIMLESS CRIME  
 
“There is no such thing as a victimless crime, and people should be allowed to do as they please with their own 
bodies and with other consenting adults. If you believe otherwise, then you are an enemy of freedom.” – Michelle 
Templet, ‘Exodus’ (The Darklight Chronicles).880 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The concept of a victimless crime is far from avant-garde within legal systems of the modern 
world. The difficulty, however, arises in the appropriateness of the criminal sanctions over 
victimless crimes, for the etymology of the ‘crime’ committed often exists within a shambolic 
duality between the pillars of law and morality. This chapter will explore the definition of 
victimless crimes and the variant forms that exist within a legal system. This will then unravel 
into the safeguarding of public order and morality by the willingness of the criminal law to 
prosecute actions that have no true victim.  
Morality and the law will be inspected in light of the famous Hart-Devlin debate, derived from 
the ignition of the Wolfenden Report. This approach shall attempt to shed light upon the 
motives of the criminal law in prosecuting victimless crimes in order to safeguard the morality 
of the public at large and to prevent wide-scale harm. Ancillary to this, inspiration from the 
already explored rights to dignity, freedom of expression and privacy will counteract the 
desired criminal sanctions by the State. This submission will further be supported by the 
concept of moralism entrenched within the rights of the Constitution of South Africa. 
Finally, this chapter will attempt to decipher whether the practice of consensual 
sadomasochism falls within the ambit of a victimless crime. This will strive to project whether 
such conduct should be met with immediate criminal sanction, demanded by the values of 
statutory guides, public policy, and public moralism. This will be construed in light of the 
societal and legal values of the South African Constitution and that of the international law’s 
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perspectives. If it is found that the definition of sadomasochism should be a recipient to the 
groupings of victimless crimes, what level of harm upon society must be established to sustain 
a prosecution under this guise? Further, would the classification of consensual sadomasochism 
as a victimless crime unjustifiably infringe the rights of the participants? 
 
5.2 Defining a Victimless Crime 
  
To evoke the conceptualisation of a victimless crime, the exploration of the definition of a 
‘crime’ becomes relevant to this concept. Burchell alludes that the general nature of a crime 
curtails the protected rights and interests of the State or that of another person.881 This viewpoint 
avers that a crime brings with it a potential victim, whose rights are infringed by the unlawful 
conduct of another. Kramer defines the socio-legal construction of a crime as existing within a 
category of legal creation,882 produced and outlined by the State.883 Thus, the State must define 
what behaviour will constitute a ‘crime’,884 and in turn, provide the criteria in which criminal 
behaviour shall be interpreted and punished885. Therefore, the legal norms, values, and morals 
of a State will serve within the primary embodiment of the criminal law and its textual outline 
of crimes. In turn, the clarity of the definition of a crime will unravel into the elements of the 
specific act itself, as outlined by either statute or common law, bringing into focus the nature 
of the crime and the appropriate criminal proceedings.886  
Within the school of Criminology, the once offender-focused inquiry is now expansive within 
a new sub-branch known as ‘victimology’.887 This sub-branch was borne from the 
considerations relating to the infringement of rights suffered by the victim by the unlawful 
conduct of the offender. This exposes the role of victimology in a new prominence within the 
framework of the constitutionally oriented criminal justice system of South Africa.888 The 
victim-focus inquiry is an expansive stride that pays homage to the safeguarding of the victim’s 
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rights by way of victim impact statements and other supporting avenues of protection.889 
Therefore, the existence of a victim to a crime is part-and-parcel to the unlawful conduct of a 
criminal offender, and it is the focus of the criminal justice system of South Africa to balance 
both the rights of the offender and that of the victim respectively. 
The term ‘victimless crime’ is ripe with difficulty in satisfying the State’s legal, and moral, 
definitions of the distinction between the parties to a crime. As explored earlier in this chapter, 
a crime will involve the infringement of another’s rights; creating a dynamic that outlines an 
offender and a victim. Further, the commission of a crime surfaces an identifiable victim, or 
the clear infringement of another’s protected rights, by the unlawful conduct of the offender. 
Actual harm need not materialise from the unlawful conduct, but the risk of harm must be 
displayed within the conduct of the offender.  
The inspection of the term ‘victimless’ is the absence of a victim, or injured party, to a crime. 
Thus, if conduct mimics the definition of a crime, yet there is no victim to the offence; surely 
the complete definition of the crime is not satisfied. The rumination of a victimless crime 
derives from this orbit, understanding that such an occurrence is probable within certain 
consensual, and often private, activities between persons. Superficially, a victimless crime may 
be defined as the willing participation of consenting individuals to an outlined crime, yet no 
victim, or injury, exists within the dynamic of the offence.890 Based on the absence of a true 
victim, the justification of the criminal law in applying its sanctions appears to be disjunctive 
to the nature of the ‘crime’ and the consensual, autonomous, nature of the interaction.  
Stone builds on the introductory definition of victimless crimes by arguing for the interpretation 
of its legal resonance.891 To Stone, the only ‘victims’ that derive from victimless crimes are 
those that are willing participants to what is considered ‘morally’ divergent criminal conduct 
by the legislature and common law regimes.892 Without a defined or identifiable victim, Stone 
conjures a relevant juncture into the assessment of a perceived ‘crime without victims’ by 
highlighting that it is the legislature’s prosecution, which inevitably victimises the consensual 
and autonomous conduct of the participants. A criminal prosecution supports the criminality 
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of such conduct, for the consensual actions of the victimless crimes are divergent to the moral 
values instilled by the legislature.  
Hughes,893 in the inspiration of Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’,894 assesses the criminal law’s stance in 
protecting against the harm that would infringe fundamental rights entrenched by the State. In 
light of the Harm Principle, the criminal law’s inspection of the unlawful conduct, which causes 
harm to others, is a valid entry point for the punishment of an offender. However, in 
contemplation of Mill’s Harm Principle, criminal conduct that does not bring harm to others, 
even if only harmful to the offender alone, should not be the recipient of the criminal law’s 
interference.895 It is essential to note that victimless crimes often involve the consensual 
interaction of two, or more, persons. Thus, consensual actions that administer harm upon the 
consenting parties sway from the ambit of what was considered as a ‘self-regarding’ act by 
Mills.896  
However, Saunders asserts that Mill’s Harm Principle accommodates for the extension of the 
‘self-regarding’ criminal act concerning consensual harm within a victimless crime.897 The 
assessment of the malleability of the term ‘self-regarding’ may be applicable to the unified 
actions of the consenting parties.898 This argument is substantive in its worth, so long as no 
harm, or infringement, befalls the rights of another who is not a party to the consensual 
relationship. Therefore, a ‘self-regarding’ criminal act, even if unlawful in the outline of State 
statute, theoretically does not infringe the rights of others and is without a victim. 
Schur identifies another plateau within the content of a victimless crime,899 putting forward that 
such a definition is satisfied within the trade of substances and items, or in the commission of 
personal services,900 that are forbidden by the laws of the State .901 The criminal law’s statutory 
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ban and criminalisation of the use of narcotics moulds the consideration of an appropriate 
example of a victimless crime.902 Meyer argues that: 
‘[The] prohibition of drugs simply creates an underground economy that cannot be taxed, controlled or regulated. 
It causes corruption and fills the prisons with people found guilty of a victimless crime.903’ 
Thus, from this submission, the use of dependence-producing substances may be defined as a 
victimless crime, for the harm incurred is personally related to the offender alone.904 Yet, the 
State punishes an offender derived from their contrary indulgence with the proscribed 
substances. This submission will be explored at a later stage within this chapter. 
The prosecution of victimless crimes appears to derive from the realms of legal, social, and 
moral prerogatives that prove to be ingrained within the values of an open and democratic 
State. This, however, exists as a reflective commentary on the concept of a victimless crime, 
for ‘self-regarding’ actions that do not infringe the rights of others are deemed to be punishable 
on the pretence that such may cause moral harm to society. Drug usage and trade may rightly 
send shockwaves through the public, yet the justification of prosecuting the practice treads 
upon a quagmire of conflicting jurisprudential views. The central question that inflates the 
concept of victimless crimes is whether the perceived immoral behaviour justifies a criminal 
prosecution by the State.  
Furthermore, where the practice deserves a lesser punishment and not that of a criminal 
sanction would ultimately depend on the extent of the harm unto others. Rightly, the State may 
argue that a prosecution against a particular practice, even if there is no true victim, is a 
deterrence against actions that would cause the moral decay of society. Whether this alone is 
sufficient to instil an intrusion into the private and consensual realm of adult interactions will 
be explored in the inspiration of the findings of the Wolfenden Report and the Hart-Devlin 
debate. 
 
5.3 The Wolfenden Report and the Hart-Devlin Debate: Precursors for the Reflections 
of Victimless Crimes 
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5.3.1 Setting the Stage: The Wolfenden Report 
 
Long after a decade from the close of World War II, the ‘Report of the Committee on 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution’,905 herein referred to by its colloquial name ‘The 
Wolfenden Report’, proved to be a pivotal piece of legal literature that juggled the progressive 
notions of law and morality within England. As a prelude to the Hart-Devlin Debate, it is 
important to note that The Wolfenden Report investigated the influx of criminal prosecutions 
against the crimes of, inter alia,906 homosexuality and prostitution(sex work).907 The primary 
objective of the Wolfenden Report was to determine whether these perceived ‘immoral’ 
displays of conduct might be legalised within the contemporary legal sphere of England. 
An equitable reconciliation was sought in consultation with the criminal law’s stance and its 
prosecution of these ‘morally divergent’ crimes. The Wolfenden Report resolved with the 
understanding that the law should not criminalise private, consensual activities between adult 
partners based on the perceived immorality of the act.908 The significance of this conclusion 
brings a two-fold submission; firstly, that the law should not criminalise private, consensual 
interactions between consenting adults, and secondly, that the criminal law should not be 
moulded by a unanimous moralistic code that trumps the morally divergent behaviour of others. 
The first consideration is crystalline in its socio-legal purport; however, the submission of the 
second consideration requires some deliberation upon the expansion of immorality in the law.  
The Wolfenden Report highlighted the moralistic backbone within the criminal law’s punitive 
stance, which lobbied for the prosecution of immoral conduct within the legal system of 
England. The perspective of divergent and morally questionable behaviour must be 
systematised into actions that harm the rights of the public and actions that do not. This 
submission encapsulates the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, convening in a flurry 
of autonomy rights that are inherent to all persons. Clearly, the progressive stance of the 
criminal law, in protecting individual liberty, added a sizeable claim for morality to take a 
lesser role in the contemporary assessment of perceived ‘immoral behaviour’. This stance 
allowed for personal autonomy to flourish between personal interactions. The substantive 
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involvement of the criminal law, if fuelled by an envisioned moral-template, proved to be 
ancillary to the rights of individual liberty and privacy within England.  
Therefore, any consensual and private action that does not harm the rights of others, even if 
morally distasteful to some, should not be the recipient of a criminal sanction. This is a 
definitive attempt to minimise victimless crimes that are created by the legislature and existent 
within the common law. The private realm of consensual adult sexual interactions, which 
facilitates for both possibilities of morality and immorality, should be tempered by the 
autonomous decisions of the partners and not the criminal law, or the social convictions of the 
community. This, however, does not condone private immorality and the widespread 
infringement of another’s rights. A private and consensual homosexual interaction appeared to 
fall within a practice that did not infringe the rights of the public at large and should no longer 
be classified as a criminal offence, based on its victimless nature.  
The recommendation by the Wolfenden Report was to place a positive duty of care upon the 
consenting adult partners engaged in alleged ‘immoral behaviour’. This derived from the 
ideology of preventing against harm from befalling the rights of others in the community who 
are not a party to the consensual relationship. Where homosexuality is practised in private, 
between consenting ‘mature agents’,909 it was not the recommendation of The Wolfenden 
Report to advocate for the criminalisation of such. Along the same strides as the 
recommendations for private and consensual homosexuality, it was the submission of The 
Wolfenden Report that prostitution (sex work) in private should inhabit a similar position. 
Morality thus should not influence a criminal sanction purely on the basis that a practice falls 
within the boundaries of a minority group within society. 
 
5.3.2 The Essence of the Hart-Devlin Debate: Broadening the Fold for the Interpretation of 
Victimless Crimes 
 
The findings of the Wolfenden Report enjoyed no respite as the clash of ideologies between 
Devlin and Hart ensued in its wake. The debate had scorched through the jurisprudential 
landscape of the criminal law and its ties with the concept of societal morality. The question at 
the heart of the debate was as follows: should the criminal law consider immoral actions as a 
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criminal offence?910 Thus, where the criminal law sees fit to criminalise consensual immoral 
conduct between adults, this would serve as a flagship for the existence of victimless crimes 
within a legal system. The exploration of the position of Patrick Devlin,911 and his disregard 
for the findings of the Wolfenden Report, will be shed by virtue of his key submissions within 
the debate. Contrasting Devlin’s perspective, the views of H.L.A Hart will be deciphered in 
light of his key submissions that support the entrenchment of personal liberty and freedom; 
rights that cannot be influenced by a unanimous moral code.912  
Devlin, and his profound affinity for the interlocking of law and morals, proposed that it is in 
the coexistence of law and morality that the protection of society will occur. To Devlin, the 
influence of a common societal morality must coax the criminal law to prosecute behaviour 
that would cause the moral deterioration of the society.913 Further, Devlin submits that the 
intangible bonds of common morality and belief are polymerised to form a unified system of 
morality that is understood by the ‘feelings’ of a reasonable man within society.914 This outlook 
proposes that morality exists within a model that is collectively shared by the members of 
society as a paragon value system, based on its intrinsic unanimity. Even though cognisance 
was given to Mill’s Harm Principle, Devlin argues that such is one of many guides within the 
labyrinth of jurisprudence that may be considered in light of the findings of The Wolfenden 
Report.915 
Devlin further submits that the safeguarding of morality will be hinged upon the determination 
of whether immoral conduct has occurred in the objective analysis of a reasonable man within 
the society. This will be interpreted by the assessment of the impact of the harm from the 
‘immoral behaviour’ and its infringement upon the collective morality of society,916 perceived 
purely from the feelings of a reasonable man.917 Devlin is of the belief that even private acts of 
immorality are sufficient to cause the withering of public morality and these must be the 
recipient of the criminal law’s sanctions. Thus, Devlin proposes that the value of societal 
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morality endures as an instrument that may be applied practically by the imposition of a 
criminal sanction, in both the public and private spheres.918 This must be considered objectively 
by the criminal law and the regulation of immoral behaviour to be assessed on the facts of each 
individual dispute. Therefore, Devlin argues that harm from immoral conduct is sufficient to 
infringe the collective safety of society and does not exist as an isolated harm inflicted between 
individuals. Society is allegorised as a complete entity, one that is deserving of a moralistic 
framework that calls for the epitome of legal protection. 
Hart, in his contrasting argument, propelled the perspective of Mill’s Harm Principle;919 and 
compartmentalised the dynamic of morality within society into ‘positive morality’ and ‘critical 
morality’.920 ‘Positive morality’ correlates to the general affinity and acceptance of morality 
within an identifiable social group.921 ‘Critical morality’, however, serves as a definitive test to 
determine the morality of an appropriate social institution and the nature of ‘positive morality’ 
within it.922 Hart thus implements the ethos of ‘critical morality’ in his submissions within the 
debate.  
Devlin had attempted to show the correlation between law and morality, calling for the 
importance of moral rules and desired behaviour from members of society,923 in order to 
preserve societal morality. The stance of Hart’s position differs, as it seeks to characterise the 
conflict between the concepts of law and morality whilst advocating for the freedom of 
individual human liberty within society. This sense of individualism, or analogous autonomy, 
is remote from the collective morality that is perceived by the feelings of a reasonable man; as 
was submitted by Devlin.924 To Hart, the law may not instil the enforcement of a ‘greater’ 
morality over the actions of individuals, unless the actions exist as a source of harm to others.925 
Devlin’s argument had stressed that a reasonable man is capable of understanding social 
morality by virtue of intrinsic moral justice, yet Hart is not willing to assume this jingoistic 
possibility as a quality that is inherent to all people.926  
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To Hart, perceived ‘immoral’ private acts, which may be practised by a few individuals of 
society, should not suffer the unanimous scrutiny of an overarching social model of morality. 
This submission is a manifestation of the isolation demanded between law and morality and 
the proposed deviation of the monopoly held by the viewpoints of the majority, sufficient to 
curtail the fundamental liberties of society as a whole. Hart argues that Devlin’s cumulative 
‘feelings test’,927 alleged to be intrinsic to a reasonable man within society, must be abrogated 
based on its disjunctive limitations to the individual liberties of all humans within society. 
Therefore, Hart asserts that the paternalism of morality is unjustified in the application of the 
law unless the action in dispute can be proven to cause an identifiable harm to society. 
This reflects Hart’s primary argument and echoes the findings of The Wolfenden Report in its 
breakdown of the victimless crimes of homosexuality and prostitution. Further, Hart expresses 
his test for harm that accounts for a physical manifestation of the harm from the perceived 
immoral conduct.928 If no physical manifestation of harm occurs from the alleged ‘immoral 
conduct’, Hart would argue that such conduct is not deserving of State criminal sanction. 
Therefore, it is in the infringement of the rights of the State that will allow for a primary entry 
point for the criminal law’s talons, and not the collective influence of societal morality. Hart is 
clearly a champion of individual freedom and liberty, deriving heavily from the vestiges of 
legal paternalism. Hart remains a jurist who is unconvinced that a single immoral act, 
committed in the private confines of adult interaction, would cause the fall of society as a 
whole. 
In conclusion, Hart’s submissions elate individual human liberty, self-determination, 
autonomy, and freedom. It is within these concepts that the criminal law would find an 
appropriate guide when interpreting a victimless crime that has occurred within a contemporary 
legal system. This, however, is not to say that Devlin stands as the antagonist of individual 
freedom and liberty.929 To the contrary, Devlin’s argument wishes to maintain the freedom of 
society as a whole by the utmost safeguarding of societal morality. At its core, Hart understands 
that morality is a hereditary phenomenon within a civilised society, yet believes that the 
principle of individual liberty and freedom must be entrenched to shape and guide such 
morality.   
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The position of the Wolfenden Report had amassed a throne of jurisprudential strides for the 
assessment of victimless crimes. The clash of ideologies between Hart and Devlin exists within 
a storm of differing theories in the positioning of the criminal law and its correlation with 
perceived ‘immoral’ private activities. It is submitted that the debate is a feast of abstract morals 
in conflict with individualism, yet one that should not allow for the invitation of the criminal 
law into the private spheres of adult interaction. The Hart-Devlin debate proves that the 
criminal law’s bond with morality is a dance with the prerogative of mitigating harm within 
society. Therefore, progressive winds of legislative development allowed for the detachment 
of the criminal law from the perceived ‘immoral’ conduct of homosexuality and prostitution 
within the English legal sphere. However, this proves to be a glacial dream for the complete 
rooting out of victimless crimes in society, as such will be dependent on the nature of the crime 
and its rippling effects of harm. 
 
5.4 Victimless Crimes from the South African Perspective: Reconciling Morality with 
Legality 
 
The criminal law of South Africa has been utilised in the interpretation of morality when 
assessing victimless crimes. Take for instance its implementation in the case of National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,930 outlining the considerations of 
homosexuality and the criminalisation of the practice of sodomy between consenting men. The 
Constitutional Court asserted that the criminalisation of consensual homosexual behaviour, 
which involved sodomy, proved to be deviant to the Constitutional rights of equality and 
privacy.931 It was also submitted that it was not in the nature of the Bill of Rights to spawn 
victimless crimes in the lawful enjoyment of one’s personality rights.932 Thus, homosexuality 
inhabited the right to sexual equality,933 which could not suffer unfair discrimination from the 
criminal law. Male rape, as accounted for by the Constitutional Court, will be viewed in the 
context of the crime of rape itself.934 The offence of male rape would be subject to the criminal 
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law’s sanctions in assessing the elements of an unlawful and non-consensual sexual 
penetration. 
However, it was the understanding of the Constitutional Court that consensual homosexual 
activities should not suffer from the same criminal sanctions imposed by the common law 
crime of sodomy. This would constitute a clear infringement of a protected form of sexual 
expression that is endorsed by the Constitutional regime of South Africa.935 Clearly, 
criminalisation of sodomy, practised within a private and consensual homosexual relationship, 
would be a clear-cut example of a victimless crime. To the Constitutional Court, the morality 
of homosexuality should be protected by the Constitutional disposition of the law, swaying 
from the prior influences of the common law and the out-dated morality models of a bygone 
past. The case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice  proves 
that the criminal law may become entangled with disputes of ‘immoral behaviour’; that which 
is sufficient to cause moral disgust amongst some groups within society. However, the 
operation of law treads delicately upon the precipice between the legal regulation of perceived 
‘immoral’ private conduct and the possible infringement upon constitutionally protected rights 
by the implementation of a criminal sanction.936  
In reflection, it is evident that the existing laws on sodomy had adverse effects upon the 
Constitutional rights of gay men that engaged in private consensual homosexual activities.937 
Any prosecution inspired from the ambit of such sodomy laws, regarding consensual 
homosexual activities, would produce a victimless crime. The argument of prosecuting the 
perceived ‘immoral’ behaviour of a minority group in society proved unconstitutional, 
therefore invalidating the laws of sodomy.938 Interestingly, the Constitutional Court highlighted 
the acceptance of morality within the criminal justice system of South Africa, yet limiting its 
applicability by submitting the following: 
‘A state that recognises difference does not mean a state without morality or one without a point of view. It does 
not banish concepts of right and wrong, nor envisage a world without good and evil. It is impartial in its dealings 
with people and groups, but is not neutral in its value system. The Constitution certainly does not debar the state 
from enforcing morality. Indeed, the Bill of Rights is nothing if not a document founded on deep political 
morality. What is central to the character and functioning of the state, however, is that the dictates of the morality 
                                                          
935 Ibid at para 85.  
936 Radebe "The Unconstitutional Criminalisation of Adult Sex Work" (Masters thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2013) 4. 
937 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 15; 1999 (1) SA 
6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (9 October 1998) at para 23. 
938 Ibid at para 37. 
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which it enforces, and the limits to which it may go, are to be found in the text and spirit of the Constitution 
itself.939’ 
From this submission, it is clear that the moral value system created by the Constitution should 
serve as the arbiter for the implementation of the law, or for the creation of new laws. A broad 
and exclusive South African morality is created by the Constitution and allows for a coherent 
perception of morality within the society. This singlehandedly renders Devlin’s views as 
invalid within the Constitutional age of South Africa. Radebe asserts that Devlin’s argument 
of a broad societal moralism should be ‘treated with caution’.940 for a far sweeping moral tenet 
would have crippling effects upon the Constitutional rights of minority groups. This notion of 
a ‘minority group’ is used broadly to accommodate for the various religions, customs, genders, 
and sexual orientations of certain members within society.941 In the perspective of the right to 
equality, as promised under the South African Constitution,942 Devlin’s belief of a collective 
morality exists in disregard for the equality of the internal morality of minority groups.  
It is essential for the law to value and respect the right to freedom of expression and for a 
person’s liberty to be augmented within their personal beliefs and opinions.943 Yet, some beliefs 
and opinions may be harmful to society and contrary to the laws of the State. Thus, this 
consideration exists separately to the shared beliefs that are unanimous across most social 
groups, such as the prevention of physical violence and serious harm unto others. It is submitted 
that morality exists in different forms and ethical considerations between people, yet there are 
some facets of this illusively difficult concept that inhabit a neutral value system. The 
Constitution creates an over-arching ‘common’ morality for the South African people by the 
sanctity of the Bill of Rights and the specific guides to personhood that demand a reciprocal 
obligation of care from other members of society.944 This would serve as the quintessence of 
the morality of the South African public; that which is neither restrictive over the lawful 
practices of minority groups, nor departing from the incentive of the criminal law’s stance in 
prosecuting unlawful behaviour.  
                                                          
939 Ibid at para 136. 
940 ‘The Unconstitutional Criminalisation of Adult Sex Work’ (2013) 11. 
941 K.L. Stone "The Decriminalisation of Victimless Sexual Offences" (Masters thesis, University of Natal, 1996) 
78. 
942 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
943 Ibid, sections 15 and 16 of ibid. 
944 Ibid chapter 2. 
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Therefore, law and morality cannot always run in concurrent streams and may ultimately 
endure as conflicting ideals.945 Devlin’s reasonable man test within society is problematic in its 
interpretation within South Africa, for society is compartmentalised into multiple facets of 
unique social groups that inhabit a plethora of moral perspectives. To combat Devlin’s 
approach, Stone states that: 
‘Moral pluralism is an important consideration which would assist in ensuring that no singular morality is 
presumed to be more appropriate than another.946’ 
The South African Constitution inevitably propels the concept of moral pluralism within the 
legal sphere and allows for a flurry of personal beliefs to be recognised. It is evident that a 
duality between moralities may only exist if such moralities are not at loggerheads. This would 
point toward the general direction that the exposure of a conflicting morality would be 
sufficient to spark a widespread moral turbulence within other groups,947 based on the 
assessment of the harm one morality may have on another. However, this consideration is 
riddled with ambiguity, for social interactions are part-and-parcel of contemporary human 
existence. Therefore, moral tolerance within the societal sphere is encouraged by the South 
African Constitution and its notion of a free, open, and democratic society.948  
Moral pluralism alludes to the coexistence of differing moralities that dwell in legal certainty 
within the laws of the State. The concept radiates a profound support for the Constitutional 
ethos of equality and acceptance between different peoples within South Africa. Further, it is 
evident that the aforementioned rights inhabit the upper echelons of the concept of morality, 
proving the interlocked nature of human rights to the fulfilment of morality. The ‘Limitations 
Clause’ of the Constitution,949 sanctions of the criminal law, and other supporting pieces of 
legislation will determine the interpretation of differing moral ideologies and whether morality 
may be limited by the operation of the law. An unjustified limitation upon a moral practice, 
which inhabits the lawful boundaries of protected rights, would prove to be unconstitutional 
and invalid within South Africa. Ackerman J, in the case of National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others supports this viewpoint by 
stating: 
                                                          
945 "The Decriminalisation of Victimless Sexual Offences" 69. 
946 Ibid at 86. 
947 Ibidat  79. 
948 Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
949 Section 36(1). 
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‘The enforcement of the private moral views of a section of the community, which are based to a large extent on 
nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate [limitation].950’ 
It is vital for the criminal law to take into consideration the values of the Constitution and the 
safeguarding of minority rights within its assessment of a possible limitation of morality. 
Numerous constitutional rights populate morality as a concept, and thus, any limitation upon 
one right may rightly extend upon the others. In addition, the criminal law should remain 
impartial and unhindered by the influence of a broader societal morality in an attempt to 
observe all variants as equals. The ultimate focus would be an equitable resolution of the 
perceived immoral act, determining whether a criminal sanction would unjustifiably infringe 
constitutionally protected rights. This would stem from the degree of the harm that emanates 
from the practice in question how said harm infringes Constitutional rights. Where 
constitutional rights are infringed by morality, it is probable that the criminal law will be 
justified in limiting morality.  
Consensual acts often linger within victimless crimes that exist by an empowering piece of 
legislation. The case of Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (herein referred to as the Teddy Bear case) was one that explored 
the unfettering of the victimless crime of underage consensual interactions amongst certain 
categories of adolescent children.951 Initially, sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act imposed criminal liability upon children under 
the age of 16 that engaged in consensual sexual activities. 952  To remedy this victimless 
crime,953 the Constitutional Court ruled that these sections were inconsistent with the rights to 
dignity and privacy of the consenting adolescent children, along with the undermining of the 
‘best interests of the child’.954   
The Constitutional Court further bolstered the claim for the sanctity of human dignity when it 
was said that: 
                                                          
950 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (CCT11/98) [1998] ZACC 15; 1999 (1) SA 
6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (9 October 1998) at para 37. 
951 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (CCT 12/13) [2013] 
ZACC 35; 2013 (12) BCLR 1429 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC); 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC). 
952 Sections 15 and 16 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
953 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children supra note 951 at para 117. 
954 Section 7 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005; Section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
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‘There can also be no doubt that the existence of a statutory provision that punishes forms of sexual expression 
that are developmentally normal degrades and inflicts a state of disgrace on adolescents.955’ 
Further, the limitations of the criminal law’s sanctions upon the consenting adolescents failed 
to establish a congruent finality of deterrence regarding any future sexual interactions between 
adolescents.956 Thus, the limitation upon the rights to dignity and privacy proved to be 
unconstitutional by way of an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation of rights.957 The 
position of non-consensual sexual activity between adolescent children, or sexual intercourse 
between an adult and a child, remained unchanged and still subject to the sanctions of the 
criminal law.958 Additionally, sexual interactions between consenting adolescents that are 
separated by a two-year, or more, age gap would still impose criminal liability upon the older 
partner.959 The judgement of the Teddy Bear case binomially rebukes the victimless crime 
created by the provisions of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act, whilst allowing for the categorised freedom of sexual interactions between 
adolescents aged 12 – 16.960  
In reflection of the Teddy Bear case, it is submitted that the harm administered by the 
implementation of the statutory provisions,961 which were found to infringe the Constitutional 
rights of adolescent children, outweighed the perceived internal harm that existed within 
consensual sexual activities of adolescents. Therefore, victimless crimes within South Africa 
appear to be eclipsed by the implementation of the Constitutional prerogatives and a holistic 
understanding of the rights of the aggrieved party. A test regarding the nature of the harm from 
the victimless practice should be conducted within the criminal law’s inquiry of the specific 
victimless crime. Firstly, this should account for the impact of the harm upon the consenting 
individuals, and secondly, the threat such a harm may pose to society; derived from the possible 
exposure of the public to the practice. 
Perhaps the deliverance from victimless crimes may one day encompass the practice of sex 
workers, engaging in commercial sex, within South Africa. This would demand a surge of 
                                                          
955 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (CCT 12/13) [2013] 
ZACC 35; 2013 (12) BCLR 1429 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC); 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC) at para 55. 
956 Ibid at para 87. 
957 Ibid at para 101. 
958 Ibid at para 113. 
959 A. Strode et al ‘Reporting underage consensual sex after the Teddy Bear case: A different perspective’ (2013) 
6 South African Journal of Bioethics and the Law 46. 
960 Ibid., 47. 
961 Sections 15 and 16 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
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support from public policy, along with a contemporary outlook from the legislature regarding 
the currently illegal practice of sex work.962 However, to overcome the legislative anomaly of 
victimless crimes, the legislature itself must confront all avenues of the perceived immoral 
behaviour root and stem. The State, inspired by an ensemble of legal literature, should draw an 
equitable line between private morality and public morality. By virtue of moral pluralism, the 
State should refrain from endorsing a definite private morality and avoid the intrusion within 
the confines of individual intimacy.963 This reflection, however, is not absolute and the State 
may be justified in limiting the practices of private morality if such conduct promises a 
reasonable degree of moderate, or imminent, harm within society.964 Nevertheless, the deep 
civic values of morality, ingrained within the South African Constitution, serve as the guiding 
lights for State intervention in the review of victimless crimes.965  
Perhaps South Africa is orbiting toward a broad attempt in decriminalising specific victimless 
crimes, starting with the personal and private cultivation and use of cannabis. This was 
reflected in the recent 2018 Constitutional Court judgement,966 involving what was coined as 
the ‘dagga couple.’967 The judgement reflects the vast infringement of the criminal law’s 
provisions upon, inter alia, the right to privacy. Zondo ACJ stated that: 
‘In my view, as long as the use or possession of cannabis is in private and not in public and the use or possession 
of cannabis is for the personal consumption of an adult, it is protected. Therefore, provided the use or possession 
of cannabis is by an adult person in private for his or her personal consumption, it is protected by the right to 
privacy entrenched in section 14 of our Constitution.968’  
This is a sterling manifestation of the breaking-down of the often-practised ‘victimless crime’ 
of the use of cannabis within South Africa. This approach is solidified within a defined 
statutory manner in the inspiration of the Constitutional values afforded to all citizens. 
                                                          
962 In the case of S v Jordan (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force as Amici Curiae (CCT31/01) [2002] 
ZACC 22; 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC); 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC) (9 October 2002), the Constitutional Court applied a 
conservative moralistic stance in the criminalisation of commercial sex. The ambit of the precedent extends to 
commercial sex within both the public and private confines of adult interaction. However, it is noted that the 
main consideration of the Court in the Jordan case was to interpret the rights of the parties invovled and to 
determine an adequete extent of a limitation of such rights.  
963 Ibid. at para. 103. 
964 Radebe "The Unconstitutional Criminalisation of Adult Sex Work" (2017) 4. 
965 S v Jordan supra note 962 at para 104. 
966 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince (Clarke and Others Intervening); National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Rubin; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Acton (CCT108/17) [2018]. 
967 L. Persens "Battle Is Far from over, Says Dagga Couple," Eyewitness News, Retrieved from 
https://ewn.co.za/2018/09/21/our-battle-is-far-from-over-says-dagga-couple. (accessed on September 22, 
2018). 
968 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince supra note 966 at para 100. 
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Evidentially, the Constitutional Court did not hold the views of a broad moralistic code to 
overpower the personal moral practices of those that engage in the private use of cannabis. The 
impact of the harm of the practice is clearly confined to the private realm of adult interactions 
and any public exposure of such will not be awarded the same protection as that of the private 
sphere. 
 
5.5 ‘Something in the Way’ - The Susceptibility of Consensual Sadomasochism Falling 
within the Definition of a Victimless Crime 
 
5.5.1 The Position of England and Canada   
 
The practice of private consensual sadomasochism lingers within multiple boundaries of legal 
contemplation. Firstly, this includes the clamour for the practice’s sanctity within the private 
sphere, which is threatened by the potential intrusion of the criminal law. Secondly, the 
autonomy rights that support the private sphere of human interaction may illuminate the 
disambiguation of whether consensual sadomasochism is truly sexual, or violent, within its 
nature.  
Thus, the criminal law is tasked with drawing an equitable line between the restriction of 
personal autonomy and its subservience to the compelling factors of preventing against 
dangerous consensual activities. If the facts of R v Brown were consulted within a 
contemporary reflection, perhaps the approach adopted by the House of Lords may have 
yielded broader definitions regarding the public interest, personal autonomy, morality and the 
right to privacy.969 It is submitted that the victimless nature of consensual sadomasochism may 
not always exist, for the consenting partners themselves dictate the intensity of harm within 
each consensual sadomasochistic encounter. This, in turn, shapes the resolve sought by the 
criminal law to be reflective of the harm that is inflicted between the partners in the specific 
relationship. Where serious, or grievous, bodily harm is intended and inflicted, it is likely that 
a prosecution will be brought forward.  
In the absence of any specific legalisation that outlines consensual sadomasochism as a 
criminal offence, the general nature of the practice falls within the realms of assault. The 
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criminal law of England, Canada and South Africa respectively differentiate between variant 
forms of assault. As a general outline, the crime of assault may occur in common assault, or an 
assault occurring in with intention to do grievous bodily harm (actual bodily harm).970 To 
sustain a prosecution for the crime of assault, an intentional and unlawful application of force, 
or a threat of such force, must be present in the actions of the offender.971 Further, the 
satisfaction of the elements of assault takes flight where there is an unwarranted application of 
force upon the victim.  
Clearly, the uniqueness of individualistic consensual sadomasochistic activities may bring 
different forms of physical harm, inspired by the consent of the partners. This is problematic, 
for the crime of assault is seemingly contradicted, based on the existence of the element of 
consent to the harm by the alleged ‘victim’. However, as explored in the landmark judgement 
of R v Brown,972 consent must fail where a specific degree of harm arises within a consensual 
relationship that is contrary to the public interest. Thus, the public interest endures as a 
resounding and stringent assessor, even within the commission of private consensual harm. 
This limits individual autonomy by controlling the ambit of consent in order to safeguard 
against a prohibited degree of harms arising.  
The recent English judgement of R v BM is worth consideration.973 The judgement referred to 
R v Brown and endorsed the resounding influence the latter has had within the legal sphere of 
England regarding the crime of assault in consensual sadomasochism.974 The facts of R v BM 
involved a tattoo artist known as ‘BM’,975 who was charged with three counts of actual bodily 
harm.976 The nature of committed harm fell within the outline of Section 18 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act.977 The appellant, a trained tattoo artist and body piercer, had acquired 
the consent of his customers to perform body modification; although he did not possess any 
medical training, nor were the modification procedures performed under aesthetic.  
The principles entrenched in R v Brown were used to limit the defence of consent to the charges 
of wounding with intention to commit grievous bodily harm. Even though the wounding which 
                                                          
970 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 580, 586. 
971 Ibid. 
972 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
973 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560. 
974 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
975 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560. 
976 The appellant had removed a customer’s ear; removed a customer’s nipple; and had split the tongue of a 
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977 Section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
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was caused by the body modification procedure was consensual, the Court of Appeal was alive 
to the inherent risk and danger of the practice being performed by an individual who was not a 
qualified surgeon. Apart from the absence of the standard methods of surgery, the Court of 
Appeal noted that the customers of the appellant were not aware of the risks of the procedure, 
along with any possible complications which may arise. The absence of a regulated system 
over the practice of body modification did not support the defence of consent to the grievous 
bodily harm raised by the appellant and proved to be a danger to the interests of the public. 
Therefore, no social utility was found in the body modification procedure and a prosecution 
was indeed effected. R v BM is reminiscent of Brown for it was accepted that in order to consent 
to bodily harm, the consensual conduct itself must exist within a recognised category of 
exemption.  
It is worth noting that a special exemption may exclude liability for the harm inflicted within 
consensual sadomasochism and will create a barrier of protection against State interference 
within the private activities of consenting individuals.978 This, as considered in R v BM, is the 
recognition of a social utility within a practice and the tolerance a court may allow to the 
consensual wounding of a person. However, consensual sadomasochism has found no refuge 
within an exempted category to the crime of assault, based on the unpredictability and severity 
of the harm that may potentially exist within the consensual dynamic.  
To the House of Lords in Brown,979 and later the Court of Appeal in R v BM,980 the degree of 
consensual harm may be sufficient to cause grievous bodily harm and even death.981 Thus, the 
assessment of the harm caused will determine the extent of the criminal law’s intrusion within 
private matters concerning victimless crimes. This can be done by drawing an equitable line 
within the assessment of valid consent between permissible harm and impermissible harm.982 
The inquiry shall highlight minor consensual injuries that bring transient harm and serious 
consensual injuries that manifest in grievous bodily harm. Even if the physically harmful 
activities are consensual and private in their nature, the implementation of a criminal 
prosecution will be justified by the benchmark of this harm inquiry where grievous bodily harm 
or death occurs.983  
                                                          
978 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560 at para 24. 
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980 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560. 
981 Ibid at para 29. 
982 Ibid at para 30. 
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The case of R v Wilson involved the crime of assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm, 
yet the State refrained from implementing a prosecution as the consensual activity occurred 
between husband and wife and was likened to the accepted act of tattooing.984 It is submitted 
that it will be disjunctive if the criminal inquiry is solely based on the dynamic of the private 
matrimonial relationship. 985 As explored in the case of R v Brown, the benchmark for a criminal 
prosecution regarding the commission of an assault from consensual bodily harm is the 
occurrence of actual/grievous bodily harm, or death. Even if the practice is branded as a 
victimless crime, which is hinged upon the consensual nature of the desired harm, a threshold 
of permissible exemptions must be interpreted in light of the nature and risk of the harm. Thus, 
grievous bodily harm will involve far more than a mere infliction of a wound and such shall 
bring the breakage of the skin or other forms of serious injury to the human body.986  
The case of Regina v Emmett,987 however, diverts from the confines of the Wilson case and 
follows the considerations of the prohibited degrees of consensual harm expressed in Brown. 
Clearly, the equitable balance between consent to physical harm must be interpreted in light of 
the harm that transcends transiency and exits as actual, or grievous, bodily harm. In this 
consideration, consent as a defence to the infliction of the harm is rendered immaterial, as the 
nature of the harm, along with the compelling strides of the public interest, outweighs the 
individualistic desires of the participants. This, once again, is a reflection of a defined outline 
regarding the prohibited harm one may not legally consent to, as followed by the Court of 
Appeal in R v BM.988 This appears to be the suitable assessment of interpreting the nature of 
harm within consensual sadomasochistic encounters by removing any possibility of the 
judiciary’s personal morality in influencing a judgement.989  
The prosecution of assault that brought bodily harm in the case of Emmett, and the abstinence 
in effecting a prosecution in Wilson, casts a veil of confusion in relation to the criminal law’s 
interpretation of consensual sadomasochism that brings bodily harm.990 The duality between 
these cases tests Article 14 of the ECHR that prohibits, inter alia, discrimination based on 
                                                          
984 R v Wilson (1996) 2 CR App Rep 241. 
985 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560 at para 33. 
986 Ibid at para 37. 
987 Regina v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710. 
988 R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560. 
989 The judgement of R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 has been scrutinised as being influenced by the personal moral 
views of the majority, rather than the equitable balance of the provisions of the criminal law.  
990 It is important to note that both cases involved similar physical harm that manifested in the form of grievous, 
or actual, bodily harm.  
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sexuality.991 This consideration is essential for compliance by the judiciaries of the relevant 
international spheres that interpret criminal cases involving consensual sadomasochism. In 
reflection of Article 14, it is submitted that a personal moralistic tenant should not influence 
the criminalisation of private consensual sadomasochism, but rather, such should be branded 
as criminal where grievous bodily harm, or death, is caused.   
Thus, an equitable balancing of the criminal propensity of consensual sadomasochism, even if 
such occurs as a victimless crime, should be conducted in the assessment of the specific harm 
from the consensual relationship itself. Clearly, if consensual sadomasochism is practised in 
the public sphere, such may be sufficient to send shockwaves through the public, based on the 
intensity of the depicted harm. However, the intricacy of consensual sadomasochism arising in 
the private confines of adult interaction exists in isolation to the public knowledge. It is 
submitted that the practice of consensual sadomasochism within the private sphere mitigates 
the exposure of the harm by confining the risks to the participants alone. The definition of a 
victimless crime is apparent in this viewpoint, for the harm is restricted to only those who 
willingly partake in the consensual sadomasochistic activities. 
The social convictions and moral beliefs of the community at large are only probed once the 
consensual private behaviour is exposed to the public. Under Article 8 of the ECHR, the respect 
for one’s privacy is contained as a fundamental human right.992 However, the Article does make 
mention that the State, or a public authority, may limit the right to privacy where such is 
necessary within a democratic society.993 This submission is paramount in conjunction with the 
degree of prohibited harm from consensual sadomasochism, as explored within the leading 
English cases. The investigation into the reasonable limitation of one’s private life by the 
intrusion of the criminal law will account for the prevention of harm that may infringe, inter 
alia, the public safety, security, health, morals and the sanctity of human rights.994    
The explored legal spheres of England and Canada within Chapter 2 of this dissertation proves 
that a culmination of legal factors must be considered when prosecuting consensual 
sadomasochism under the banner of the criminal law. The validity of personal autonomy of the 
consenting partners is not absolute, as the ECHR allows for the reasonable and justified 
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limitation of the extendibility of autonomy rights such as privacy.995 Therefore, freedom to 
consent to actual bodily harm that brings serious injury will be eclipsed by the combined values 
of the criminal law, the public interest, and public policy. This will inevitably nudge private 
consensual sadomasochism toward the definition of a victimless crime as such is justified, 
based on the nature of the harm and the potential risk of the practice itself. Where the practised 
harm is below the threshold of grievous bodily harm, private consensual sadomasochism may 
evade criminal prosecution. These submissions outline a clearer approach in the judiciary’s 
interpretation regarding the nature of the harm practised within specific, private, and 
consensual sadomasochistic relationships. However, without a defined legislative guide to the 
validity and acceptance of the practice, the susceptibility of private consensual sadomasochism 
existing as a crime is highly probable in light of its inherent nature to cause assaults.   
Thus, the exposure of the harm emanating from the consensual practice must be sufficient to 
cause potential risk and sufficient harm to the public safety. However, difficulty arises where 
consensual harm exists within the private realms of adult interaction, as the exposure of the 
harm is exclusive to those who consent to the injury. Surely, by application of the findings of 
the Wolfenden Report and by the submissions of the Hart-Devlin Debate, the private confines 
of adult interactions should not be limited by State intrusion where no harm exists outside the 
consensual interactions. By virtue of the precedent shaping landscape of the English and 
Canadian legal spheres, an equitable barrier of permissible harm to consensual injury should 
be determined by the relevant court in accordance with the harm inquiry created in R v Brown 
and the cases that followed.996 As mentioned earlier in this subchapter, if the consensual activity 
of the private encounter transcends the threshold of permissible harm, a limitation upon 
personal autonomy rights may be effected by the criminal law’s sanctions.  
It would be disproportionate if a blanket imposition of the crime of assault were applied to all 
variants of consensual sadomasochistic activities. Where the impact of the harm and 
infringement from the criminal sanction outweighs the harm that is practised within the 
consensual relationship, a prosecution should be avoided. This steers consensual 
sadomasochism away from the ambit of a crime where the harm is minor, or transient in its 
nature. The same cannot be said for consensual sadomasochism occurring in grievous bodily 
harm, or in greater intensities. This investigation should be assessed objectively in light of the 
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values of the criminal law, the public interest, and the policy considerations of the relevant 
jurisdiction.   
 
5.5.2 ‘S.S.C’ and ‘R.A.C.K’: The Internal Controls of Consensual Sadomasochism  
 
The ‘kink’ community is one with stringent rules and safety measures that have formed part of 
the bedrock of its internal society. If conducted in line with the internal controls of the 
community, negotiation and consent are essential within the ideology of safety in the sexual 
dynamic.997 There are two predominate avenues of control that are valued within a consensual 
sadomasochistic relationship. The first consideration is the practice of ‘Safe, Sane and 
Consensual’ interactions (herein referred to by the acronym S.S.C). Secondly, another 
consideration of control is the ‘Risk Aware Consensual Kink’ (herein referred to by the 
acronym R.A.C.K). Both of these concepts will be explored in relation to their influence within 
consensual kink relationships and their attempted mitigation to harm caused between 
participants.  
‘S.S.C’ alludes to a general criterion of consensus that should be existent within consensual 
‘kink’ relationships. Since sadomasochism falls within the bracket of ‘consensual kink’,998 
stringent observations of safety derive heavily from the framework of S.S.C. In the hopes of 
deciphering the linguistic definitions of the acronym, the following submissions must be made:  
 Safety can be defined as the absence of harm, or the risk of injury, within the consensual 
relationship.999  
 Sane asserts the rational mental capacity of the participants that are able to perceive and 
appreciate the nature of the consensual activity.1000  
 Consensual is synonymous to a mutual agreement between the partners regarding the 
acceptance of all particulars, or foreseeable events, of the consensual activity.1001  
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The contents of ‘S.S.C’ propel a definitive and absolute standard within a consensual ‘kink’ 
relationship. To satisfy the objectives of the acronym, one must align both their physical 
conduct and mental bearing to the objective outline of ‘S.S.C’. Clearly, the ‘kink’ community 
creates an objective test for the harm that may be incurred within the consensual ‘kink’ activity. 
This proposes that one is engaging in safe, sane and consensual kink activities, based on the 
alignment of their physical and mental bearings with criteria of the aforementioned definitions. 
Where one or more requirements from this framework are omitted, such may be deemed as 
conduct arising outside the desired scope of a safe, sane, and consensual ‘kink’ activity. The 
difficulty of considering all ‘kink’ activities under the framework of the ‘S.S.C’ is that such 
would limit the subjective diversity of differing ‘kink’ activities. Furthermore, a single, 
stringent safety and control framework does little to accommodate for the varying degrees of 
risk and harm that may be present in other consensual ‘kink’ relationships.   
In minor, yet definitive contrast, R.A.C.K is applied to encourage a framework that is derived 
solely from the subjective dynamic of a specific ‘kink’ relationship. In a reflection of the 
respective roles between the partners, the onus of safety, sanity, and consensual ‘kink’ are 
placed upon the participants within the duality of their relationship. A focus of this framework 
is the bolstering of the internal assessment of harm that is subjectively desired between the 
consenting partners. R.A.C.K encompasses the following objectives for assessment: 
 Risk and the possibility of personal injury created within the dynamic of the relationship 
must be established. This is noteworthy, for the element of ‘safety’ within the specific 
consensual activity is reflected in the light of a ‘risk-awareness’ approach between the 
partners.1002 
 Awareness is pivotal between the participants in the consensual ‘kink’ activity. 
Awareness may be compartmentalised within the knowledge of the risk that is present 
in the relationship and the reflection of the appreciation of the potential harm. 
 Consent, once again, is vital for the negotiation between ‘kink’ partners. A mutual 
agreement must exist, reflecting the appreciation of all particulars, or foreseeable 
events, of the consensual activity. 
 Kink, being the form of sexual expression, is the binding inspiration of sexual 
interaction between the partners.  
                                                          
1002 See the Social Context for the Development of SSC and RACK in "From “SSC” and “Rack” to the “4cs”: 
Introducing a New Framework for Negotiating BDSM Participation." Op cit note 998 above. 
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R.A.C.K is a framework that endures in an awareness-driven approach. This is identifiable to 
the specific will of the participants who belong to a particular consensual kink relationship. 
The subjectivity of the assessment may be valid, only if the partners themselves show a holistic 
manifestation and appreciation of the acronym’s criteria, applied to their sexual dynamic. Thus, 
a partner to the ‘kink’ must display personal awareness to the desired consensual harm, along 
with appreciating the risk of harm that exists within the relationship. If such an appreciation is 
absent, the validity of the relationship fails the awareness-driven test of R.A.C.K. This 
submission reflects the subjectivity of certain consensual ‘kink’ relationships and encourages 
the internal autonomy of the participants to shape the dynamic of ‘kink’,1003 based on their 
informed decisions.1004 R.A.C.K inevitably deviates from the prescribed descriptions of S.S.C, 
allowing for a newer and personalised consensual dynamic between partners.1005  
Thus, the freedom afforded by the guiding frameworks of the ‘kink’ community allows for a 
duality within consensual relationships. It is submitted that not all consensual kink relationships 
will involve the risk of harm, thus the S.S.C methodology may be applied. However, where 
risks are prevalent, the R.A.C.K measures entrench a personalised consensual rubric of 
assessment regarding the appreciation of the harm from such a risk. Ultimately, the consenting 
partners to the activity will choose which framework to follow, based on their autonomous 
desires.1006 This supports the consensual nature of the ‘kink’ dynamic and caters for 
negotiations between the partners in optimising safety by controlling the risk of harm 
internally.  
Consensual sadomasochism may prove to be more sexual in its nature, with violence or 
physical force as an accessory factor. The harm that is caused by consensual ‘kink’ 
relationships should also be interpreted in light of the internal framework chosen by the 
partners. This reflects the internal moralism of the consensual relationship and ignites the 
necessary safeguards for the rights of equality, privacy, dignity, and freedom of expression. 
However, the greater the harm and the more intricate the ‘kink’ relationship, the higher the 
degree of legal scrutiny and intrusion may be. The criminal law may give credence to the 
                                                          
1003 See "Rack vs SSC".  
1004 Ibid. 
1005 J.W. Bean "The SSC Mistake," Within Reality, Retrieved from http://withinreality.com/wp/ssc-mistake/. 
(accessed on 11 September 2018). 
1006 Black "SSC vs R.A.C.K". 
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internal frameworks of the ‘kink’ community, yet will not fully consider these as absolute when 
juxtaposed to its own controls. 
 
5.5.3 Possible Stance within South Africa 
 
To avoid rewording that which has already been explored in this chapter, the South African 
outlook will be influenced by the values of the Constitution and the controls of the criminal 
law if interpreting consensual sadomasochism.1007  
In reflection of that which has been established from both English and Canadian perspectives 
of creating a threshold of permissible harm, the crime of assault will be probed in light of its 
variants within South African criminal law. Common assault, that brings transient and trifling 
harm should not call for a prosecution of private consensual sadomasochism, based on the 
nature of the harm and the autonomous actions of the partners. However, in following the 
approach of R v Brown, a defined threshold of declaring consent to an assault as immaterial 
must be established.1008 It is submitted that this may exist in the definition of an assault with 
intention to do grievous bodily harm, as accounted for by the criminal law of South Africa, 
which causes actual bodily harm.  
Assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm has progressed to reflect that such may 
constitute any harm that is capable of causing serious injury and sufficient to interfere with the 
health of a person.1009 The intention element of this form of assault is potentially satisfied based 
on the agreement between the consenting partners to inflict harm. If a partner desires a severe 
degree of harm to be inflicted upon them, and the corresponding participant agrees, such may 
reflect a candid resonance of the satisfaction of the element of intention. Thus, if the South 
African criminal law were to draw the line of consent to sadomasochism at the commission of 
actual bodily harm from an assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm, consent to the 
harm will fail as a defence for an accused, based on the intensity of the inflicted harm. 
Therefore, it is submitted that consensual sadomasochism which does not bring grievous bodily 
harm may find exemption from prosecution if such a matter is heard before a South African 
court.  
                                                          
1007 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1008 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
1009 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 586. 
164 
 
However, even if the consensual harm occurs in a private setting, the South African criminal 
law may be justified in imposing a criminal sanction over actions that bring actual bodily harm 
in the pursuit of sexual gratification. This plunges certain consensual sadomasochistic activities 
into a victimless crime bracket; and in the dearth of legal literature to this sexual activity, the 
possibility of the victimless crime status is likely to endure. Clearly, if consensual 
sadomasochism were to be practised in the broad spectrum of the public, the exposure of the 
social harm of the practice increases. Perhaps the criminal law may adopt some leniency if 
addressing a matter that involves private consensual sadomasochism that occurs below the 
threshold of grievous bodily harm. 
The Constitution tacitly combats victimless crimes under the Bill of Rights by entrenching the 
fundamental rights of personhood.1010 The right to equality caters for the prevention of 
discrimination by the State regarding, inter alia, sexual orientation.1011 Further, the right to 
privacy may potentially safeguard the existence of specific forms of consensual 
sadomasochism occurring within the private areas of adult interactions.1012 The difficulty of the 
criminal law in finding an avenue of criminalisation for private consensual activities may lie 
within the right to freedom expression.1013 However, sadomasochism is far more than a 
normative sexual activity, and in some instances, promises a degree of physical harm. The right 
to freedom of expression does not condone any form of imminent violence1014, and in turn, 
consensual sadomasochism that brings violence is seemingly divergent to this Constitutional 
provision.   
These aforementioned rights are not absolute and may be limited under the Limitations Clause 
contained within the Bill of Rights.1015 The Constitution acts as the harbinger of validity for the 
consensual practice and its corresponding autonomy rights, however, such may not be absolute 
depending on the nature of the desired harm. This will be interpreted in light of the degree of 
the harm incurred and it is probable that where actual, or grievous, bodily harm arises, a 
criminal prosecution will likely follow. It is submitted that even if the practice is consensual in 
nature, the extent of the harm caused will determine the entry point for the criminal law. Albeit 
a potential victimless crime, the nature of the harm from consensual sadomasochism may prove 
                                                          
1010 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1011 Section 9(3). 
1012 Section 14. 
1013 Section 16. 
1014 Section 16(2)(b). 
1015 Section 36(1). 
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ancillary to the morals created by the Constitution and that which is commonly shared by the 
public interest, public morality, and public policy. Ultimately, a matter that involves consensual 
sadomasochism bringing bodily harm must be assessed in light of its own facts and merits.  
The recent judgement of YG v S offers an interesting contemporary outlook on the South 
African criminal law’s perspective relating to the disciplinary chastisement of children.1016 The 
principles of the judgement are noteworthy in relation to the interpretative outlook on 
disciplinary chastisement being declared as unlawful, based on the infringement such a practice 
brings upon the rights of a child. This may be compared to the possible position a South African 
court might have when determining the validity of consensual sadomasochism that brings 
degrees of bodily harm.  
The judgment reflects the adaptive nature of the South African Criminal law in supporting the 
inherent Constitutional rights of the child, and even extending the crime of assault over the 
actions of a parent who implements this method of discipline. The importance of the judgement 
is that it also considers the defence of reasonableness – reasonable chastisement in the matter 
at hand – and the credibility of such a defence where bodily harm has been administered. 
It was the consideration of the Keightley, J that the common law defence of reasonable 
chastisement is unconstitutional and invalid within the legal system of South Africa.1017  It was 
the opinion of the Court that the common law must be developed in order to emancipate the 
rights of the child in terms of the Constitution and the rights bestowed under the Children’s 
Act.1018 It is evident that the stance of the Court in entrenching, inter alia, the Constitutional 
rights of the child transcended even the consideration of freedom of religious beliefs in the 
present case.1019 The Court was instrumental in interpreting the defence of YG, being that of 
reasonable chastisement, and eventually ruled in favour of upholding and protecting child-
orientated rights within the South African legal system.  
In determining what was reasonable, the Court noted the following:  
“In determining what is reasonable or moderate, much will depend on the facts of each case. Our courts have 
indicated that regard must be had to factors such as: 
                                                          
1016 YG v S (A263/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 290; 2018 (1) SACR 64 (GJ) (19 October 2017). 
1017 Ibid.  
1018 Ibid at para 61.  
1019 The accused father (YG) had pleaded that it was within the freedom of his religious convictions to apply 
corporal punishment as a form of discipline over his child, after he had found his son watching pornography. 
Accordingly, he raised the defence of reasonable chastisement of his child in the wake of his charge.  
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1.) the nature of the child's disciplinary infraction; 
2.) the motive of the person administering the punishment; 
3.) the degree of force applied; 
4.) the object that was used to administer the punishment; and 
5.) the age, sex and build of the child.1020” 
 
Keightley, J stated the following: 
“It is important that the State is empowered, rather than shackled, by the arsenal at its disposal to investigate, 
prevent and protect children from harmful and potentially harmful situations.1021” 
Upon a critical analysis of the above-mentioned statement, it is evident that the State is 
equipped with an inventory of legal aids to protect and interpret the rights of children when 
faced with acts that would infringe such rights. This outlook may be also give clarity to the 
position of a Court when interpreting consensual sexual violence that brings bodily harm, and 
may progress such beyond the notion of a victimless crime. Just as children’s rights are 
protected, so too may the submissive’s rights be safeguarded where consensual bodily harm 
has been administered. The consideration of reasonableness as a defence with regard to 
consensual sadomasochism that brings bodily harm may rightly follow the considerations of 
the Court in YG. It must be stressed that there is no defence of reasonable sadomasochism 
within South African law, and so the defence of ‘reasonableness’ to the harm caused will be 
shaped upon a case-by-case basis and within its contextual definition. This will aid the relevant 
Court in determining whether the harm administered transcends the ambit of reasonableness to 
the specific consensual relationship. 
In order to determine a defence of reasonable harm to consensual sadomasochism, the 
following should be considered: 
Firstly, it would be appropriate for a South African court to assess such a defence upon the 
degree of harm which is administered by a dominant upon the submissive. As explored in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, the commission of serious, or grievous bodily harm is the probable 
                                                          
1020 YG v S (A263/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 290; 2018 (1) SACR 64 (GJ) (19 October 2017) at para 34. 
1021 Ibid at para 79.  
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entry point for prosecution of consensual sadomasochism. Where said harm is caused, it is 
likely that the defence of reasonableness will hold little merit for an accused.1022  
Secondly, where items or objects are used to inflict the consensual harm, such may override 
the concept of reasonableness with regard to the given practice, as the force of the intended 
harm is heightened. A Court will also consider the motive of the person administering the 
bodily harm or punishment.1023 Importantly here, consensual sadomasochism lacks a societal 
conviction and the motive for inflicting the violence is for the sexual benefit of the consenting 
partners.1024 This would prove to discredit the defence of reasonableness for the commissioning 
of bodily harm in the practice of consensual sadomasochism if found before a South African 
court.  
Thirdly, and in consideration of the force and nature of the harm caused, a court would be alive 
to the infraction of the rights of the submissive within a consensual sadomasochistic 
relationship. A defence of reasonableness in this stead would be hinged against the State’s 
obligation of safeguarding the rights to bodily safety and security, along with the protection of 
the submissive’s inherent dignity.1025 Where a court views that the consensual harm is too 
severe, the actions of the accused would translate to the crime of assault.1026  
The considerations of the case of YG extend to the clarity of consensual sadomasochism and 
the practice being considered a crime if the harm caused between the partners extends into 
serious, or grievous, bodily harm. Additionally, such may find prosecution where the 
consensual harm is inflicted in great force and disregards the rights safety and dignity of the 
submissive. The onus of proving said infringements must be borne by the State and it is 
imperative that such an investigation is conducted in relation to the specific consensual 
relationship.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Victimless crimes appear to be existent in continuous judicial debates across the legal 
jurisdictions of the world; yet, positive steps have been taken to rid a legal system of such 
                                                          
1022 Ibid at para 70. 
1023 Ibid at para 34. 
1024 As was explored in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
1025 YG v S (A263/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 290; 2018 (1) SACR 64 (GJ) (19 October 2017) at paras 40 and 72. 
1026 Ibid at para 74.  
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anomalies. Moralism may once have existed as a battering-ram for the criminal prosecution of 
victimless crimes, however, such appears to be dwindling in the contemporary legal spheres of 
the world. It has been explored that the application of the law itself should serve as the final 
arbiter regarding a practice that is considered ‘morally divergent’ and a holistic balancing of 
the interests of the accused and the State must take flight. If the harm practised by a consensual 
and private activity outweighs the protected rights of the State, a valid classification of a 
victimless crime shall occur. It is likely that if consensual sadomasochism is found before a 
South African court, a prosecution is likely to occur where the harm practiced falls within the 
definition of actual, or grievous, bodily harm.  
The act of consensual sadomasochism may fall within criminality and face prosecution where 
the State can prove that the actions of an accused has brought serious, or grievous, bodily harm 
that has infringed the rights of safety and dignity of a person. If an accused were to raise the 
defence of reasonableness in regard to the inflicted harm, such will be assessed in light of the 
nature of the harm caused, along with the force applied and the motive in administering such 
violence. This, in turn, may bring consensual sadomasochism out of the victimless crime 
consideration and apply definitive criminal sanction over said activities.  
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CHAPTER 6: AMALGAMATION OF THE ARGUMENTS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
6.1 Summary of the Research Findings 
 
The case of R v Brown and its retinue of developing matters from both England and Canada 
may undoubtedly influence the possible stance of the South African Criminal law regarding 
the legality of consensual sadomasochism.1027 Where consensual sexual violence arises in 
varying degrees of bodily harm, it is likely that the criminal law will launch a multi-faceted 
investigation into the harm caused. This will also give credence to the specific Constitutional 
rights of the participants. The debate surrounding the validity of consensual sadomasochism 
may borrow a judicial perspective from the positions of England and Canada in sculpting a 
guiding rubric for the South African legal sphere. However, without specific legislation that 
outlines the validity of the varying degrees of harm emanating from consensual sexual 
violence, the existing legislation and common law positions of South Africa are the probable 
avenue of accessibility for a court to determine such matters. The inquiry of a court will be 
hinged upon the nature of the consensual relationship and the degree of the harm caused by the 
partners.  
The premise of this dissertation intended to determine the response of the criminal law to 
private displays of consensual sadomasochism, as it is within this network where the greatest 
infringements of personality rights arise by both the actions of the participants and the possible 
intervention by the State. It was not the intention of this dissertation to determine whether 
consensual sadomasochism may be classified as predominantly violent, or a form of sexual 
expression. Merely, this dissertation sought to interpret the relevant case law and supporting 
pieces of legal literature to draw a predictive outline of the South African law’s approach if a 
similar matter arises within its jurisdiction. Further, consensual sadomasochism practised in 
the public sphere was not the focus of the dissertation, for a prosecution of the practice is highly 
likely in this medium, based on the widespread exposure of the harm to the public. The legal 
validity of consensual sexual violence within the private confines of adult interaction is a far 
                                                          
1027 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
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more intricate web to decipher, yet the dissertation has considered multiple areas of inquiry 
that potentially outline the direction of a South African court if faced with such a matter. 
Thus, it is suggested that just as the criminal law interprets dangerous consensual activities that 
bring variant degrees of bodily harm, it should also adopt a similar approach when dealing with 
private consensual sadomasochism. Within the early investigation of valid consent to bodily 
harm, the applicability of the common law doctrine known as the volenti non fit iniuria takes 
flight. Even though such has greater application in the law of delict, the criminal law may 
rightly borrow from this doctrine in the assessment of consent. This draws inspiration from the 
submissions of chapter two of this dissertation regarding consent to bodily harm – echoing the 
element of intention to cause and receive specific bodily harm. The volenti non fit iniuria 
doctrine may be applied in light of consensual sadomasochism arising in serious bodily harm 
in the South African legal system. This will reflect the voluntary acceptance of the risk of a 
partner to the consensual harm and the waiving of their right to claim damages, or effect a 
prosecution, against the harm-bringer if the outlined harm arises.1028 However, the intensity of 
the harm that is practised greatly moulds the application of the doctrine and it may not always 
exist as the clear-cut colloquialism of ‘he who consents cannot be injured.1029’  
Chapter two found limitation in the exploration of the South African perspective on varying 
degrees of consent to bodily harm. The jurisdictions of England and Canada drew the line of 
invalidly of consent at the occasioning of actual bodily harm practised in consensual 
sadomasochism. The criminal law of South Africa highlights two forms of assault, namely 
common assault and assault within intention to do grievous bodily harm. In the hopes of 
following the guidelines of the international precedents, a South African court may draw an 
equitable line regarding the invalidity of consent to sadomasochism where grievous bodily 
harm arises, even if the element of consent is present.1030  
Therefore, the objective of chapter two was to illustrate a coherent balance between the extent 
of valid consent to bodily injury and the entanglement of consensual sadomasochism in this 
inquiry. It was explored that this investigation will be determined by the nature of the harm 
caused within the consensual relationship and that valid informed consent is not an absolute 
defence to avoid criminal liability where grievous bodily harm arises. Evidently, chapter two 
                                                          
1028 See Plumridge v Road Accident Fund (2656/2009) [2012] ZAECPEHC 48 (7 August 2012) at para 11. 
1029 See Roux v Hattingh (636/11) [2012] ZASCA132 (27 September 2012) at para 41. 
1030 See S v Ngubeni (A459/2008) [2008] ZAGPHC 178 (17 June 2008) at para 25. 
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highlights the volenti non fit iniuria doctrine’s correlation with public policy and various 
protected autonomy rights of the consenting sadomasochists.  
Under chapter three, public policy prerogatives of England, Canada, and South Africa were 
respectively probed in juxtaposition to harm caused by consensual sadomasochism. This 
inquiry, feeding off the thread from chapter two, considered a contemporary outlook of public 
policy and its toleration of consensual harm that brings varying degrees of bodily injury. 
Specifically, the chapter drew inspiration from the developments of the law reform 
commissions of the England and Canada, which focussed on the prevention of harm unto the 
members of the public. The consideration of the ‘Social Utility’ principle, regarding the validity 
of a consensual sadomasochistic practice,1031 was disputed as being inadequate to stand as the 
sole reason to criminalise such conduct.1032 The Law Reform Commission of the England 
notably attempted to shed a clear resurgence of public policy and its interpretation of the variant 
harms caused within private consensual sadomasochism. In terms of its more notable 
submissions, the Commission proposed that the policy considerations would not allow the 
validity of consent to excuse criminal liability where seriously disabling injury is practised.1033 
This exists as a paramount contemporary position, as it is aimed at the prevention of widespread 
harm unto members of the public and to control the practices of private consensual 
sadomasochism that brings such serious harm.1034 Further, the chapter outlined the growing 
social prominence of sadomasochistic material that exists within the accessibility of the 
contemporary public spheres of the world. 
The aim of chapter three was to show the possible outline of South Africa’s public policy 
considerations to consensual sadomasochism, bringing varying degrees of bodily harm and 
broader social infringement. The content of the chapter projected the legal aids that inhabit the 
considerations of public policy, influenced by the Constitution, as well as the boni mores 
criterion and Ubuntu. These factors mould and guide the possible South African policy 
considerations regarding consensual harm emanating from sadomasochism and the permissible 
degrees such harm may include. The chapter, by the implementation of the aforementioned 
legal aids, arrived at a candid reflection of the duty of care for the autonomy rights of the 
                                                          
1031 Bielefeld ‘The culture of consent and traditional punishments under customary law’ (2003) 145. 
1032 See R v Jobidon 1991 2 SCR 714. 
1033 See para. 10.52 of "Consent in the Criminal Law: A Consultation Paper, No. 139," 146. 
1034 Ibid see para. 2.18 (7), 20. 
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consenting sadomasochists when facing a possible criminal prosecution by the State.1035 Yet, 
the converse exposed that a criminalisation of consensual sadomasochism may be effected 
where the practice is sufficiently probable in causing widespread harm unto the public.  
Chapter four resumed the ignited debate of the sanctity of the autonomy rights of the consenting 
sadomasochists and sought valued direction from the precursor international conventions for 
human rights.1036 The chapter explored the progressive jurisprudential amalgamations of the 
concept of autonomy and narrowed the investigation into three paramount rights, as contained 
within the South African Constitution. The right to privacy1037 echoes the chapter’s drive to 
safeguard the private dwelling of the autonomous actions of the consenting sadomasochists.1038 
It appears that if the State infringes the right to privacy, a collection of other autonomy rights 
will also fall into limitation. The chapter further sought to reflect the right to freedom of 
expression within consensual sadomasochistic relationships and its internal controls and 
limitations, as accounted for by the South African Constitution.1039 The right to human dignity 
brings the most difficulty in terms of jurisprudential clarity, based on its subjective-objective 
construct.1040 This, however, appears to strengthen the argument for the safeguarding of the 
practice of consensual sadomasochism, even in the commission of grievous bodily harm, if the 
harm is truly desired by the injured party as part of their dignity. Therefore, the right to human 
dignity and its creation of an intrinsic bulwark for each individual serves as a potential repellent 
to the criminal prosecution of consensual sadomasochism.  
The broad consideration of chapter four illustrated the conglomerate of human rights linked to 
the practice of consensual sadomasochism within a collaborative nature. It is within human 
dignity that the rights to privacy and freedom of expression may grow, however, section 36(1) 
of the Constitution limits the absoluteness of these rights under a defined and stringent 
framework.1041 The chapter arrived at the conclusion that where an appropriate South African 
court is faced with consensual sadomasochism bringing grievous bodily harm and injury, it 
may rightly limit the autonomy rights that give rise to such harm; namely the rights to privacy, 
                                                          
1035 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 
938 (CC). 
1036 See UN General Assembly "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1948) and Council of Europe 
"Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (1950). 
1037 Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1038 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Limited [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
1039 Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1040 Section 10. 
1041 Section 36(1). 
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human dignity, and freedom of expression. Here, the appropriate balance between the protected 
constitutional rights of the participating sadomasochists and the compelling interests of the 
State may be achieved by the potential limitation of the autonomy rights under section 36(1),1042 
based on the severity of the harm caused. This, however, as explored within the confines of 
chapter four, is dependent upon a case-by-case basis and the individual facts presented before 
the appropriate court.  
Chapter five of the dissertation interpreted the probability of consensual sadomasochism 
enduring as a victimless crime within the South African legal sphere. This penultimate chapter 
showed the detachment of the appropriate international criminal spheres from the influence of 
public morality in shaping a criminal prosecution. Clearly, the South African Constitution 
propels a broad collective moralism by entrenching such values across numerous internal 
provisions, whilst tacitly influencing other pieces of legal literature to adopt a similar stance. 
However, it is likely that the common morality of the broader public may not influence the 
dispensation of the criminal law, as such is likely to derive itself from its statutory virtues. 
Therefore, moral pluralism is an important consideration for an appropriate court to consider 
if interpreting the harm from private consensual sadomasochism and the moral tolerance of the 
practice itself.  
In the absence of any defined statutory or common law definition of consensual 
sadomasochism bringing varying degrees of bodily harm, it is likely that a South African court 
will juxtapose such to either common assault, or assault with intention to do grievous bodily 
harm. Ultimately, private consensual sadomasochism causing transient and trifling harm may 
suffer no criminal sanction, and thus, may evade the definition of a victimless crime and the 
implementation of a prosecution. The penultimate chapter asserted that where the private 
consensual activities bring grievous, or serious, bodily harm, it is necessary for the criminal 
law to effect a prosecution, based on the consensual practice exceeding the desired legal 
threshold of valid consent to bodily harm.1043 A defence of reasonableness to the harm caused 
by an accused will likely fall away where the nature of the harm was serious, or grievous in its 
nature and has infringed the Constitutionally protected rights of a person.1044  
 
                                                          
1042 Ibid. 
1043 See R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560. 
1044 See YG v S (A263/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 290; 2018 (1) SACR 64 (GJ) (19 October 2017). 
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6.2 Recommendations 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
The dearth of legal literature surrounding the South African Criminal law’s interpretation of 
consensual sadomasochism does not leave this practice in a legal void. The case of R v Brown 
and the contemporary case of R v Lock, prove that the growing developments of judicial and 
jurisprudential interpretation of the issue are never static. The case of R v Brown showed the 
initial stance of the English Criminal law to consensual sadomasochism and the application of 
the laws of assault to effect an immediate criminal prosecution. Further, the case outlined a 
desired level of harm that may be practised within consensual sadomasochism that is permitted 
by the current criminal law positions. Moreover, the case sought to establish a defined social 
usage of the practice to permit the validity of consent to actual bodily harm.  
The weakness of this approach, and its inherent problem within the contemporary South 
African legal sphere, is that it ushers a blanket disregard to the autonomy rights of the 
consenting partners. Further, the approach in Brown is problematic within a contemporary legal 
sphere, based on the ever-evolving public policy considerations relating to the acceptance of 
certain consensual sadomasochistic activities. The case of Lock reiterates that a court should 
consider a matter of consensual sadomasochism that brings actual, or in grievous, bodily harm 
upon its own facts and merits. It is probable that a South African court may adopt a similar 
approach as the aforementioned matter where consensual bodily harm is practiced. Through 
the establishment and unravelling of supporting legal literature, the dissertation also advocated 
for the credence of the expansion of public policy and its population of consensual sexual 
activities that bring various degrees of desired bodily harm.  
Without a defined legislative outline, a court may consider the likeness of consensual 
sadomasochism bringing actual, or grievous, bodily harm in light of a role-playing game. This 
option proposes that consensual sadomasochism might be interpreted in the same avenues as 
the rules of a lawful sport and within a reflective internal appeal that is in line with the values 
of the ‘kink’ community. Further, the collection of exploratory research from the cross-
jurisdictional timeline of England and Canada proposes the development of the criminal law in 
safeguarding the personal autonomy rights of the consenting partners in the harm-causing 
relationship. Even if the judiciaries of England and Canada, along with the submissions of their 
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respective law commissions, do not list consensual sadomasochism as an exception to 
prosecution, the legality of the practice may still evade criminality based on the extent of harm 
practiced within the specific consensual relationship.    
 
 
6.2.1 Proposed Recommendations for a South African Court’s Inquiry 
 
Without any defined legislative authority governing the practice of consensual sadomasochism, 
the relevant South African court may consult the existing resources of the criminal law to effect 
an adequate response to the occasioning of serious, or grievous bodily harm. However, a court 
must be alive to the considerations of the nature of the consensual practice, along with the 
recognition of the constitutional rights that protect the participants in their private and 
autonomous actions. Even though some consensual activities may bring grievous bodily harm, 
the relevant court should consider the practice upon its own merits and in light of the internal 
controls that are shared between the partners in inspiration of the standards of the ‘kink’ 
community. The following recommendations serve as a potential guiding rubric for a court in 
South Africa if deciphering consensual sexual violence. These recommendations and 
submissions, inter alia, attempt to guide a balanced and contemporary approach for a South 
African court’s interpretation of the desired consensual harm that is practised and the interests 
of the State in safeguarding the public from receiving such harm.  
 
i) Informed Consent 
Informed consent is essential between the consenting partners to the sexual activity 
which brings bodily harm. In matters concerning the commission of varying degrees 
of bodily harm from consensual sadomasochism, the dominant should provide all 
particulars of the specific outcome and the true nature of the potential harm from 
the desired practice. The submissive, in turn, should express informed consent in 
their appreciation to partake in the harmful activities by accepting the reasonable 
risk of the potential injury. A submissive may only be considered to have given 
informed consent when they are aware of all material elements of the specific 
consensual activity. Therefore, the injured submissive that has received actual, 
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serious, or grievous, bodily harm must show a holistic appreciation of information 
regarding the specific harm of the practice from the dominant. It is recommended 
that informed consent must be observed between the dominant and submissive for 
the consensual practice to receive a potential exemption from a criminal sanction.   
 
ii) Capacity 
An adult participant must possess the necessary mental competency to partake in 
consensual sadomasochism. The dissertation has shown that adults who partake in 
consensual sexual violence must be imbued with the requisite mental capacity to 
express legally recognised consent to the appreciation of the potential risks of the 
practice. As recommended earlier, such a capacity must exhibit informed consent 
to willingly partake in the consensual sexual violence and a court may be best suited 
in testing this by reviewing the nature of consent between the partners. It would be 
appropriate for a court to consider the submissions of the DSM-V in assessing that 
those who partake in consensual sadomasochism are not mentally impaired.1045  
 
iii) Discrediting the Advanced Consent of an Injured Submissive 
Some consensual sadomasochistic activities may render the submissive 
unconscious. In this regard, it is recommended that advanced consent given by a 
submissive will not be a defence to certain physically harmful activities inflicted 
upon their body whilst they dwell in a state of unconsciousness. For consent to 
serious, or grievous, bodily harm to be considered as valid by a South African court, 
the injured submissive must be aware of the specific harm at the time of its 
infliction.  
 
iv) Minority Protection in the Facilitation for Freedom of Sexual Expression 
Those who partake in consensual sadomasochism may be considered as a minority 
sexual group. The duty of care upon the State to safeguard the freedom of sexual 
expression between the consenting adults correlates to the protection of sexuality 
rights. 
                                                          
1045 American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 ed.  (2013). 
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It is probable that the members of the ‘kink’ community might find solitude in the 
enjoyment of their private acts of sexual expression if the State takes proactive 
measures in the safeguarding of the right itself.  
This may be achieved by the recognition of an accused’s sexuality rights if an 
inquiry is made by a court. However, such rights may be limited where the 
enjoyment of said rights infringes other Constitutional rights and the notions of 
public health and safety within the notions of public policy.  
Therefore, it is necessary for the State to tread carefully when attempting to limit 
the right to sexual expression when implementing a criminal prosecution against 
consensual sadomasochism which brings bodily harm. 
 
v) The Flight of Subjective Human Dignity  
Amongst the myriad of jurisprudential strides regarding human dignity, it is 
important for the State to acknowledge the subjective aspect of human dignity that 
is intrinsic to the specific consensual relationship. This will allow for the 
blossoming of the right to human dignity in the autonomous actions of the partners, 
as inspired by the concept of Ubuntu. Further, the subjectivity of the internal human 
dignity shared by the partners may be drawn from each consensual sadomasochistic 
inquiry involving variant degrees of bodily harm. Perhaps the State may mitigate a 
criminal prosecution against serious, or grievous, bodily harm emanating from the 
consensual practice if it were to consider consensual sadomasochism as forming 
part of the fundamental human dignity of the participants. 
 
vi) The Permissibility of Privacy in Consensual Sadomasochism 
The private sphere may not be arbitrarily infringed by the involvement of the 
criminal law to contain the potential widespread harm, permeating from the 
consensual relationship. Perhaps an inquiry into the private realm of consensual 
adult interactions may only be effected if the interests of the State, its criminal law 
and its policy considerations outweigh the interests of the participants. 
 
vii) The Limiting of Autonomy Rights 
It is recommended that section 36(1) of the Constitution be applied if a court is able 
to prove that the limitations of the autonomy rights are reasonable and justifiable 
within an open and democratic society. An objective inquiry must be considered by 
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a court in this stead, whilst holistically reflecting the concord of the specific 
consensual sadomasochistic relationship.  
 
viii) Public Interest and Influence: Sexual Gratification in the Contemporary Policy 
Considerations 
Even though sexual gratification has not yet formed an exemption to the inflicted 
degrees of consensual bodily harm, it is prudent for a court to consider the 
development of the practice of sadomasochism. The cases explored in chapter two 
of the dissertation may influence a South African court to interpret the consensual 
practice as a private sexual act, rather than an immediate demonstration of assault. 
However, even if instances dictate that an individual should not be the recipient of 
a criminal prosecution; the activity itself is not rendered lawful based on this 
consideration. It is likely that where grievous bodily harm is practiced, the influence 
of the public interest would nudge a court toward implementing a prosecution 
against an accused.  
 
ix) Internal Controls of the Kink Community  
It is recommended that a court consider the values of Safe, Sane and Consensual 
practices, along with the reflection of a Risk Aware Consensual Kink relationship 
if deal with consensual sadomasochism bringing bodily harm. This creates 
objective criteria for a court to assess the severity of the consented harm in light of 
the standards of the kink community, whilst also allowing for the subjective 
assessment of the internal dynamic of the sexual activity. This allows for the 
internal rules of the kink community to flourish as a consideration of the court in 
giving credence to the validity of the consensual practice. The existence and use of 
a safe word during the consensual practice may also prove vital for the inquiry of a 
court, as such reflects the internal controls utilised by the partners themselves and 
the voluntary rescindment of consent to the sexual activity. 
 
It must be noted that these internal rules of the minority community may not 
necessarily rescue consensual sadomasochism which brings grievous bodily harm 
from State prosecution. It may, however, act as a mediator between the purport of 
the criminal law and the interpretation of the facts of the matter. The unregulated 
code of the kink community serves predominantly as a substantive interpreter of the 
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specific relationship that has brought consensual bodily harm and may aid the 
inquiry of a criminal court if assessing a similar matter.  
 
x) Promotion of Public Health and Morality 
The quintessential aspects of the criminal law’s safeguards, as well as the policy 
considerations of South Africa, relate to the prevention of harm from befalling 
members of the public. It is probable that a court may attempt to safeguard the 
bodily safety, security and integrity of the injured submissive; as inspired by section 
12 of the Constitution in implementing a criminal sanction. However, a broad social 
morality should not influence the dispensation of the criminal law and it is 
recommended that Constitutional morality should endure as the bedrock of the 
concept. 
 
Where the severity of the inflicted harm arises in the form of serious, or grievous, 
bodily harm, it is likely that the State will favour the safeguarding of public health 
and morality and will inflict a criminal prosecution over the consensual conduct. It 
is unlikely that the subjective rights of the consenting adult partners will triumph 
over the Constitutional imperatives owed to the public as a whole where the above-
mentioned form of bodily harm is practiced.  
 
xi) Reasonableness and Degrees of Permitted Private Harm 
Transient and trifling consensual injuries should not call for a criminal sanction. 
However, where the harm incurred results in actual, or grievous, bodily harm, it is 
recommended that the State should effect some element of paternalism and limit 
the personal autonomy of the participants.  
It is vital that a defined manner of permitted harm be established by the findings of 
a court, based on the merits of the matter itself. A defined and permitted rubric of 
consensual private harm shall avoid the unanimous collection of all consensual 
sadomasochistic cases suffering from the brand of a victimless crime. It is probable 
that by the close of such a criminal inquiry, the prohibited ground of consensual 
harm in the form of sadomasochism is likely to be the commission of serious, or 
grievous, bodily harm. Thus, permissible harm is any other harm that is not serious, 
or grievous, or harm that brings death. 
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Additionally, the defence of reasonableness with regard to the inflicted consensual 
harm is unlikely to hold any merit for an accused where serious or grievous bodily 
harm is practiced. This is indicative of the Constitutional values, namely the safety 
to bodily integrity and prevention of bodily harm, a court is likely to follow and 
uphold when protecting the rights of the injured partner.   
It is unlikely for the State to set the benchmark for intervention at transient and 
trifling consensual harm that falls outside of the definition of serious, or grievous, 
harm. Therefore, where the latter of the harm arises as a result of consensual 
sadomasochism, it is likely that such shall be met with State prosecution. This 
illustrates the seriousness of the injury and that consent, nor reasonableness of the 
specific harm, are insufficient in establishing a defence to the consensual harm.  
 
xii) Consideration of the Impact from Media Influences 
The now-famous literary piece known as ‘Fifty Shades of Grey’ is but a mere 
granule within the developing avalanche of sadomasochistic material within the 
public sphere. It is recommended that a court should consider these contemporary 
influences as a noteworthy facet in the potential criminal inquiry. Additionally, a 
court should be alive to the consideration of the exposure such material might have 
in influencing the private interactions of consenting adults. It is further submitted 
that this may directly induce the actions of consenting partners to mimic and 
recreate such depictions, as seen in R v Lock, in private interactions and propel the 
spread of consensual sadomasochism. Judicial deliberation in this stead should 
interpret the matter upon its own facts and merits and consult the influence of the 
sadomasochistic material in relation to the bodily harm caused.  
 
xiii) Creation of Guidelines for Consensual Harm 
From a predictive outlook, any tearing of the skin releasing blood, the breakage of 
bones, or death of the consenting partner will transcend the desired South African 
policy considerations of permissible harm between consenting adults. The infliction 
of grievous bodily harm as a result of consensual sadomasochism is probable to 
endure as the benchmark for a criminal prosecution to be administered by the State. 
 
It is recommended that this form of serious physical infliction within the private 
sphere of adult interaction be cautioned against by positive action on part of the 
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State. Ultimately, the positive action on part of the State is likely to be a criminal 
prosecution where said harm arises. Without a specific statutory definition of 
consensual sadomasochism bringing serious, or grievous, bodily harm, perhaps the 
State may attain the greatest guidance under the eventual direction of the South 
African Law Reform Commission. It is recommended that if a matter of consensual 
sadomasochism finds itself before a South African court, an investigation by the 
South African Law Reform Commission would be most beneficial for the 
development of, inter alia, the criminal law’s position relating to such a consensual 
practice.  
 
The reach of the Law Reform Commission’s investigation and research will 
undoubtedly spur valid legal recommendations as to the permissible degrees of 
bodily harm that may be inflicted within such practices. The possible findings, 
suggestions, and recommendations of the South African Law Reform Commission 
may ease the validity of the practice’s transition into broader legal acceptance, 
whilst also outlining prohibited forms of physical harm. In turn, these submissions 
will be proposed to Parliament and the relevant provincial legislatures, giving rise 
to potential future legislation dealing specifically with consensual sexual violence 
and its variant internal practices. 
 
6.3 Final Remarks 
 
The overall intention for the study of this research dissertation was to determine the probable 
stance of the South African criminal law in interpreting private and consensual sadomasochism 
that brings varying degrees of bodily harm. Based on the findings from relevant foreign and 
national sources of legislation, case law and policy considerations, it is probable that 
consensual sadomasochism bringing transient and trifling harm will not be subject to 
immediate criminal sanction. However, it is fathomable that an injury that brings serious, or 
grievous, bodily harm will be subject to the inquiry of the criminal law, even if committed 
within the private confines of consensual adult interactions. If arising within the South African 
legal sphere, consensual sadomasochism must be the recipient of a broad legal interpretation 
to determine its validity. This is attributed to the personality rights that are intrinsic to the 
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consenting partners and their possible limitations by application of the Constitution, the 
doctrine of public policy and the current criminal law.  
The issue of consensual sadomasochism is one that is unique within South African 
jurisprudence. The reach of informed consent to physical injury, tied to the values of personal 
autonomy of the consensual practice, is entwined within the viewpoints of the current policy 
considerations of South Africa. This issue will inevitably simmer in the boiling pot that would 
be the eventual judicial review of the consensual practice that brings serious bodily harm. 
Reflectively viewed, the stance of the South African law to consensual sadomasochism, 
bringing varying degrees of bodily harm, is a pressing incentive for exploration, as shown by 
the growing sexual content and influences within the contemporary society. 
The English case of R v Brown notably established the position of the relevant international 
jurisdictions where matters arising in consensual sadomasochism were brought into legal 
scrutiny. However, the antediluvian methods and approaches of R v Brown, which proposed, 
inter alia, State-control over private and autonomous adult interactions, prove unfounded 
within the current South African legal system. It is probable that if a South African court hears 
a matter of consensual sadomasochism, it would likely follow the contemporary guise set out 
in R v Lock by interpreting the facts of each case on their own merits regarding the practiced 
consensual harm. This approach, inter alia, will give credence to the personal autonomy of the 
participants, the safeguarding of relevant personality rights of the participants and the current 
policy considerations related to the matter itself.  
It would have been impractical for the research to delve into consensual sadomasochism 
practised within the public sphere, for the exposure of the harm and the risk of injury are no 
longer restricted to the private realm. Perhaps the impact of widespread exposure to consensual 
sadomasochism within the public sphere is a debate for another academic piece. Ultimately, if 
this research were to be conducted, such may draw significantly on the preventative controls 
of the criminal law and the greater criminalisation of the practice itself.  
The Constitutional rights of the participants served as the dissertation’s contrasting argument 
for the protection of their specific personality rights; namely human dignity, privacy and 
freedom of expression. The probability of consensual sadomasochism falling within the bracket 
of a victimless crime rests upon the duality of the nature of the specific practice and the manner 
in which it occurs. Ultimately, the revelation of the research dissertation showed that where 
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serious, or grievous, bodily harm is inflicted in private settings, a prosecution of the consensual 
practice must be effected.  
It is submitted that a core moralistic creed regarding the legal validity of the practice may only 
be derived from the Constitutional prerogatives and not the viewpoints of the broader public 
morality, nor the internal opinions of the minority groups that practice sadomasochism. When 
interpreting private consensual sadomasochism bringing serious, or grievous bodily harm, the 
relevant South African court may rightly limit the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. 
However, in consideration of these final thoughts for the dissertation, the subjective value of 
human dignity, which may be associated in the effecting of the consensual practice, must be 
acknowledged and protected within the State’s potential inquisition. The positive duty of care 
owed by the South African law in propelling human rights, public health, and societal safety is 
etched across the broad canvases of numerous pieces of legal literature. It should be the 
consideration of a South African court to observe the aforementioned safeguards, especially in 
the protection of minority sexual groups and their individual autonomy in the enjoyment of 
their Constitutional rights. 
The possible textual aids for a court’s interpretation of consensual sadomasochism may be 
borne from the development of the specific crime of assault, along with any supporting 
legislative guides of applicability regarding the issue.1046 However, a potential proposal from 
the South African Law Reform Commission shall provide the necessary research, 
interpretation, and definition of the Constitutional validity of consensual sexual violence in a 
holistic sense. This shall be beneficial for the overall balancing of the interests of the South 
African State, its public policy considerations and its criminal laws, as weighted against the 
autonomous interests of the participants to the consensual practices. The South African legal 
system should not shy away from such future developments and legal intrigue, as it is within 
the core of the country’s democracy to be ‘strong in will; to strive, to seek to find and not to 
yield’ in the presence of any legal anomalies. 1047  
 
 
                                                          
1046 Section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
1047 K.F. Shoily "Myth and Meaning in Ulysses: Homer, Tennyson and Joyce" (Masters thesis, Brac University, 
2013) 19. 
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